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Abstract 
Týe olit cs of Chile -el-weer 70 ý-: I =A0 is 
analysed in this thesis from he poi^. t of view of `he 
political caries. These are treated as p Arts of a s; s `em 
anrd not considered individually. This allows for a 
iifferent ezp1anation of the actions of the parties and 
the politicians in a process which is vastly known. 
In these twenty years, Chile wen: fr`ml ie-Tocracy, 
destroyed by a brutal coup d'etat, to a sixteen year 
rJictatorship, ený-ied ý'y a very : ý--leý_ reconstruction of a 
renewed democracy. These changes take on a new look if 
seen from the perspective offerer here. 
Taking the party system as the axis of the history, 
the elements of continuity an. i change o servable in the 
collective and individual actors reveal themselves to be 
. Different from established accounts of this era. This 
amounts to a new explanation that makes intelligible 
parts of the process that w,., ere, 1: ntil recently, e: "_plaine 
, sway by moral judgements about the behaviour ofi 
indivicuals. 
Attention is given to properties of the system which 
aie not evident a, first sý g`-: t cut e- erTM i-: e -, the con, -,;, 1ct 
of leaders and org«. nisa+-ions. From this more dist-n}_ 
:0 int of yew it is possible to fir. -_ew meani gs to The 
posit-,. o-_s arl actions of the -mang rotaio nis`s of the 
story, : ifferen a^ain troy the ones that they themselves 
oýfer. 
The first chapters (1 and 2) examine the str.. cture 
of the riiemocratic regime and The role of The -art- system 
in it. Chapters 3 and 4 analyse the dictatorship and its 
attempts to destroy the parties and the parry syste ý, as 
well as the way the parties reappeare, as a model of 
orgardsation : ýrncng the sane forces -ha- s. ýpporte` the 
dictatorship. Chapters 5 and 6 examine the survival of 
the opposition parties and the changes they suffered 
under the dictatorship. The conclu,. ing chapter describes 
the results of all these by looting at the new jemocratis 
regime, the continuity of the party system and the 
changes in it that resulted from its accepting the 
inheritance of the dictatorship. 
ABBREVIATIONS 
AD Allar_za Democrat ica 
(Democratic Alliance) 
AN Acuerdo :: acjor. a (P arg. la Trarsiciör. a -a Ple-: a 
Democracia) 
(Natior! al Agreement [For the Trans tion to Full 
Democracy]) 
CEPAL Comisiön Econ hrrmica Para America Lati-a 
Er' C EconDmr. ic C rrLission for Latin Hmerica and the 
Caribbean 
CNI Central Nacional de Informaciön 
(National Center for Information) 
DII1A Direcci6n , Ie riteligencia Nacional 
(Directorate for National Intelligence) 
IC Izquierda Cristiana 
(Christian Left) 
I-"APU Movimiento de Acciön Popular Unitaria 
(Unitary Popular Action NN"nvement_ ) 
MDP Movimiento Derm. ocrätico Popular 
(Popular Democratic Movement) 
MIR Movimiento je Izquieria Revolucionaria 
(Movement of the Rvolutionary Left) 
MUN Movimiento de Union Nacional 
(Movement of National Union) 
PAIS Partido Amplio de la Izquierda Socialista 
(Open Party of the Socialist Left) 
PC Partido Comunista 
(Communist Party) 
PDC Partido Demöcrata Cris: iano 
(Christian Democrat Party) 
P Partido Nacional 
(National Party) 
PPD Partiao por la Democracia 
(Party for Democracy) 
PR Partido Radical 
(Radical Party) 
PRODEN Progra, -.. _i de Desarrollo Nacior. al 
(National Development Programme) 
PS Part ido Sociaiista 
(Socialist Party) 
RN Rer, ov: aciör. Nacior. al 
(National Renewal) 
UDI Union De-,. cc ra -a_ räependien je 
(Independe-. t Democratic Union) 
UP UT-: idad P, -oular 
(Popular Unity) 
Introduction. The disappearance and restitution of 
dennocracy in Chile :a research problem. 
0.1. The pr--)b1e-r- 
The interprer, ýjtion of recent Chilean political history 
pY :T osPý ir. this work re-, a re efýr_ý i ri of The 
theoretical concepts used to analyse these processes. As 
will be seen, these con--opts A- not derive frcc_ a single 
theory. Rather, components of several theories have been 
adopted to suit the different aspects of a reality, which is 
too complex to be explained by only one theory. It has been 
necessary to select pieces of dil-ýferent theoretical 
frameworks which have proved their worth in the analysis of 
particular historical cases. 
The theoretical apparatus used here to analyse party 
systems, ani is especially concernei with their democratic 
character on the one hand and with their stability or 
instability on the other. One of several factors c(_>nsiderei 
is that of polarisation. This derives from the manner in 
which the or ., nents of the s ,,, stem define -e., 7-selves. It 
relates the party system, as a group of actors, to both the 
symbolic f ramewcrr: (its ie logical expression) ani `o the 
social system. Within this social syst , the parties are 
made i ,, p of actors who seek political represen atior. by r,. eans 
of iioo > ýý ical ropcsals (their (,, -trines and prco c-. armes) 
The theory p'-: t forwar. i ire his s: ud; -.. ill try To corre.: c 
r i. _s ýerspeo'i ive. Ln be TM1La Je ere --o analyse 
those factors whose function is to integrate the political 
syst'-T an whose e isre-: ce TM. eans that . he ia0ýC, cries of the 
individual parties are unable by themselves to define any 
YJ ýYty o the sys±err. as a `otali -- y. Such: a prccerty is 
the degree of polarization of the system. 
These elements are to be found jr. other theoretical 
frameworks which have scuaht to explain aspects of the 
political parties. For e: _arr. cle, the theory of elites (or 
that of oligarchies of Michels) states that these justify 
their existence as guilds of professional politicians by 
means of an ideology. This is sometimes implicit and it 
takes the form of a" national project" . It 
is within this 
generalised ideology of "the party system" that the 
individual ideologies of the parties ore defined. These 
can, at times, show a degree of extreme polarisation in the 
form of alternative projects for the restructuring of 
society. However, the integrated elite takes charge of 
redefining and introducing "realist" to the ideas, which the 
rank and file of the party may have e. --pressed. Thus the 
analysis must assume a greater degree of complexity when it 
tries to place the causes of particular actions on one or 
another ideological level. It must avoij the trap of 
attributing to irJiviiuals the moral responsi', ility for iie 
inc ctrl istrrncies which 'he actions and positions adopL J by 
G creý; nd- ý__ fir `_^e 
existerice of a party system that the actors who make it 
ýr _. r su , rainy «ýe heir :rg, ra --TM. es or--er Zo 
obtain alliances. The first priority of these alliances is 
to maintain the re-a- ionships wh ch keep -he 
together. This creates a chain of subordination which 
extends even to the reýationsh1cs within the parties 
themselves where groups, factions, and iniividual leaders 
must s, a: )c: rdinate their e:. _cressions to the yi.:. y s imposed c, 
participation in the party system. 
The system of parties is an organism open. to the system 
of social domination. The political order expresses this 
domination. Moreover, it is so constitute as to keep this 
domination in being by means of the ideological integration 
of the representatives of different classes. The social 
classes reproduce their positions of dominant and 
subor, Uinate by means of their organisations and ideologies. 
The tact that the party syste, -. contains social class 
ýJiflerences does not automatically mean that it is unstable. 
Prep sals for social reorgar_isatior. may e su criinated -o a 
national project. The parties and the system they make up 
may or may not be pe rTeable to i, eoloaical changes or to the 
demands which social mcvements put forward. This property 
o. she system, a-: its cýssirile relaxic-slnip wiT'h. tree 
system's stability, has almost always been consiered in 
4 
cue ii be The i ea :f rleýat1 v. 7e =e .s. Fr. e_ _ u 
"h-/ rmobilisati', ý_" ir: the case of Chile. 
The coup d' eta, of 1973 cegar. a perki of rr_ilitarý- 
'iictatorship in Chile which. lasted more than 16 years. The 
elections of 1X89 ari the chance of cover crent from Pinocher 
to Aylwin in March 1990 were celebrated as a return to 
democracy. The history of this interruction of democracy in 
Chile, together with its reconstruction, could be told, and 
has, in fact, beer. told from a variety of points of view. 
Many of these accounts, chronicles and analyses have been 
written to justify a particular political position with 
respect to the events themselves. This means that their 
value as historical documents is, from the point of view of 
the present analysis, limited. 
To retrace yet again a story whose main even--s are 
widely known needs justification. Such an undertaking 
should make some new contribution. This is especially the 
case with events widely regarded as being of considerable 
it z, r}ance. What will be attempted here is an analytic 
reconstruction of events as they occurred, taking as a 
starting p int a framework which is, in itsel., not. free 
from ambiguities: the system of political parties in Chile. 
On the one hand, the party system is so controversial that 
even its conditi, rns o' exis'ence are questionable. On the 
other, it is a structure within which The inäivi, äual actors 
1; 
rý fine heir ,: ýý r--i es _r_ey at . r, -te TM: eani_.., 
to their actions. 
To set 1lp the analysis c` two ea es of Chilean pclitics 
ir. this ýýýa1Peý-: r. its us ro avoi i some of he l : es whi. h have 
rjr, minat<., i accounts of this era. I, -,: ieei, these received ies 
also seem to influence the actions of some of the participants 
in the present political scene. are: To bring about a 
different an'r, (it is : r. opei) more effective analysis, two 
questions are fundamental: first Te relationship between 
social forces and their political and ideological expressions; 
second, the meaning of the positions taken up by the main 
political actors. Normally, there are inconsistencies between 
the explicit ideology of political organisations and the 
pos il Eons they assume. These inconsistencies are e. -, plained, 
more often than not, by resortir:.: to (positive or negative 
moral judgements, which result fr: TM. the relationship of a 
given analyst with his subject. The present analysis starts 
from the party system and its context and provides for the 
activities of the parties, allowir: q the conditions in which 
political processes take place to be revealed without 
:i tors irr.. Thus, a c--: T., iex ac'.,: of ti re Sete mining a ,r ors 
to which the political actors (the parties) are 
oblioeJ ros. T: ject themselves is Thrown in --o hi--h relief. 
6 
3recei 1 Jß',. i eas (-vwh ch may e'Ter. ._ ýr. be :"_ _rl 
government circles) which are given alternative reaings 
are: ire this tr. esis are: 
1)That the destruction of the Chilean political system in 1? 73 
was the result of polarisation o the lo^ai ideology --:, 
at least partly, from the outside, by such factors as the 
Cuban revolution. 
2)That this could have been avoided if the Popular Unity and 
the Christian Democrat parties had been able to reach so ße 
kind of agreement. 
3)That Pinochet and his group "opened up" the possibility of a 
return to democracy. 
4)That the make-up of the political alliances at present in 
power in Chile is the result of a new "maturit,, -" and the 
, acceptance of the lessons taught by the past. 
The alternative ideas proposed are: 
1)That the process of polarisation was produced by the 
permeability of the parties, especially those on the left, to 
the demands of the subordinated social classes. If exterior 
ide,: logical radicalisation (then general in Latin America) 
played any part in this, it found expression in radicalisation 
within the party political framework. Exar-. rrles wculi be ' he 
alliances between socialists, communists and others in Popular 
Unity or in left wing groups outside parli, - 
7 
Lý . `". at wr. a- was negotiar , ý-ý- e `-. reeY -r e ýr. ý -star ýem:; cra-s ar g 
the Popular r-ity Party governmen` in 1 73 was the s, rvival of 
the system wr. ýri r_rýý st -an ýerý. c rats were : rowever alres, iy 
committed to its destruction by their subordination to the 
right-wing opposition strategy. 
3)That the transition of power in Chile was result of a 
cccrifrontation in which here was a redefinition of The 
relationships between the forces at work in society ar_i their 
y, y: litical representatives, the parties. Both the width of the 
ideological spectrum and the permeability of the parties to 
social demands were reäetined by means of a reconstruction of 
the party system. 
4)That the agreements and alliances which make up the basis of 
the present reconstructed party system, are a reflection of 
t he i, Jcccological power relationships between different sections 
of the political elite. These relationshius, in turn, stem 
from the way in which the dictatorship redefined the future 
development of Chile. 
0.2. Poli-ical science any history . refine the parries. 
The political parties and the framework within which they 
, spe ate are n,, *, independeni construe Lions which can nýe defiT-: e,. i 
or analys('J without referring to other data or other struct'. ires. 
The empirical approa: ' es which have beer. generally used. -o st ý ;r 
them take their existence as a äiven. However, from the s--art, 
8 
J1J lýsfis are red re- o ; -:: 4 
to the statements they make because of the ý-ri ier iably historical 
-- ture of the pher: orrer_or: ,lr: e parties are rex} rýca' 
l in ked 
in the f1rst place, to the idea of democracy. This concept has 
been the subject of innumerable philosophical, normative and 
scientific discussions. 2 The existence of political parties which 
c, )rrp -e for the right to govern in elections is normally 
considered an indicator of a functioning liberal democratic 
system. Like all indicators, however, his one ^les not exhaust 
the idea of democracy. Nevertheless there exists a consensus 
that if parties and elections do not eist, iemocracy in the 
modern sense of the word cannot be said to exist either. 3 
This competitive democracy, however, gives rise to such 
problems as the nature of the relationship between politics 
an, U society. On the one hand, the e: -. 1stence of different 
parties implies differences of opinion about- who should govern 
and what a government should ý:. It might be thought tha- 
these divisions are simply a product of human nature itself, 
some in-built ambition to possess power, which leads 
individuals to organise themselves in such a way as to obtain, 
exercise and retain it. Yet, since The fo =a--ion of the first 
modern party systems, the notion arose that there existed not 
1 The most , ece: t exanp1e is the ti `le the book by Scott Mainwaring: 
hýtr; i: üi^" Parry ystems in the Third Wa e cf -emccra i sat'on. 
See Giovanni Sartori: Teoria de la democracia, 2 vciLUnes. 
Scott Mainwariro and Timothy R. Scully (Eds. ) Buildi,:.; Democratic 
Institutions: Party Systems i:: La-. in America, p. 3. 
9 
ýr"lý a CJ`^. cetýýiOI1 --wee_^_ peopi e an ii° s, also -hat 
this "expresses" and "channel=" conflicts of 
in}eress which gý be, ýýrld cclitics a-: . inis: ra-ion, to 
the 
very basis of the social str1c ýe. This changes the basis o 
the ideological probler.. It now becomes concer-e -. w, th the 
definition of society: how it may and should develop. When an 
ar } empt is made within this fr me-,,. crk to explain the actions 
of political parties, it leads to a "sociological" approach 
in which the analysis is centred on the "representativit,,, Y' of 
the parties and their ideology. 
On the other hand the existence of peaceful coexistence 
within the political system and the regular competition for 
power between the parties has resulted in the creation of 
, different kinds of institutions. The role of the parties in 
the functioning of the government differs from one system to 
another. This, in turn, has had the effect of producing an 
analysis of the parties as something more than mere 
participants in elections. 'ýr. ey are seen as component parts of 
other, larger more complex systems. This is what has given 
rise to a f`, rrr: of p`slit ical science which. has Dee-. callei 
" instituti)nýi1i: -'-" .9 
A rr,: rallel exists between the history of political 
parties as :, ep ed parts of tr. e s1's-'-=-, , a-i, i as leaitima--e 
subjects tor analysis in s%litical science. From the earliest 
10 
c Jr stirur iorial discussions :e: r cý eTM. arse of hoý. ti `o 
incorporate unavoidable a-: -J permanent iffereT_: es of opinion. 
Finally it was iecided -o accept this situation as inevitable 
and try to limit its consequences by regulating the framework 
within which competition for power would take place: that is, 
elections. 5 This had the effect, from the normative point of 
view, of making the evolution of the political parties 
dependent on the extension of the right to vote, together with 
the regulations which govern this. Until quite recentl,:, 
constitutions have not made any reference to political parties 
beyond establishing the right of citizens to form them and 
belong to them. The laws which govern electoral processes, 
however, deal with the way the political parties may 
participate in them. In this way, the political parties as 
entities, from a normative point of view, acquire only a 
subordinate existence as participants in electoral processes. 6 
Since the middle of the nineteenth century, socialist 
ideology has generated a new kind of party. From the outset, 
the problem of taking up a class position vis-a-vis the 
bourgeois state defined its agenda. These parties also 
confronted the problem of whether or not to participate in 
elections and to conf: ---- i to the parliamentary system, issues 
which formed the subject of heated doctrinal discussion. 
Alan Ware, Political Parties and rrty Systems, pp. 8-9. 
5 Giovanni Sartori, Partidos y sistemas de part-,, -, pp. 35-44. 
Max Weber, Ecomc mia 
After t rle First World, War, however, the argument was settled, 
at least for Western Europe, as a result cf the faiLLre of 
those attempts to carry out a proletarian revolution rhafi 
sought to imitate the Bolshevik Model. ' The actions o 
socialist parties in some countries, mainly Germany ad Italy, 
have been scrutinised and criticised by Robert Michels. 
Michels has identified a common characteristic --f political 
life organised around parties: the tendency to produce an 
elite which reproduces itself within the party organisation. 8 
Taking into account the points of view set out above-and 
there are still others- at least some of the misunderstandings 
generated by the terms "parties" and "party systems" can be 
seen. 9 In brief, contained within these terms are varying 
conceptions of society and the political order. The problem is 
whether these conceptions are based on the individual as such 
or whether the political order is not the product of a 
structure of conflicting relationships between different 
categories of individuals. This is a very complex problem 
because, despite initial observations, some parties may 
7 Adam Przeworski sees this change as a question of electoral strategy with 
fluctuations in the definition of "class". Nonetheless, he states that in 1918 
the British Labour Party opened its ranks to "workers by Capitalism and 
Social Democracy, p. 25. 
8 Robert Michels, Political Parties: Sociological Study of the Oligarchic 
Ter;, ýen ies of Modern Democracy. 
On the difficulties of formulating an err -rical definition of "political 
parr, " see Alan Ware, Op. cit., pp. 2-r. 
12 
introduce this distinction into their ideology, and str c: tre 
their strategies accordingly-lo 
By observing the existence of the parties as actors which 
compete within a system of electoral norms accepted by all of 
them, this issue can be sidestepped. The parties also seek 
positions of power in a system of government which is generally 
accepted by all of them. If the system is to be changed, the 
change must be subject to the outcome of an electoral process 
together with norms of transformation accepted by all the 
actors. The following, from Alan Ware, may be cited as a 
potentially valid definition: "A political party is an 
institution that (a) seeks influence in a state, often by 
attempting to occupy positions in government and (b) usually 
consists of more than a single interest in the society and so, 
to some degree, attempts to "aggregate interest". " Another 
definition is given by Mainwaring and Scully. "We follow a 
slightly amended version of Sartori's definition of a political 
party, by which a party is `any political group that presents at 
elections and is capable of placing through elections 
candidates for public office' The amendment is that a political 
group that would present candidates for public office, but- is 
10 The problem of how a social class may be constituted as a social and 
political actor is discussed by Przeworski, op. cit. Chap. 2. 
`' Op. cit., p. 5. 
13 
un ble to do so either because it is proscribei Cr because 
elections are not being held, is also a part/' . 
12 
In this way, the limits of the systeT. wouli be iefine, 
by norms and by the acceptance of these norms by the 
participants. However, these definitions Displ ace us --wards 
another framework -the electoral system- whose 
characteristics strongly influence the party system. This 
is the case, for example, in the size of the electorate 
relative to the total population. 13 Moreover, the parties 
represent interests and opinions which are defined in 
function of lines of conflict (cleavages). These, in given 
historical periods, define their societies. However, these 
conflicts should amount to something less than ruptures in 
order to avoid breaking the basic consensus. Sartori 
observes that: "conflict about fundamentals is not a 
possible basis for democracy nor is it, in fact, for any 
political community. Such conflict - real confrontation- 
leads to civil war, with secession as the only solution. i14ln 
this way, either a society is seen as a community in which 
there are no fundamental conflicts or a democratic political 
community is structured in such a way that these conflicts 
are not expressed in terms of alternative forms of political 
arrangements. 
Op. cit., p. 2. 
13 Arend Lijphart, Sistemas electorales y sistemas de partidos. 
14 Giovanni Sartori, Partidos y sistemas je part- :,. c, 4-, p. 40. 
14 
Despite all these limi`ations, the -iel 
- 47 sty ies 
which examines party systems has made advances as a form of 
empirical research. As such it seeks to answer she many 
theoretical questions which previous attempts to formulate 
definitions have left unsatisfied. Thus, the study of parr- 
systems is, in itself, taken to be an indicator of the 
functioning of a democratic system. In the absence of a 
generally agreed definition of democracy which would serve 
as a parameter for the evaluation of different political 
systems, it is necessary to take as a starting point the 
idea that democracy, as a quality of a political system, is 
a question of degree. The difference between a dictatorship 
and a democracy can be clearly established by the point of 
origin (elections). However the consolidation of a democracy 
through the existence of an institutionalised party system 
can only be registered as a point on a continuum. The idea 
of a continuum suggests a process: placing any particular 
case at a point on the continuum indicates its relationship 
to this political polarity. One of the possible 
consequences of adopting this point of view is that the 
modern political process can be presented as a democratic 
progression. Nevertheless, this J, oes not seem to be 
possible in most of the Western political processes. It 
would seem that the process of beccmLi-_ democrat lc can be 
described in terms o± particular stages which seem to repeat 
15 
themselves ýr_ -which are r. ot irreversible. ' 
frequently seemed an appropriate strategy is not to vct for 
ar. abstract description or for a historical consideration of 
particular examples but rather to analyse one particular 
case. This permits the examination of the genesls of some 
characteristic features of the liberal democracies, with 
particular reference to parties and the tarty systems. Such 
a methodology seems promising in view of the fact that some 
recent instances have acquired the status of models. 
Moreover, the similarity -real or imaginary- of the 
structures of particular situations has led to the spread of 
parties, ideologies and programmes on an international 
scale. 
The difficulty of analysing party systems is summed up 
by Ware when he observes that the study of party systems 
implies simultaneously more and less than the analysis of 
the individual parties. 16 This complexity is generated by the 
relationships between the parties within the system: ie., 
the structure of the system. Given that each presents a 
different kind of dynamic, the problem can-. --, 7 be resolved 
deciding to give causal priority to one or the other of the 
two levels of analysis. An er, pirical problem must be 
resolved in each particular investigation given that no 
theoretical mcjel exists for the ` imul , ýane`: lis invesr is r ins; 
15 Mainwaring and Scully, Op. cit., p. 6. 
16 
of bc1fih ' ýe indivi ýýai ayýies d their i: -. per-, ti arg,, 
dynamic. Thus Ware observes that, in the case of the British 
parties, a book- about the parties themselves woui have to 
be focussed differently from, one about the party system. 
The p pint is to decide which historical process is to be 
analysed and which of the two levels would contribute more 
to the explanation of this process. 
The process of constructing democracy may be described 
as the reduction of conflict to competition. The framework; 
of the competition is fixed by the constitution which 
instigates the norms of the party syster'.. The electoral 
system defines the posts which will be competed for, and 
sets the rules for the form of the competition. The party 
system permits the organisation of the competitors. This 
last component comes to occup%, the positicri of mediator 
between three elements whose relationships are not clearly 
defined. First, there is the citizen, as an individual with 
voting rights. These constitute the pr mar definition of 
citizenship. Second, there is the individual as part of a 
social category, defined by sore factor which may or may not 
be considered in the definition of the parties. Third, 
there are the ideologies which mare possible the 
constitution and the functioning of the political sysrem, or 
which the party system is a part- This is srructurei on the 
Ware, Op. cit., p. 7. 
17 
follýJ-tzir: g t. levels iien-; týa 
representative of the ideas wt., hich a group of citizens 
identify with and, (b) the neology -La! -e-. as a whole, which 
puts limits on who can participate in the competition and on 
the ideological identities which they can asst . e. 
The ideological factor which has marked out the limits 
of present-day political systems is na: ionalism. This --erm 
is understood here in its widest sense as the justification 
and legitimising of the existence of The na ion state, which 
has become the dominant form of political organisation in 
the modern world. Nationalism has to -- wi`h the fissures 
which gave rise to those conficts whose resolution 
constituted the foundation of, at least in embryonic form, 
the modern political structures that we today define as 
liberal democracies. These fissures were either religious, 
as in the English civil war of the seventeenth century; 
political, as in the French revolution of 1789; or of 
colonial separation as in the case of the United States. 
Each of these fissures ideologically imprinted the resulting 
constitutions and political parties. In terms of 
organisation, the social classes who were the prot< gac; -Asts 
of these processes made an elits who reserve'. gor 
themselves the right to participa+_e in political -i. =airs as 
electors, candidates aid n. e ers of governments. Th: e first 
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great elf : -, sior, of s, affrage, was 
directed towards the working class. 
The twentieth century saw the in corco rr ion of :: r. e 
urban working class and its organisations into the political 
system in the form of political parties. Th'ss The rieh-- to 
vote was granted to a larger number of citizens. 
Revolutionary and internationalist tendencies were iefeate , 
politically and ideologically during the Firs'- WorlA War and 
within the social democratic parties. In This way, the 
independent nation state, particularly the republic, became 
the dominant model of political organisation in Europe and 
the world. This is a phenomenon of the twentieth century. 17 
The years after 1918 saw the establishment of the nation 
states which resulted from the dissolution of the empires. 
After 1945, this model was generalised through the process 
of decolonisation. Obviously, this is a model of processes 
defined by their results. Except in a few instances, among 
which are those of Switzerlani, the United Sta`es är:, _ß the 
United Kingdom, the liberal democratic systems diJ not 
survive the twentieth century and its conflicts in any 
important country. The structures described here correspond 
to reconstruction carried out ir the West týtrin the cold 
war period. It is at this time when an integrated national 
politics can be odserved. The , w-- rkin:; class c : rtes are 
17 : \I-no J. Mayer, The Persistence of the Old :: 
0 
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either part of tree gover . TMen _ or it . _g 
for power within the norms laid down by the electoral 
system. 
From the sociological point of view, this situation is 
explained by saying that a compromise : r_-as been reached 
between the material interests of the classes in conflict 
within the capitalist system. The working people receive 
increased welfare on the condition that they do not call 
into question the continuance of capitalist accumulation. 
As the state is the broker of this arrangement, political 
competition is defined as the seeking of electoral support 
by parties which are allowed to participate on the condition 
that they do not question the system as such. 18 
03. Latin America and liberal democracy 
The processes and ideas described above had a very 
important influence in Latin America. However, simple 
imitation was never possible. From the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, the former Spanish colonies in America 
had to adopt a modern form of political organisation. After 
various attempts, they all became republican nation-srates, 
formally defined as such. This formal definition a:: q. ire 
great importance in the drafting of many cc st ions. 19 The 
18 Pr eworski, Op. cit., Chapter 4. 
19 As evident in more than 200 constitutions in 170 years in the 21 cot : t-ries 
represented by Spain, Portugal and their former American colonies. Bernardino 
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represented bjj E-. glar: d Uri=ed -a es an- France 1 1i e: _ 
was translated into an infinite number of proposals for 
prýlitical organisat ion on. The aim was to ±Li -a :e the i leas an, - 
political solutions which h_a characterised the processes of 
formation of these sys-er: s. However, the confronta`ion of 
interests in these peripheral former colonies contained 
features which did not permit a mechanical application o 
the institutional solutions from the societies taken as 
models. 
Something which must be taken into account when 
considering this lack of correspondence between model and 
reality is the elitist form assumed by the political 
parties. These were often factions, proto-parties or 
groupings of powerful men who resolved their differences by 
negotiation or by agreements between leaäers. Moreover, the 
extension of the suffrage, when it occur! -, >,. 1 , in 
predominantly rural societies, was not the result of s 
process of modernisation (industrialisation ar,., urban 
growth). Nor was it the consequence of the incorporation of 
new independent social sectors. Rather, it was a means of 
reinforcing the dominant social groups i-: the rural areas. 
These controlled the results of the elections. 20 
Bravo Lira, De Portales a pinochet: Gobierno y ie L^er. ,: J ,::,: -: erno en Chile, p. 
11. 
` Karen L. Remmer, Part, Corrpetit-,, n in, . rjentlna and Chile. 
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All these factors : ear: that poli_lcal 
regular elections and the increasing participation of the 
social sectors which economic s: eii c--. en was creating, were 
rare in the region. Chile, from the 1930s to 1960s. was one 
such. It must be emphasised ghat this situation i n. ý 
stop the local political parties in other Latin American 
countries from acting as if they forme cart of functionin:: 
democratic systems. Their names and ideologies suggest self- 
images which sought to absorb their European and North 
American models. Their main problem lay in the fact that 
they did not manage to construct a system which would 
exclude both direct action by state institutions such as the 
armed forces, and the all pervasive influence of the Roman 
Catholic Church. 21 In fact, the post war period in Latin 
America was characterised by the domination of a p:. litical 
ideology given the name "Latin American populisrr('. This was 
made up of organisations dependen` on governments whose 
raison d'etre was to provide support for the ideology 
together with the social and political mobilisation of the 
people. Such organisations as the PRI in Mexico and 
movements like Peronism in Argentina or Var:,.: is, in Brazil, 
wouLl be examples of this phenomenon. There are exceptions, 
but these have not occurred in any of the three largest 
Whether these concepts are applicable in Latin America is controversial. 
for example, Mainwaring's discussion with Sartori about whether or not a 
4 party system exists in Colombia and Brasil. Op. cit., pp. - 5. 
T) 
Latin American countries. Ur :J gay ha a f, - r ctio-_i _ 
democracy which lasted through a long period of prosperity 
until 1973. Colombia Venezuela develcce : wo-parr,, 
democracies after the dissolution of the dictatorships r 
the end of the 1950's. 
0.4 Chilean democracy, the exception 
Democracy in Chile functioned -rom 1932 until the 
catastrophic rupture of 1973. This exceptional history gave 
rise to all kinds of explanations. A metaphysical 
hypothesis attributed it to Chilean "flair". Sociologists 
such as Cardoso and Faletto put it down to the kind of 
social classes which emerged out of the "enclave" 
situation in the mining industry, the way in which Chile was 
inserted into the world economy, and the politico- 
ideological form of representation they found in the 
political parties as a "model" of organisation. 22 
The main hypothesis of this study consists of a 
reconstruction of the history of this period which tar=es the 
party system as its starting point. This system evolved in such 
a way that it gradually included rising social groups wit-hin ---s 
ranks. This stable group of political parties was ma de up of an 
elite of professional politicians which virtually monopolised 
the political representation of the different social classes. 
I here were periods of volatility bu`, in general, i- ma1y be said 
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that a stable nucleus of pol-it-clans, careers professional 
depended on their being affiliated to a given party, Conti iei 
to exist. The key problem here is how such a system could ccT. e 
into existence when the participating parties represented 
ideologies whose social projects were completely antagonistic. 
This polarised situation would seem to indicate that Chilean 
party system was essentially unstable. Nevertheless, the 
obvious ideological inconsistencies of the period from the 
1930's to 1960's indicate the existence of an underlying 
ideological structure which unites these parties. This 
structure was, in the opinion of the present author, a project 
for national development. This did not differ in essence, from 
similar projects in other Latin American countries. These 
projects were adopted by governments which represented 
alliances of similar social groups. However, these alliances 
were founded within ideological and organisational frameworks 
which had little to do with those of the political parties. 
Different versions of this ideology of the system were 
incorporated in each of the parties. These, in turn, became 
proposals which, in parliamentary terms, are presented as 
"technical" problems which do not affect the ideologies crop`se 
k }- each party as its social project. 
23 
Fernando H. Cardoso and Enzo Fale t tc, _z:: äencia '. e -rollo e: -. America 
Latin.:, pp' 2ý1-129. 
See later in Chapter 1. 
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The reconstruction cf this ali-iricl-asive r_ týor_ l rc ect 
has been placed at the level of the state. (The development 
state, the compromise state, the welfare state, etc. ). However 
it is on the level of the system of government, the par`-4es and 
the electoral system where the effects of the consensus can be 
observed, without resorting to other metaconstitutional factors. 
In the first chapter of this stud,, - the existence of this 
elite of professional politicians, especially those who form the 
nucleus of the system is shown, together with their dependence 
on the parties. At the same time, the parties represent 
particular social classes, especially those on the left, despite 
their integration into the national project of the elite. This 
explains why the "Chilean road to sociali3 !' was, at the same 
time (or only) the extreme ideological expression of a project 
of industrial development later described as statist and 
populist. 
The second chapter describes the crisis of the political 
system which took this national development project to its 
limit. This was the prograrrrrie of the Unidad Popular. The 
result was that the capacity of the party system to maintain 
social domination was exhausted. Slowly, new elites began to 
appear on the right and the left at the edges of the party 
system and began to have an influence on the strategies of the 
parties which made up the system. This led to a threat to the 
arrangements of social _i`--ninati 
ion v hich the system was perceived 
-)5 
as unable to maintain. Thus, the forces on the right, who frcT. 
outside the party system counselled the hard line policy which 
led to the coup d'etat, were able to triumph. The central 
question of this chapter is whether the crisis of social 
domination in itself provoked the break in the party system. I- 
is also possible that the development of alternative elites 
outside the party system, particularly on the right generated 
the conditions for the crisis. 
Chapter 3 describes the phase of the rise }c power of the 
dictatorship. The partial destruction of the political system 
(in particular, the party system) was achieved. This was done 
by the repression and setting aside of the professional 
politicians, including those of the right. A schere of e, -_momic 
development was imposed which none of the participants in the 
party system of the era before 1973 would have been able to 
implement. Thus a new project, different from that which had 
formed the basis of the ulterior consensus, was imposed. 
Parallel to these changes in the economy, projects for the 
replacement of the political system were also put forward. 
These culminated in the imposition of a new cons mutier which 
would have impeded the reconstruction of the party system by 
excluding groups on ideological grounds. 
Chapter 4 is concerned with the crisis in -he 
dictatorship. It is shown how the recons: rucr i'-. of the part,, 
syýf em generated , move towards a iiffere t ernocracy. This 
26 
involved a new scheme of economic development bei kose a= 
a national project. As the main characteristic of the 
aictatorship was social exclusion, exactl,, T the -p -site of she 
inclusive project which was destroyed by the coup d'4-, '-at, the 
party system had to be mcaified. This process produ: , 
mainly, a generational and ideological renewal of the right. 
Two new right wing parties were formed. These (together with 
some elements of the previous right wing elite, reactivated 
because of the social protest which threatened the 
dictatorship) make up the groups which generated the 
political and economic projects which the dictatorship 
imposed. They were however marginal with respect to the party 
system which existed before 1973. 
Chapter 5 tries to demonstrate where the main element of 
continuity lies. The core of the earlier party system was the 
Christian Democrat Party. This group managed to arrogate to 
itself a key role in the process of reconstruction of the 
system of political parties. Originally this group supported 
the coup d' etat, only to find itself e:,: ciuded from power h, r 
the military. Later, it recovered political legitimacy by 
initiating a dialogue with the govern-rant an the 
axis of an alliance of opposition parties which negotiatcc. the 
terms of the re-. ciocratisation. Thus, it couid imco>se the 
! -,, suits its negotiation with the dictatorship upon its left 
wino allies. The agreement reachei with the acta: orshic 
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depended on the acceptance of the two main elemen`s of the 
national project of the dictatorship by the Christian 
Democrats. These entailed (a) a new political system tear was 
accepted with modifications which were not unimportant but 
neither were they fundamental; and (b) a new model of economic 
development that was adopted together with all of its social 
consequences. 
Chapter 6 describes the fate of the left. Defeated by 
the dictatorship both militarily and politically, it suffered 
a slow ideological erosion which ended with its incorporation 
into the reconstructed system of political parties. Here it 
was subordinated to a political elite with an ideology which 
had moved either to the centre or the right during the long 
years of the dictatorship. The ideological evolution of the 
left in the world generally and the disintegration of the 
Eastern bloc seemed to justify their adoption of the national 
project of the dictatorship. 
The last chapter contains the study's conclusions. It 
seeks to show how these separate narratives of the evolutions 
of different political groups through the cycle democracy - 
dictatorship- new democracy can be understood only if the 
characteristics of the party system are analysed. Its 
ideological and organisational destruction and reconstruct-ion 
show a certain rewriting of the rules. Some factors such as 
stability; the relation of the party system to soc ety; the 
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domination of some groups and the possibility ; car-, c-k a: ir 
by other subordinate groups; have been changed though, perhaps 
in some cases, not completely. A balance of ccntir_. -ai`ies sý. 
changes has been effected between the two periods of democracy 
interrupted by the dictatorship. 
On the theoretical level, the main conclusion is that the 
use of the concepts "party" and "party system' should be 
redefined in the analysis of specific historical situations. 
This is because of the difficulties that occur when the 
characteristics of a system, especially its limits, are 
defined in general terms and on an abstract level. Moreover, 
as in every analysis of complex structures, it is very 
difficult to justify realigning the axis of explanation from 
one level to another, in purely abstract terms. In this case, 
the difficulty arises when we move from the analysis of the 
action of a party as an individual unit to the meaning of the 
parties as players operating together within: the totality of 
the system, considering not only their reciprocal effects but 
also the wider implications for social domination. 
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Chapter 1. Political parties in the 1970 Chilean election 
1.1 Introduction, the 1970 Chilean presidential election 
The possibility that Salvador Allende might be the 
winning candidate in the presidential election of 
September 4,1970 aroused comment not only in Chile but 
in the world press. What appeared to be unusual was not 
so much that Unidad Popular and the socialist candidate 
were offering "a peaceful road to socialism, "1 but that 
the real possibility existed that they might win the 
election and Allende assume the office for which he had 
been nominated. 
Explanations for such an event turned upon the 
idiosyncrasies of Chile, the Chileans and the historical 
crossroads at which they had arrived. Such metaphysical 
embellishments as the "Chilean national character" were 
used to explain these events. 2 One wholly subordinated 
explanation changes the entire view of the Chilean 
political process. That is, the existence of a system of 
parties that acted as the principal part of the political 
1 Which was, after all, an old motto of the international communist 
movement directed by the Soviet Union. Alonso Daire studies the 
course of this thesis in the Chilean Communist Party in "La poll i: a 
del partido Comunista desde la post-guerra hasta la Unidad Popular", 
in El Partido Comunista en Chile: Estudio multidisciplinario, 
Augusto Varas, compiler pp. 180-190,. 
2 'In their pluralistic politics, the Chileans lay bare their souls, " 
Richard E. Feinberg, The Triumph of Allende: Chile's Legal 
Revolution, p. 89 
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system (the latter being understoo as the str', ýc`'re 
constituted by the system of government, the system of 
parties and the electoral sys`em). In that sense, i: was 
basic in determining the conduct of the most outstanding 
actors in the process. In other words, if the political 
confrontation implied a strategic social confrontation, 
the latter was expressed (channelled) by the rules of the 
political system. And that to break those rules, as in 
fact occurred, was a decision requiring a prior process 
of maturation and accumulation of forces disposed to do 
so by wearing down the rules of the political system as 
they had functioned up to that moment. In the world of 
1970, of a general upsurge of the left and, in 
particular, of the "new lefts, " "Castro-like" in Latin 
America and "Post-`68" in the world at large, the Chilean 
political process was particularly resonant to the ears 
of foreign observers. In the first place, political 
actors identified themselves by the names of parties 
obedient to universal ideologies, that is, originating 
in 
Europe. Secondly, the period of stable functioning of 
the Chilean political system went back to the thin--ies, 
thereby having lasted longer than the systems of most 
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European3 nations, not to mention the rest of La: ýn 
America where the Chilean case was frankly exceptional. 
Once Allende assumed office, discussion turned upon 
his chances of implementing his programme and completing 
his term of office, the two being related in different 
ways. If the simplistic view is accepted, according to 
which the violent end of the process in 1973 was not only 
unavoidable but predictable, given the insoluble 
contradictions it posited to the nation's prevailing 
social domination, an explanation is required for the one 
thousand days it took to come to its end. Those thousand 
days of a highly troubled political and social process 
may be seen as the road to a prefigured finale, or as the 
oscillations of a system which, by a series of failed 
attempts to stabilize led to its unforeseen restructuring 
at a point far from equilibrium. 4 
Discussion should be posited in terms of legitimacy, 
in view of the fact that a violent outcome was imposed in 
the face of the impossibility of changing the government 
by legal means and the rules of the system being worn 
out. However, legitimacy, as a process of social 
3 Only the United Kingdom and the United States preserved a 
liberal 
democratic regime functioning normally during the crisis period of 
World War II. 
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acceptance, is not exhausted in legaliýy. The legi imaý, I 
of the Unidad Popular administration must be measured 
the intensity of the violence employed by t: e insur , e- ts 
to topple it in 1973.5 Repression, always justified in 
terms of the presence of armed groups, was aimed at 
social and political organizations that supported the 
government. This support may be measured b' the scope of 
the sectors affected by the first stage of dictatorial 
repression. 
1.2 Definition of the temporal framework of the process 
The search for a genetic explanation for the 
situation in 1970, in the evolution of the party system, 
raises the problem of definition and periodisation. Tr 
is a matter of temporally delimiting the system 
constituted by the principal actors in the electoral 
political process. If the presidential candidacies are 
considered as blocs of parties and tendencies, left, 
right and center, the system may be taken back to 1958, 
when the same three forces also competed for the 
presidency of the republic. Two of the three candidates 
4 Using the formulation expressed by Wallerstein in rthinki:: ý Social 
Science, p. 235, of the dissipative systems pr, _posed by Ilya 
Prigogine and Isabel Stengers in The New Alliance. 
5 "Official" accounting of dead and disappeared is contained in the 
so-called "Rettig Report. " Informe de la Comisiön Nacional de 
Verdad y Reconciliaciön, texto oficial completo. A commen, ary tha- 
adds other sources is contained in Genaro Arriagada, Por la raz6n o 
la fuerza, Chile bajo Pinochet, pp. 22-27. 
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competing for election in 1970 had also campaigned i.. 
1958, along with a further two candidates (absent on }h: e 
latter date) .6 However, if analysis is applied to The 
party system, the forming of blocs was a "normal" effect 
of presidential races, but was not the regular functional 
structure in parliamentary and municipal life. If the 
parties are taken as components of a system and the rules 
of the game among them as criteria for periodisation, the 
evolution of the system must refer to the applicability 
of the Constitution of 1925. That is, to the period that 
begins in 1932 and the genesis thereafter of elements 
that would come together in 1970 as collective (party) 
and individual (leaders) actors. 
The period to be considered, 1932-1970 is 
characterized by regular and normal functioning without 
violent interruptions of a government established under 
the Constitution of 1925. This prominently includes the 
holding of periodic elections, the results of which were 
not questioned in significant terms by any of the 
principal actors, i. e. the political parties. 
The 
latter, came to constitute a system that functioned 
throughout the period with only one major crisis, the 
period of exclusion of the Communist 
Party from leg, 11iý-yT 
The 1958 candidates were Alessandri, A11eräe, 
Bossay, Frei a:.: 
J4 
between 1948 and 1957.7 The 1925 Constitut1or. was the 
result of an extraordinary negotiation to establish a 
rule to replace the parliamentary system of gove-rm. e-- 
established in 1891 based on interpretation of the 
Constitution of 1833. This form of government had beer. 
eliminated by a number of military pronunci3rne; t3 
beginning in 1924, culminating in the military 
dictatorship of Carlos Ibanez del Campo, 1927-1931.8 
Features of Chile's political development pertinent 
to this subject include: 1) the early organization of a 
state and system of government rarely challenged 
internally by force as a significant threat9; 2) the 
conversion of factious forces into political parties or 
proto-parties which channel their activities within 
constitutional rules1°; 3) a quasi-monopoly of political 
activity and posts within the political system by a party 
elite devoted to politics as a profession; 4) The 
Zamorano. In 1970 the candidates were Alesandri, Allende and Tomic. 
' On the outlawing of the Communist Party see: Julio Fadndez, Marxism 
and Democracy in Chile, pp. 73-75; Furci, Carmelo Faündez, The 
Chilean Communist Party and the Road to Socialism, pp. 38-61; Maria 
Soledad G6mez, "Factores nacionales e internacionales de la politica 
interna del Partido Comunista de Chile (1922-1952), " El Partidc 
Comunista en Chile: Estudio multidisciplinario, August: Varas 
(compiler), pp. 114-133. 
8 See Ricardo Donoso, Alessandri, agitador y demoledor. Also Gonzalo 
Vial, Historia de Chile (1891-1973), Vol. III, Chap. 13. 
" Periods of considerable threat to order were few after 1830: 1851, 
1859,1891 (in which the revolution was victorious), 124-1'-, 27 a, -, 
the dictatorship which lasted until 1931,1938,1939, and 19rq. 
io Karen Remmer, Party Competition in Argentina and Chile, Political 
Recruitment and Public Policy, 1890-1930. 
35 
broadening of the electoral clientele for these par es 
by extending suffrage and incorporating new social 
sectors into political participation which, in turn, 
increased the elite by the creation of new almost always 
short-lived parties, and 5) a rooting of political 
parties in the social conscience to the extent of making 
membership in or sympathy for a party a factor in social, 
individual and group identification. 
1.3 The order of the system in 1932 
In 1932 a system of government was put into 
operation prescribed by the Constitution of 1925, by 
virtue of which only once under that regime was a 
president of the republic and a bicameral legislature 
elected simultaneously. The first presidential term 
under that scheme (the second term of office for 
president Arturo Alessandri Palma), was a period o 
reorganization of parties affected by external and 
internal crises expressed ideologically as divisions and 
alliances carried out within and among parties. 
Three processes that took place in this period are 
important in the formation of party characteristics 
in the system constituted by them. The first was the 
exclusion of the military from politics and the open 
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social rejection of their participation i--, the = ade: 
dictatorship by means of, among other features, a curious 
militarization of party youth active in street c-. -as'-., es--. 
The second was the formation of a left consisting of two 
parties the names of which, Socialist and Co: n_-unist, 
deceptively recall the situation of the left and the 
labour movement in Europe during the same period. A thi 
feature was the formation, under Ibanez, of a generation 
of university leaders who would quickly step into the 
foreground once democracy was reinstated and become 
career models within the political elite. 13 
What was deceptive about the parties of the left was 
that the Chilean Communist Party was not a breakaway from 
the Socialist Party as was normal in Europe. On the 
contrary, the foundation of the Chilean Socialist Party 
in 1933 represents the regrouping of labour and 
ideological tendencies and organizations among which 
there were anarchists, anarcho-syndicalists, left 
nationalists, Trotskyites, and other splinters from the 
Communist Party. 14 
11 See the chapter in General Carlos Prats' Memorias entitle: 'La 
reacciön civilista contra la dictadura de Ibane: ". 
1 Fernando Pinto Lagarrigue, Crönica politica del siglo XX, Chapter 
XI. 
13 Salvador Allende and Eduardo Frei M. belong t, this -enera`ion. 
14 Fernando Casanueva Valencia and Manuel Fernandez Canque. El 
Partido Socialista y la lucha de ciases Chile, chapters II and III. 
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This first period, 1932-1938, may be seen as a test 
run for the system. All the actors who would contribute 
to the character of Chilean politics for the next -: -_-ee 
decades would be deployed in the 1938 presidential 
election. By then, all the features that would form The 
nucleus of the party system that would last until 1973 
would have already been activated. 
1.4 The normal functioning of the system and the Radical 
administrations of 1938-1952. 
The events of 1938 were perceived by some of those 
affected by them as a change of epoch' 5. Three carp Jidates 
took the field in the presidential election. The 
candidate of the traditional oligarchy was Gustavo Ross 
Santa Maria, backed by the most traditional Liberal and 
Conservative parties. Pedro Aguirre Cerda was the 
candidate of the new social forces, workers organize in 
the Socialist and Communist parties, and subord--, ated by 
the middle classes who, dependent upon the state, 
organized themselves into the Radical Party, all alliý. 
in what was called the Popular Front in the lange. -jge of 
the time. A third candidate, the formerJA* ý. raor ros 
Ibanez del Campo was supported by marginal 'on'es (the 
15 Eduardo Balmaceda Valdes, mundr que se . e... "; lberto _,: 
1tra 
Cortes, Pedro Aguirre Cerda, quoted by Ger: ~. ir Valenzuela, La 
democracia präctica. Los Ucbierno5 ra.:: c-, Aes, 
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National Socialist Workers' Party) and had con--a-. s amo-: 
the military, mainly the army. The latter was eliminated 
from the contest after some of his followers 
Nazis) attempted a coup d'etat which was not joiner by 
the army and was ferociously crushed by the police. " 
This threw the Chilean Nazi vote, which had in the 
previous election (1937) won only 4% of the vote, to the 
Popular Front. In view of the close results of the 
presidential election (50.17% for Aguirre Cerda ag. -iins- 
49.24% for Gustavo Ross), there is almost general 
agreement that the Chilean Popular Front victory was due 
to the decided last minute support of the Na: is. '7 
The Popular Front victory caused a crisis ým., ng 
Conservative Party youth who split off to form the 
Falange Nacional. 18 Thus, on the level of the political 
elite this left six principal actors on stage who, wit 1, 
changes that need to be explained, would worm the syst enn. 
of Chilean political parties until 1973. The parties th, -it 
would constitute this system were: the Conserva'=ive an,, 
Liberal parties on the right, Radical and Falar: ge 
16 A more recent testimony to these events is to be found in the 
Memorias of General Carlos Prats, pp. 74-7r. 
1' This paradox of Chilean politics is one among .; o- hers 
ha:. 
suggests to me the importance of the party system in explai: -. .,: _.. '. 
concrete conduct of political actors and the differen-es 
hý*wecr. 
them and their declared principles. 
1' Ricardo Yocelevzky, La Democracia Cristiana Chilena y e1:: 
de Eduardo Frei. 1964-1970, pp. 85-8r. 
39 
Nacional (Christian Democrats after 1957) at the e-. -er 
and, on the left, the Communist and Socialist parties. 
From the point of view of the COMPOSi: -'L--- of ---. e 
professional political elite, this configurati:, -: 
represents an expansion that would culminate in the 
incorporation of middle classes via university student 
political movements. The road to individual political 
ascent would continue to function under party control 
until the sixties. 19 
At the same time, the military on active duty were 
excluded from participation in the political process at 
this level. 
As for the electorate, it grew to the point of 
opening the possibility of including worki,:: -ý class 
sectors that could be encouraged to vote by their 
organizations or by some clientelist relationship. The 
right to vote included males over 21 years of age, 
capable of reading and writing, and registered as 
voters. 20 
The composition of party rank-and-file and par-'y 
structure as a relation between elite, ; -ank-acid-: 
ile an; 
1° Even today, the elite dominating the F liti«al system 
reconstructed in the late eighties originates 
from *he univorsi*y 
youth of the parties of the sixties. 
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electoral clientele differed in each sector. Or. -he 
right, the historical parties are parties of ncrables who 
co-opt each other by virtue of their social relations. 
Both the Liberals and Conservatives claim captive 
electoral clienteles by virtue of their regional 
influence as landowners and, therefore, control of the 
campesino vote which lacks autonomous organization. The 
Conservative Party also has the Catholic hierarchy on its 
side. The Liberal Party, on the other hand, was the 
first to attempt the mobilization of popular urban 
sectors for electoral ends. It was in this party that the 
most noteworthy professional demagogue of the twentieth 
century, Arturo Alessandri, took part and whose political 
performance became legend. 21 
In the center, a segment of the Radical Party' s22 
leaders resembles the liberals but also has a broad base 
of support in the urban middle classes politicized by 
discussion of contingent and doctrinaire political 
20 German Urzüa Valenzuela, Diccionario politico i ti ti -:: ` ional cie 
Chile, pp. 154 and 155; and Historia politica electoral de ^i1e 
(1931-1973), pp. 14 and 15. 
'1 Ricardo Donoso, Alessandri, agitador y demoledor, Vol. I, and 
Gonzalo Vial, Historia de Chile (1891-1973), Vol. III, Arturo 
Alessandri y los golpes militares (1920-1--425). 
22 Bibliography on the Radical Party includes Florencio Duran, F. 1 
Partido Radical, 1958; German Urzüa Valenzuela., Eý Par. -ido Ra,; -cal, 
su evoluciön politica, 1961; Jorge Mario Quinzio Figueiredo "El 
Partido Radical, origen-doctrina - convenciones", i:,: Pa=ýti" 
Competition in Argentina and Chile: Political Recruitment and 
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subjects in party assemblies throughout the c un`r-, 7. ' 
These functioned regularly in a national 1-. etw(----'r- of 
restaurants and cantinas (the so-called Ra ical 
which became the most popular but not the only ones of 
their kind24 
It should also be mentioned that the middle class 
was influenced in its intellectual activities by the 
Masonic lodges mostly attended by militant radicals but 
also by some liberals and, later on, by growing numbers 
of socialists. For its part, the Falange Nacional had 
been born closely associated with the activities of 
Catholic Action25 and the growth of its militant rank-and- 
file was linked to the Church's social action in working 
class sectors inaccessible to the conservatives, and 
among university youth. 
On the left, party militancy became, in the case of 
the Communist Party, part of the cultural life of the 
urban working classes. This is also true -o a lesser 
degree of the Socialist Party. From the beginning o the 
Public Policy, 1984; Luis Palma Züniga, Hi st, -, ria 
del rti, 
Radical, 1967; Peter G. Snow, Radicalismo : leno, 1972; 
'3 Remmer, Op. cit. P. 17 situates this form o. organi a . 
ion as 
existing in the 1880s. 
2a There was still a Democratic Club and even a Liberal Club in 
Santiago in the sixties. However, their survival canno` be expla: r. e 
by any political activity, but apparently because of a tax exemption 
consequent to the name of some organization regis-er in --hp -. a-e 
of the establishment. 
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organization of working class sectors in the r e--eem-ý-: 
century, activities of solidarity, educationýr ý-. d 
recreation facilitated access of the most poliýicý 
groups to political organization and mobilization. 
The Popular Front alliance coincided ideologically 
with the global political tendencies dominant during 
World War II. However, what is more specific -o a 
peripheral economy like the Chilean, is that it expressed 
politically the social alliance which backed devel, -pme-, t 
throughout Latin America. These social alliances and this 
development ideology became the dominant national 
strategy in almost all the countries of the region. They 
were carried out by a variety of political-ideological 
combinations27 generically called "populism" in the 
analysis of Latin American social sciences until he 
eighties at which time the term came to be used to refer 
pejoratively to the whole model of development 
implemented in those years . 
28 In its classical polfit i ,- sl 
meaning in Latin America, populism designates such variei 
regimes and tendencies as Peronism in Argen`ina, Varg': ism 
25 Oscar Larson, La ANEC y la Democracia Cristiana. 
.6 The "Sociedad de Artesanos La Union" founded in the XIX century by 
Malaquias Concha, a democratic leader, was still functioning in the 
sixties in the interest of mass education. 
'' Fernando H. Cardoso and En: o FaIetto, Dependencia y desarrollo en 
America Latina. 
=`' Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards, The ý'Acroeconomics of 
Populism in Latin America. 
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in Brazil, and Cardenism in 1930s Mexico. What all these 
had in common is the social alliance in which the axis is 
constituted by an industrial bourgeoisie alie to the 
state elite (civil or military) and that subordinates the 
urban and rural working classes. In Chile, this social 
alliance specifically expresses itself, ideologically and 
politically, in an alliance of socialist, communist a-d 
radical political parties. 
The achievements of the Chilean Popular Front, which 
the Radical Party always claimed as its own, 29 consisted 
of a policy of industrialization by import substitution; 
the creation of a development bank (Corporaciön de 
Fomento de la Producciön, CORFO); the establishment of 
protectionist tariff barriers; and the subordination of 
the organized working class movement to "national goal:, " 
of development. These political foundations crumbled at 
30 the beginning of the Cold War. At the same time, this 
policy, which had been largely spontaneous and reactive 
in terms of the world economic situation created by he 
1929 crisis and was aggravated by the war, became -i 
29 German Urzua Valenzuela. La iemc, ý: racia präc,. ica. Los c : ernos 
radicales. 
30 Julio Faündes, Op. cit. 
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conscious technical proposal for development promoted . 
the UN Economic Commission for Latin America [ECLA]. 31 
In formal terms, the breakdown of the alliance 
occurred in a number of stages, but its culmination was 
the proscription of the Communist Party and rela`e' 
organizations in 1948. This was a crisis for the entire 
party system. 32 In fact, this process constituted Chile's 
adaptation to the post-war world. The alternatives were 
either to maintain the political system centred on the 
partysystem or to "normalise" the political system in 
Latin American terms by replacing the alliance of parties 
that politically and ideologically expressed the 
developmental social alliance by a "movement" similar to 
those existing in Argentina and Brazil. Ibarism 
represented this alternative in 1952.33 
1.5 The failure of Ibanism, a Chilean attempt at 
classical populism. 
In the face of a combined reaction from the party 
system, Ibanism failed to consolidate itself. However, 
i, 
- 
did experience a realignment of forces 
leading some 
authors to say that this crisis was 
in fact t: e 
31 Raul Prebisch, El desarrollo de la America Latina y alazmics 
de sus 
principal es probl ema s. 
32 German Urzüa Valenzuela. Historia politica electoral 
de Chile. 
1931-1973, pp. 68-71. 
33 Urzüa V. Op. cit. chapter III. 
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replacement of one party system by ar. o her. 3ý 
system that re-emerged in the fifties to preset 
candidates in the presidential ejections of 1958 re-. nine 
the same with a few significant, but not thoroughgoinc, 
changes. The stabilizing features that characterized the 
continuity of the system are the survival of the elite, 
the relative constancy of electoral influence and the 
continuation of the dominant ideological model as a 
national strategy for development. This only be. - mes 
explicit and refined through the replacement of the 
Radical Party by the Christian Democratic Par'--y as the 
principal force of the center and axis of the system of 
alliances. 35 
The survival of the elite is demonstrated by the 
failure of leaders associated with multiple short-lived 
movements created to support Ibanez or to consolidate 
their position within that elite. Those who were able to 
establish themselves earlier or later were the ones 
That 
associated themselves with established par'ies, 
principally the Christian Democrats at 
the T er. ` of is 
founding in 1957. Of the five presidential candidates : io 
'. ' Genaro Arriagada, -Hacia ., n "Big Fang 
-: cl -- e`er: a dc 
35 It may be said that during its admin'. sa`ion 
after the ' r-; la 
Front, the Radical Party represented 
in the pra_-iice . he stra*eay 
for national development. Later 
this was given a the .e ical basis 
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competed in 1958, four were "respectable" r. e-: ers oý t .,,. e 
elite. They were associated with parties and allia-. es 
thereof. Alessandri was supported by conservatves a-. ý 
liberals; Bossay, by the Radical Party; Frey by the 
Christian Democrats; Allende was nominated by the 
recently created Frente de Acciön Popular (FRAP), an 
alliance of communists and socialists. The exception was 
the caricatural "priest from Catapilco" Antonio Zamorano 
Herrera who tried to create a populist mobili: ati: mn or 
the fringes of the left, by organising the (reunified) 
Socialist Party and the (re-legalized) Communist Party. 
The stability of electoral support, a structural 
feature, must be considered in the light of its intrinsic 
relativity. This is principally due to the considerable 
increase in the number of electors as women obtained the 
right to vote in 1949 . 
36 Secondly, the Ibanez victory of 
1952 had especially erosive effect on the socialist 
party, which by contrast underscores the relative 
37 
stability of the communist vote. 
Table N°1 Deputies of the six principal par`_ies, by 
legislature 1932-1973: 
by ECLA and ideologically appropriated by he Chris, ian : e, --crats on 
the basis of their contact with the latter 
36 The electorate almost doubled between 1949 and 1J-3, rising from 
592,000 to 1,100,000. Urzüa V. Op. cit. P. 15. 
37 The communists obtained 10.2% of the vote in 1945 were then 
outlawed and did not participate agar until 
19,1, when 
obtained 11.37%. The socialists got 
12.8% in 1945,9.3% in 1449, 
9.8% in 1953,8.7% in 1957 and 11% in 1961. 
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Election year Deputies of the Total n-r er 
Six principal of iepties 
Parties 
1932 83 142 
1937 124 1ý7 
1941 132 147 
1945 130 147 
1949 106 147 
1953 52 147 
1957 113 147 
1961 135 147 
1965 144 147 
1969 150 150 
1973 142 150 
Sources: Compiled on the basis of data contained in 
Ricardo Cruz-Coke, Historic electoral de Chile, 1925- 
1973, German Urzüa Valenzuela, Diccionario politico e 
institucional de Chile. 
Only in 1932, in a reorganizing election, and in 
1953, partially as a consequence of Ibanez' election to 
the Presidency six months before, did the principal 
parties get less than two-thirds of the deputies. Two- 
thirds was the only qualified majority specified in the 
1925 Constitution 38, by virtue of which, theoretically, 
any agreement among the six principal actors in the 
system could be made law. 
The period of least relative influence of the six 
principal parties, at its lowest in 1`453, also includes 
38 There are laws defined as being of greater importance, whereby i,. 
is believed that a simple majority (50% plus 1) of . 
he members of 
the two chambers is insufficient to pass them. 
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the previous election (194 with 106 deputies among the 
six), and the period immediately after (1957, with 113). 
Table 2 Composition of the Chamber of Deputies by parties 
1932-1973 
Legislature (by year of general election) 
PARTY 32 37 41 45 49 53 57 61- 65 69 7 
NATIONAL 
CONSERV. 
LIBERAL 
34 35 32 36 31 2 23 17 3 
18 35 22 31 33 23 30 28 6 
33 34 
CHRISTIAN DEM 
(FALANGE) 
3333 17 23 82 56 50 
RADICAL 31 29 44 39 34 19 36 39 20 24 5 
SOCIALIST 19 15 65 57 12 15 15 27 
COMMUNIST 6 16 15 16 18 22 26 
SUB-TOTAL 83 124 132 130 106 52 113 135 144 150 142 
MINOR AND (4) (3) (4) (5) (7) (6) (2) (1) (1) 
UNSTABLE PARTIES* 
(REPRESENTED 30 15 12 16 32 73 15 12 3 
MORE THAN ONCE) 
PART REREPRESENTED(12) (2) (2) (1) (2) (7) 
(4) (5) 
ONLY ONCE* 25 5 3 1 9 17 17 8 
INDEPENDENT 4 3 5 
2 
SUB-TOTAL 59 23 15 17 41 95 34 12 38 
TOTAL NUMBER OF 
142 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 150 150 DEPUTIES 
49 
*(0)is THE NUMBER OF PARTIES excepting the 6 principal 
parties which won representation in the Chamber of 
Deputies in that year's election. 
Sources: Compiled according to data in Lia Cortes and 
Jordi Fuentes, Diccionario Politico de Chile, and Ricardo 
Cruz-Coke, Electoral History of Chile 1925-1973. 
The minor and unstable parties that won 
representation in the Chamber of Deputies and the 
legislatures in which they took part, indicated by year 
of the general election, are as follows. Agrarian Party 
(1932,1937,1941,1945 and 1953); Democratic Party 
(1932,1937,1941 and 1945); Democratic Party of Chile 
(1932,1937,1941,1945,1949 and 1953); Radical 
Socialist (1932 and 1941); Liberal Progressive Party 
(1945 and 1949); Authentic Socialist Party (1945 and 
1949) Agrarian Labour Party (1949,1953 and 1957); 
Popular Socialist Party (1949,1953 and 1957); The 
People's Democratic Party (194 9 and 1953); 
Traditionalist Conservative Party (1949 
National Democratic Party (1961 and 1965). 39 
and 1953); 
ill Parties winning parliamentary representation only once beginning 
in 1932 were: 1932: Employees Guild of Chile (AGECH), Independent 
Democratic, Social Democratic, Liberal Democratic, Doctrinaire 
Liberal, Unified Liberal, New Public Action, Independent Radical, 
Independent Radical Socialist, Socialist, Unified Socialist and 
Social Republican (total: 12); 1937: Republican Action and National 
Socialist Movement (total: 2); 1941: Socialist Workers Party and 
Popular Socialist Vanguard (total: 2); 1945: Popular Liberating 
Alliance (total: l); 1949: Revolutionary Action, Radical Democratic 
(total: 2); 1953: Renovating Action, Labour, National Peoples' 
Movement, National Ibanista Movement, National Christian Movement, 
Radical Doctrinaire, United Popular (total: 7); 1957: Democratic 
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This development of parliamentary life, seen through 
elections to the Chamber of Deputies makes it possible to 
demonstrate certain characteristics of the system that it 
is important to emphasize: first, the existence of a 
professional political elite is based largely on the 
careers of deputies. In the eleven ordinary general 
elections to the Chamber of Deputies held between 1932 
and 1973 the electorate was required to vote for 
representatives to 1618 seats. These were occupied by 903 
individuals of which, 81 continued their political career 
in the Senate and three of them reached the Presidency of 
the Republic. It should be added that the total number 
of presidents in this same period, eight, had occupied 
seats in the Senate before being elected to head the 
executive. 
This, in principle, recognizes the existence of a 
"political profession" pursued by a limited number of 
individuals. It is true that a political profession is 
not limited to parliamentary representation, however, we 
have substantiated that in this period no president 
reached the top of national politics without having 
previously occupied a place in one of the chambers. 
Workers Party, National Republican Movement (total: 4); 1973: 
Independent Popular Action (API), Radical Democracy, Christian Left, 
Radical Left, Movement of Popular Action (MAPU) (total: 5). 
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The crux of the argument is the relationship 
existing among this professional political elite, 
although it may be made visible only in the space of a 
parliamentary career in which more individuals take part 
- the Chamber of Deputies - and the party system. We 
consider the latter to have been formed by the six 
principal parties, reduced to five in some periods . 
40 
This connection may be seen in the statistical 
relation between individuals and parties occupying seats 
in the Chamber of Deputies only once during the entire 
period under consideration. This turned out to be low 
(0.226)41, which indicates that seeking and achieving a 
parliamentary career is best associated with some of the 
principal parties. Hence, it is highly probable that 
deputies elected by parties entering parliament only once 
subsequently sought continuity by joining one of the 
principal parties as individuals or by alliance or 
fusion, as part of an organization. 
1.6 Politics in three blocks, 1958-1970 
'10 At the outset there was no Socialist Party, founded in 1933 (the 
fact that representation was achieved once in 1932 does not lead to 
the conclusion that it was part of the system thereafter), not even 
Falange Nacional, founded in 1938, between 1948 and 1957, the 
Communist Party was outlaw and finally in 1965 Conservatives and 
Liberals were joined in the National Party. 
41 The Pearson coefficient of correlation was calculated for the 
variables 'proportion of deputies elected only once over the total 
number of deputies and proportion of parties that reached parliament 
only once over all parties" 
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The result of the 1958 presidential election 
prefigured in several senses what would occur in 
subsequent strategic confrontations within the political 
system, that is, in the subsequent presidential elections 
of 1964 and 1970. In the first place, in 1958, three 
principal figures appeared on the scene and remained for 
the rest of this historical period: Jorge Alessandri, 
Salvador Allende and Eduardo Frei. Victory fell to 
Alessandri, but Allende, who held second place obtained 
only 33,416 votes less. The "Priest of Catapilco"92 
obtained 41,304 votes, wherefore analysts agreed in 
attributing Allende's defeat to his populist campaign. 
This made a victory for the left seem probable in another 
election of the same kind. In the second place, this 
election marked the definitive replacement of the Radical 
Party by the Christian Democrats as the prime power in 
the center of a party system and the ideological 
spectrum. This change would have important consequences, 
for the Christian Democrats represented a new generation 
of young politicians who would assume the ideology 
dominant in the overall party system. 
The Radical Party was the axis of the system of 
party alliances that had, in Chile's case, politically 
42 See above page 45. 
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represented the social alliance that responded throughout 
Latin America to the consequences of the 1929 world 
crisis. This social alliance typically joined industrial 
interests (a weak bourgeoisie) to personnel dominating 
the state apparatus and simultaneously dependent upon it 
(civil and military middle classes). It was to this main 
axis that worker organizations and in some cases 
campesino mobilizations were subordinated. The 
ideological and organic forms this social alliance took 
were diverse (populist movements). But in the Chilean 
case these took the shape of a unified alliance of 
political parties (the Popular Front), in which what was 
most noteworthy was the participation of the working 
class subordinated to its parties (socialist and 
communist), but ideologically independent when both 
declared themselves Marxist. 43 
Reorganization of the capitalist world under the 
hegemony of the United States at the end of the Second 
World War was carried out by means of ideological- 
political instruments like the United Nations. Within 
these lay the implementation of a strategy for organizing 
43 See Faündez, Op. cit. 
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a world of nation-states, all of them in theory able to 
develop as such. 44 
The UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) 
theoretically coded the experience of the largest states 
in the region (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico) and 
converted them into a technical program for economic 
development, access to which would be gained by 
industrialization via import substitution. ECLA 
director, Raul Prebisch, formulated the ideas shaping 
that strategy. They became the doctrine around which pre- 
existing curricula in the social sciences in Latin 
American universities were reformulated and new schools 
for social sciences were founded (in sociology, political 
science, demography, social anthropology, etc. ) where 
none had previously existed. This constituted a forceful 
move toward the modernasiation of those institutes and a 
renewal of ideas under discussion, and generations of 
university; students in the 1950s were the first to 
benefit. 
In the early 1950s, Christian Democrats, still in 
the guise of Falange Nacional, began to partake of these 
ideas and appropriate them via some of their leaders and 
"Immanuel Wallerstein,. "Development: Lodestar or Illusion? " in 
Unthinking Social Science, pp. 104-124. 
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intellectuals. 45 They thus became the principal attraction 
for young Chilean university students in search of a 
ideological home in which to begin their political 
careers. By the end of the decade, Christian Democrats, 
through university membership, were leading student 
federations in the eight Chilean universities. 
It was also at the end of the decade, in 1959, that 
the Cuban Revolution changed the political and 
ideological landscape of Latin America. In the early 
sixties, priority U. S. foreign policy toward the nations 
of the region was expressed in "The Alliance for 
Progress. " This was a U. S. government fund aimed at 
promoting development in the Latin American countries, 
conditioning their participation in it to the undertaking 
of "structural reforms" along the policy lines proposed 
by ECLA. 96 At the same time that the armed forces of all 
the region's nations were reorganized and equipped for a 
hypothetical "internal war, " i. e. they were converted 
into counterinsurgency forces, the armed forces of the 
United States were developing the means to intervene in 
45 In 1954 Frei appeared as the spokesman for a Committee of the 
Interamerican Economic and Social Council of the OAS, expounding the 
viewpoints of ECLA's in an Annual Report in the discussion of which 
he had participated as an expert. Jerome Levinson, and Juan de Onis, 
The Alliance that Lost its Way p. 39 
46 Levinson and De Onis, Op. cit. 
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those countries threatened by insurgent movements. 47 To 
this should be added the intent to use these burgeoning 
Latin American social sciences as an instrument to 
evaluate the risk of social and political 
destabilization. 48 It was in this scenario, with the Cold 
War as an internal element of the region, that Chile 
faced presidential elections in 1964. 
1.7 Christian Democrat reformism. 
The left, organized in the Frente de Acciön Popular 
(FRAP), and composed of communist and socialist and other 
minor parties, again nominated Salvador Allende. The 
Christian Democrats also re-nominated their 1958 
candidate, Eduardo Frei M. The right, in power at the 
time with Jorge Alessandri as president, decided to 
support Julio Duran, candidate of the Radical Party, 
which had been integrated into the governing alliance 
during the period. 49 
Party campaigns and party alliances backing three 
candidates favored the probability of a victory for the 
alliance in power. However, a prior trial of strength, a 
q7 Operaciones contra fuerzas irregulares, translation of English 
Manual FM 31-15, May 31,1961. Cuartel General, Ministerio del 
Ejercito. Included in the Report of the Special Commission of the 
Chamber of Deputies on Operation Camelot, pp. 273-313. 
4" Report of the Special Commission of the Chamber of Deputies of 
Chile on Operation Camelot in 1965. 
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special election of a deputy at the beginning of 1964 
gave the victory to the FRAP, suggesting the danger of an 
imminent victory of the left in the presidential election 
scheduled for September. 50 The parties of the right, 
liberals and conservatives, therefore withdrew their 
support from Duran and gave it to Frei. Simultaneously, 
and with the help of the US government, an advertising 
campaign was launched known as "the campaign of terror, " 
full of truculent anticommunist invective, disseminating 
the idea that a victory for Allende would mean the 
imposition of a Marxist dictatorship, and describing 
Allende in the worst possible terms . 
51 This nevertheless, 
represented a profound crisis in the political right. In 
the first place, its electoral support was declining52 in 
the agrarian provinces, stronghold of its social power. 
Second, acceptance of its support by Frei and the 
Christian Democrats without negotiation or concessions, 
turned the right into a negative factor, in the sense 
that it only sought to prevent a left victory, without 
proposing its own platform. To this was added, between 
49 The Radical Party entered Jorge Alessandri's administration on 
August 26,1961, with four secretaries. Jorge Mario Quinzio 
Figueiredo, Op. cit. p. 86. 
5° Yocelevzky, Op. cit. pp. 129-134. 
51 Covert action in Chile, pp. 14-16. 
`'2 Tomas Moulian, La forja de ilusiones: el sistema de partidos 1932- 
193, pp. 109-122. 
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1963 and 1964, the presidential candidacy of Jorge Prat, 
withdrawn in April 1964, in which nationalist and fascist 
elements were mobilized, accentuating the anti-system and 
anti-party character of Acciön Nacional. Nevertheless, 
the organization they created would subsequently be the 
embryo of right wing reconstruction. 53 
The Christian Democrat candidacy accepted the 
support of the right, disseminating the (evidently false) 
supposition that support of Frei meant support of his 
reform program. 54 This consisted of a detailed plan for 
development prepared by party professionals and 
technicians and their sympathizers and containing the 
ideas associated with ECLA and in the final period, with 
the Alliance for Progress. 55 
For its part, the left also prepared an economic 
development program, also based on the ideas of ECLA, 
with the participation of economists linked to that organ 
of the United Nations56 (as in the case of the Christian 
Democrats). The left was put on the defensive by the 
53 Mario Arnello, Proceso a una democracia, pensamiento politico de 
Jorge Prat. 
54 See for example the "Discurso de la patria joven" of June 21, 
1964. 
55 Informe preliminar para un programa de gobierno de la Democracia 
Cristiana. Primer Congreso Nacional de Profesionales y Tecnicos de 
la Democracia Cristiana e Independientes (Libro Azul). 
5b Las bases tecnicas del plan de acciön del gobierno popular, 
OCEPLAN, Comando Nacional de la Candidatura Presidencial del Dr. 
Salvador Allende. 
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"campaign of terror" and tried to project an image of 
moderation, encouraging political-electoral organization 
and mobilization, but discouraging labour mobilization 
and de-emphasizing solidarity with the Cuban Revolution, 
the principal source of images for the "campaign of 
terror". 57 The whole party system thus appeared to be 
shifted toward the left, leaving the parties of the right 
without an ideological platform of their own. The center 
and left shared and quarreled over the ideas for national 
economic development, the center showing only a more 
technocratic bent. At the same time, the Christian 
Democrats sought to replace the left in their influence 
on urban and rural working class sectors by executing a 
plan of organization and mobilization of sectors not 
politically influenced (according to them), such as 
campesinos, shantytown dwellers and women. 58 
The most important measures carried out by the 
administration of Eduardo Frei Montalva between 1964 and 
1970 were the Chileanization of copper, 59 campesino union 
organization and agrarian reform. 60 All three were linked 
57 This was emphatically denied by Allende in an interview with the 
journalist Carlos Nünez, in 1970, included in the book Chile, Ala 
vltima opci6n electoral? pp. 94-95. 
58 With respect to the ideology and practice of this concept see 
Yocelevzky, Op. cit. chap. V, pp. 189-212. 
59 Luis Maira, Camino a la nacionalizaciön del cobre. 
`'`' David Lehman, Agrarian Reform in Chile. 
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to economic development plans and to the political and 
ideological struggle with the parties of the left. The 
Christian Democrats' strategic goal was to make 
themselves into the governing party that would carry out 
within itself the social alliance necessary to promote 
and back the reforms it proposed. In this it broke with 
the functional style of the party system. This was due 
to, in the first place, the right had had, in the Frei 
election, no alternative in the face of a victory from 
the left, but to unconditionally support the lesser evil. 
It was also due to the Frei presidential election of 
September 1964 being followed by a parliamentary election 
in March 1965, in which the Christian Democrats obtained 
a never-to-be-seen-again majority in the Chamber of 
Deputies. This was in part a product of a "band-wagon 
effect", and in part a result of the politicization of 
society in the presidential year. 
The reforms introduced by the Christian Democrats 
reached neither the specific goals proposed nor the 
political effects envisioned by those who had proposed 
them. In the light of its importance for the Chilean 
economy, the fact that the Chileanization of copper 
turned out to be insufficient was a weighty argument in 
producing the consensus with which the following 
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administration intended to nationalise all mineral 
resources. 61 Campesino union organisation combined with 
agrarian reform finally eliminated the captive electoral 
influence of the landholding oligarchy, the foundation of 
liberal and conservative representation in parliament. 
However, when the goals of agrarian reform were not 
fulfilled in terms of the number of beneficiaries, social 
and political mobilization in the rural sector ended by 
favoring the left. 62 The same thing occurred in the urban 
sector where organization and mobilization of city 
dwellers, instead of creating a popular foundation 
without class ideology, which was the view of Promocion 
Popular, ended by reinforcing the presence of Marxist 
parties in that sector as wel1.63 
The development of a generation of students aspiring 
to political careers in the sixties, was influenced by 
phenomena of international ideologies on the one hand 
and, on the other, by their prospects for promotion and 
development within the system of political parties. The 
Cuban Revolution had an impact on Latin America that is 
61 Julio Faündez, "A Decision without a Strategy: Excess Profits in 
the Nationalization of Copper in Chile" 
62 From the promulgation of the law for campesino union organization 
in 1967, the growth of campesino organizations was explosive. Among 
the fastest growing, between 1968 and 1969, was the Confederacön 
Nacional de Campesinos e Indigenas Ranquil affiliated to the CUT. 
6' Franz Vanderschueren, "Political Significance of Neighbourhood 
Committees in the Settlements of Santiago. " 
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difficult to exaggerate. 64 Nevertheless, in each country, 
those who were the first to join what was later called 
"castrismo" came not from Marxist or Socialist 
tendencies. They were middle class youths with a 
university education, generally formed in the parties and 
movements that had been dominant in the fifties, 
influenced by nationalist and developmental ideologies 
and who found their political careers obstructed or 
retarded by a generation aging too slowly for its 
interest. 
In Chile, the first manifestation of this tendency 
would occur before 1964, among the youth of the Radical 
Party. As soon as that party subordinated itself to the 
right and joined Jorge Alessandri's administration, with 
some of its members in the presidential cabinet, a large 
segment of the Radical Youth abandoned the party and 
created the Movimiento 65 Social-Progresista. After the 
1964 elections, a segment of the Juventud Socialista de 
Concepcion, made up mostly of university students, joined 
extra-parliamentary Marxist groups. These included 
communist and socialist dissidents of previous decades 
64 Costa Rica is the only Latin American country that had no armed 
movement inspired by the Cuban guerrilla model. 
65 Some of the names associated with this movement are surprising 
today. In spite of the fact that this movement, in the best Chilean 
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and formed the Movimiento de Izquierda Revclucionario 
(MIR), 66 which became the most important group on the left 
external to the system of political parties. 
A similar, but not symmetrical, movement occurred on 
the right. The left included elements seeking development 
outside the party system, for the most part positing 
armed struggle as the road to power, within the Guevarist 
movement then in style. On the right there was an 
ideological realignment that added members to the party 
system who had lived a more or less marginal political 
life. These were mainly nationalists who assumed 
leadership positions in the new National Party, that 
after 1966 joined Conservatives, Liberals and the 
National Action Movement which had launched the 
presidential candidacy of Jorge Pratt in 1963. Other 
youths, situated outside the party system and possessed 
of ideologies contrary to the course of development taken 
by Chile were also represented. These groups were of 
three types: 1) Catholic "integristas" opposed to the 
limitation of property rights which the agrarian reform 
style, was not an armed movement, it attached itself ideologically 
to the Second Havana Declaration. 
66 The founding of MIR in 1965, consisted in the unification of 
marginal left tendencies: Trotskyists and "reinocistas" of the 
forties with castroist youth. 
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was imposing; 67 2) Catholic university students opposed zo 
the domination of university political life and later of 
national life by the political parties ("gremialistas"); r` 
and 3) Nationalists who remained outside the National 
Party. 69 
Both on the left and the right, these developments 
had an influence that was not explicitly recognized by 
the actors belonging to the party system. The right took 
advantage of the presence of a violently inclined left. 
And the retrograde thinking of the burgeoning new right 
scandalized the left. However, the party system as whole 
continued to channel what was fundamental in national 
political life and, in general, expressed social demands 
while extra-legal acts were sporadic. 
The environment in which the 1970 presidential 
electoral campaign took place was characterized by 
growing social mobilization begun in 1964, presenting 
fertile ground on which the Christian Democrats tried 
67 This is the public origin of the Chilean Society for the Defense 
of Tradition, Family and Property (TFP), known by the title of its 
publication, the journal Fiducia. In 1965, they collected signatures 
to protest the constitutional reform of the right to property, which 
would facilitate the expropriations necessary for agrarian reform, 
sent to Congress by Frei administration in December 1964. That 
protest was published in El Mercurio of May 15,1965. 
Their origin goes back to 1966 in the Law School of the Catholic 
University. Jaime Guzman, Escritos personales, p. 39. 
69 Traditional marginal fascists, like the MRNS, or mobilized by the 
opportunities for change drawing near, like Patria y Libertad. 
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first to compete with the left, but then in t:: e second 
part of Frei's administration decided to repress it. 70 
A polarization occurred in the ideological sphere 
that took shape in sectors on the right and left 
organized outside the party system, but that influenced 
the closest parties above all through youth sectors for 
whom they represented an alternative. 
Ideological change even reached the center, the 
party of the government which, at the middle of its 
period in office, ought to have opted for a 
radicalization of its reform program, to compete with the 
left, or adopt an attitude of moderation that might 
permit it to present itself as an alternative to the left 
among sectors of the right, as had occurred in 1964. By 
resolving in favor of the latter possibility, the 
Christian Democrats saw youth sectors separate from the 
party and form their own organization, the Movimiento de 
Accion Popular Unitaria (MAPU). 71 
In cultural terms, Chilean society was shaken by 
abstract universal ideological polemics. For example the 
above mentioned Catholic ultra-right organized its 
70 On the social and political mobilisation under the Frei 
administration see Faündez, Julio Guzman, Marxism and Democracy in 
Chile, p. 152. 
71 On the internal struggles in the Christian Democratic Party during 
the Frei administration see Yocelevzky, Op. cit., pp. 279-315. 
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Chilean Society for the Defense of Tradition, Fa_-r. ily an 
Property (FIDUCIA), which, according to its best knowv 
expression, viewed the Christian Democratic goveriment 
and its reform programs as the anteroom to communism. 
Such people rejected the vogue of the period -- shoulder 
length hair on men, rock groups and so on -- and caused 
violent incidents among middle and upper class youths. 
Student movements culminated in 1967 with the occupation 
of the main building of the Universidad Catölica and a 
sign on the facade denouncing Chile's principal and, 
naturally, right wing newspaper, El Mercurio, as a 
purveyor of falsehoods. 
Meanwhile in public universities the Movimiento de 
Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR), which directed the 
Universidad de Concepcion Federation of Students, became 
popular among the students. This was the main 
"castroist" -type movement in Chile. They rejected the 
elections as a way to power and carried out several bank 
robberies in 1968 and 1969. 
The victory of Christian Democratic reformism lent 
the overall political system the appearance of a shift to 
the left, by subordinating the right in the presidential 
election and then defeating it in parliamentary elections 
the following year. At the beginning of 1970 the system 
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still appeared to have shifted in that direction but with 
the right on the way to rapid recovery. 72 The perception 
of a threat from outside the party system as part of this 
reconstruction of the process enjoys the advantage of 
hindsight. For the actors, if there was a perception of 
threat, it was no more than the victory of one of their 
adversaries. The Partido Nacional appeared to be 
reinforcing the system by incorporating nationalistic 
currents that had been until then blatantly anti-system 
and anti-party. 73 Only the right, and not all of it, 
perceived Allende's victory as a threat to the system 
itself. If there was an explicit threat to the existence 
of the system it came from the ultra-left which could not 
be considered capable of creating a crisis even in the 
Chilean politics of the moment. It was a feature of right 
wing propaganda to try to associate Allende's candidacy 
with the armed activities of the MIR and other groups, or 
to confuse occasionally illegal social mobilizations with 
acts threatening the system. 
72 The recently created Partido Nacional enjoyed a noteworthy success 
in the 1969 parliamentary elections, tripling the representation in 
the Chamber of Deputies, which the conservative and liberal parties 
had obtained in 1965. 
73 Such is the case of the National Action Movement which went i-s 
name to the new party which concluded former Ibahists and nazis, who 
were earlier still. 
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Apparently, the system faced the 1970 presidential 
election with a repetition of previously confronting 
forces (the worn out thesis of the three `hirds), 
represented by already well-known candidates, one even 
having beeen previously elected to the same position for 
which he was being nominated again. A more careful 
analysis reveals elements of continuity and change 
related in a complex fashion. 
On the right, the factor for continuity was the 
candidate Jorge Alessandri who, as was pointed out 
earlier, had already held that investiture between 1958 
and 1964. He had the support of conservatives and 
liberals now joined in the new Partido Nacional. However, 
this new party had among its leaders individuals who 
until then had been marginal to the party system. Some of 
them, from as far back as the Creole Nazism of the 
thirties, had participated with others in the ephemeral 
populist experience of Ibanez, with a nationalistic 
ideology that had always remained subordinate within the 
system. However, they aspired to conquer an electoral 
clientele among the urban middle classes that would 
replace the comfortable captive vote of the campesinos 
now mobilized by both the Christian Democrats and the 
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left since the advent of new forms of organization in the 
rural sector. 
The crisis suffered by the traditional parties o 
the right had also mobilized entrepreneurial corporative 
organizations within which, during the Frei 
administration, competition appeared between Christian 
Democrats and the traditional right for influence in 
those sectors. This produced the paradoxical result of 
increasing the influence of entrepreneurial sectors in 
the government at the cost of the more ideological 
influence of the Christian Democrat Party itself, but 
also activated new political forces outside the party 
system. 74 
All the same, Alessandri's candidacy had a 
centripetal effect on the political system, attracting 
and subordinating to its rules the new arrivals who 
represented a renewal of the right within and outside the 
party system. This renewal seemed to make the right 
strong enough to avoid subordinating itself to the 
Christian Democrats (as they had done in 1964) even with 
the increasing possibility of an electoral victory of the 
left. Nevertheless, this Alessandrist right of 1970 
continued to fall within the ideological model of 
the 
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party system as far as the economic development of the 
country was concerned. With respect to the formulation 
of its program of government, Alessandri's campaign 
brought "the Chicago boys" head to head with "the brains 
of the captains of industry who had flourished under the 
protection of import substitution. " 75 
Although it is possible to detect the beginning of 
the demise of the party system as far back as the 1960s, 
it cannot be said that the system was in a state of 
crisis in 1970. On the contrary, if neither the left nor 
the right electoral campaigns were able to introduce 
centrifugal forces into the party system, they were 
indeed able to neutralize them. What unleashed the 
critical process was the result of the elections of 
September 4,1970, and the victory of Salvador Allende 
and the Unidad Popular. 
74 See Yocelevzky, op. cit. pp. 222-228. 
` Arturo Fontaine Aldunate, La historia no contada de los 
economistas y e1 presidente Pinochet, p. 32. He adds, 
'From De 
Castro and his people came a letter to the candidate establishing 
their positions and declining to continue in their posts. 
" 
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Chapter 2. Unidad Popular and the crisis of the political 
system in 1973 
2.1 The problem and the points of view from which i} has 
been examined 
Chile's experience from 1970 to 1973 has produced a 
veritable avalanche of books since Allende's election and 
even more after the tragic end to his incumbency. ' The 
thematic axes of this extensive and growing literature 
are various. The most common are attempts to evaluate the 
chances of a peaceful transition to socialism, both among 
its supporters in general and among its enemies. 2 Later, 
after the Chilean left was defeated, appraisals of the 
experience appeared which largely preserved the same 
earlier positions. 3 To these must be added 
justifications for the roles played by some of the 
actors, individual and collective, who survived the 
1 Just collecting and classifying the bibliography on the subject 
would constitute a full-fledged research project. Here only 
representative examples of it will be mentioned. 
2 Examples of publications subsequent to Allende's election include: 
Clark, Kate. Chile, Reality and Prospects of Popular Uni`, -, Lawrence 
& Wishart, London, 1972; Debray, Regis. Conversations with Allende, 
New Left Books, London, 1971; Feinberg, Richard E., The Triumph -f 
Allende: Chile's Legal Revolution, Mentor Books, New York, 1972; 
Garces, Joan. Chile: el camino politico hacia el socialismo, F:. 
Ariel, Barcelona, 1972; Labarca, Eduardo. Chile al rojo, Juan Pablos 
Editor, Mexico, 1971; Morris, David J. We Must Make Haste-Slo, ti_'y. 
The Process of Revolution in Chile, Vintage Books, New York, 1973; 
Vitale, Luis. ýY despues del 4, ýque: Ediciones Prensa 
Latinoamericana, Santiago, 1970. 
3 This example is cited because of the significance of the a: thcr, a 
friend and advisor to Salvador Allende, see Garces, Joan. . A? lende %, 
la experiencia Chilena. Las armas de 1a politica. 
72 
events as victors or vanq'sisheci .4 Amongst supccrters of 
socialism, there were those who credited the chances of 
a peaceful path to socialism and those who denie t_at 
possibility, proposing armed struggle as the only way to 
take power. 5 However, among the former, there was a 
difference between those who justified their hopes in 
general on doctrinaire theoretical terms and those who 
accepted the exceptional nature of the "Chilean case. if 6 
Among its enemies, the predominant view was of the Unidad 
Popular government as a "communist conspiracy" which, 
peaceful or not, would sooner or later lead to 
dictatorship, thus the whole discussion taking place on 
the left made no sense to them. ' 
After the denouement of the process, the same 
arguments assumed new significance. For those who 
believed in a peaceful road to socialism, the causes of 
its defeat were to be found in the immorality of its 
4 Altamirano, Carlos. Dialectica de una derrota. Arriagada, Genaro. 
De 1a "via Chilena" a 1a "via insurreccional ", (with the prologue by 
Eduardo Frei M. ). Arriagada, Genaro and Claudio Orrego, Leninismo y 
democracia. Prieto, Helios. Los gorilas estaban entre nosotros. 
5 See Joan Garces, Op. cit., as an example of those who believed in 
the Chilean way, and "MIR, mouvement de la gauche revol: ýtionaire" 
1970-1973 Recueil du Textes, " Politique Hebdo, Paris, 1974, as an 
example of the other position. 
b The difference, however, is a matter of nuance. An interesting 
example of this phenomenon can be seen in the difference between 
president Allende's first message to the full Congress, May 21, 
1971, and the reasons given by Joan Garces in E1 Estado y los 
probl emas tdcticos en e1 gobierno de Allende, pp. 225-277. 
Echeverria, Andres y Luis Frei B., (compilers). 1970-1P7?: La lucha 
por la juridicidad en Chile, vol. I, p. 9. 
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enemies, the Chilean right and the Jove rme, -` of : ~e 
United States, and in the irresponsible acts of he 
ultra-left. 8 For those who criticized the peace, U 
attempt from the left, responsibility falls on the 
"reformists" who led the process and the people to 
defeat. 9 For the enemies of socialism, now triumphant, 
it is a matter of "proving" the existence of the 
Communist conspiracy which, again, vitiates the prior 
discussion and, furthermore, morally justifies the acts 
of all those who took part in the coup d'etat. lo 
Only exceptionally is a study to be found that seeks 
to frame in other terms the situation that led Chile to a 
victory of the left in 1970 and to military dictatorship 
in 1973. This is doubtless due to the paradigmatic 
importance attributed from the outset to the Chilean 
experience, setting aside any connection with the 
country's importance in the world. This makes it 
practically impossible to adopt an indifferent point of 
view toward the values that were in play and the results 
of the entire process. 
ß El pleno de agosto de 1977 del Comite Central del Partido 
Comunista 
de Chile. 
%QUE ES EL MIR? " document prepared by the Central Committee of the 
MIR in hiding. December 1974. In MIR, 1973-1975. The position of 
he 
small *Maoist" sector is described by Palacios, 
Jorge. Jnile: An 
Attempt at "Historic" Compromise. The Real Story of the . 
elende 
Years. 
1" Moss, Robert. Chile's Marxist Experiment. 
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It is not my intention to respond to the --estio-s 
raised by all the literature on the case. The purpose of 
this analysis is to examine the evolution of its actors 
between 1970 and 1973, with special attention to the 
organizational and ideological forms adhering to each of 
the opposing forces for the final encounter. 
Rather than evaluate the Chilean road to sociaýism, 
it is here sought to describe the destiny of the 
political parties and the system of conflict resolution 
established among them, in a situation that put their 
ability to channel a crucial social conflict to the 
test. 11 
2.2 The Unidad Popular Program and its interpretations 
The problems of Allende's administration and of the 
Chilean left tend to be conceptualized, both then and 
subsequently, as an ideological conflict. This woulJ be 
centered on tactical questions that posited the 
application of Unidad Popular's Basic Program of 
Government, assuming a degree of consensus around his 
program as a strategic definition. Two positions may 
defined in this conflict, corresponding to two p_: ý. r 
blocs within the left. On the one han., the 'ýýmý, mist 
11 An analysis of the genesis of the system may be found in: 
Yocelevzky, Ricardo. "El desarrollo de los partidos politicos 
75 
Party and Allende himself represented a pose or o 
fundamental matters, described as "reformist"; ' its 1-1 
critics. On the other hand, the position represertei, 
the MIR, and other sectors of the Socialist Party a-: ýý 
MAPU, was described as "revolutionary" or %%,,, L tra- 
leftist", according to the favourable or critical 
character of the definition intended. In confrontations 
subsequent to 1973, arguments are expressed as if the 
acts of these sectors had been independent one from the 
other and explained preferably by their consistency or 
lack of it with doctrinaire points of view e:. -. pressed by 
each of them. Thus a cross-fire of mutual recriminations 
appears in which the facts described are fundamentally 
the acts of the ""other. " 
The operative part of this version of the process is 
limited to the existence of the ideological conflict. 
From it, matters of organizational shape and social 
representativity on either side tend to be arbitrary ýr: ý, 
in some cases, frankly abusive. 
12 One way arcuF it . is 
problem is to define the ideological conflict Th the 
light of relations established between tLhe sectors 
instead of supposing their total division or, even, tr: eir 
chilenos hasta 1970. " Argumentos, N° 7, Mexico, Agostc, 
1989 and 
summarized in the previous chapter. 
12 For examples of this, see Prieto, Op. cit. and Pala 
ios, Op. cit. 
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absolute independence. This offers a much more mple.: 
picture at the organizational level, and casts ioub` o^: 
some suppositions as to the social represent-at vity of, 
each of the adversaries, although a degree ofi 
inconclusiveness, in comparison to other commentaries of 
this period, is an inavoidable corollary. 
The ideological conflict seems well defined if 
adherence to the Chilean road, as a possible shift to 
socialism without violent rupture in the institutional 
framework, is taken as the axis of commitment. If social 
forces were expressed as supporting the government, then 
the transition to a socialist society, within the same 
institutional framework, was possible. 13 Opposing this 
view was another that took Allende's 1970 election as 
merely an accident of history. And to the extent that the 
strategic blueprint was really a shift to socialism and 
not only a collection of reforms, the process would 
"become normalized" via a violent break which, if the 
socialist forces were victorious, would have to yieli to 
a dictatorship of the proletariat. 
14 
13 Corvalän, Luis. "Nada hay mäs revolucionario que luchar por el 
exito del Gobierno Popular" Informe al pleno del Comite Cen~ral J-1 
Partido Comunista November, 1970. 
14 "Anälisis de la significaciön y las consecuencias e la eleccibn 
de Salvador Allende a la Presidencia de la Republica. " ý1me': t 
prepared by the MIR National Secretariat and 
in the 
journal Punto Final in October 1970. 
77 
The first consequence of these pcsi`_ons were `wo 
different definitions of the meaning of the acticr. s he 
government should undertake. One entailed the 
legitimation of the administration on three essen}iai 
levels: respect for legality, economic development a:: ii 
satisfaction of the demands of urban and rural working 
class people. 15 These three different levels of government 
action would have to yield electoral support and social 
mobilization which, expressed within legal limits, would 
have the effect of demobilizing the opposition. This 
point made the need for coherence between the blueprint 
for economic development and political strategy evident. 
The second involved the sector we will call "pro- 
rupture" (to avoid its chosen name of "revolutionary" or 
the pejorative "ultra-left" or "violent" used 
respectively by their critics within the government any 
by the right opposition), for whom political tactics 
should have no other axis than mobilizing the masses to 
consciousness of the imminence of confrontation. With 
that as the starting point the levels at which t*-: e 
government sought to legitimate its actions changed 
in 
relative importance. What shifted to the 
ýoregrcl, ýnd were 
the immediate benefits to rural and urban w rkir: g class 
15 With respect to the latter, see "Las primeras cuarenta 
medidas del 
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sectors even at the price of planne- objectives for 
economic development and the maintenance of the legal 
16 framework. Thus, the two tactical views -ashe, 
concrete points that required policy definition by the 
government . These included the question: of rh,,. a ..: 
depth in the application of the economic program. Another 
was the problem of social alliances, particularly, he 
need to adjust policies to the goal of broadening 
government support among the middle classes. A further 
point was the maintenance of legal order in the presence 
of social mobilizations the likes of which had never been 
seen before. 
These three points largely summarize the 
multiplicity of axes of encounter between the two 
interpretations. The first postulated harmonizing the 
two different objectives: economic grow. %wth and 
transformation of structure. The Basic Program of 
Government, oriented by the view of economic development 
that links the distribution of income and he 
redefinition of a growth strategy'7, sought to harmcr, ize 
Gobi erno Popular" 
" See the critique of this position in Corvalän, Luis. Informe il 
pleno de agosto de 1977 del Comite Central del Partido : cmunist_i de 
Chile. 
17 Vuskovic, Pedro. "Distribuciön del ingreso y opciones de 
desarrollo" in Economia politica en la Pop_: 1ar, Edi`crial 
Fontanella, Barecelona, 1975. 
1. 
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these objectives via the definition of three areas of 
property in the economy: the area of social proper-; j, the 
area of mixed-property, and the area of private prope--:,, -. 
The area of social property would have to guarantee the 
government the capability of strategic management of the 
country's development, whereas the other two areas, mixe, 11 
and private, would be subject to that strategy stimulated 
by other instruments of economic policy. These were 
basically the control of foreign trade and banking by the 
state and by a level of demand that would be the product 
of redistribution of income and would compensate for the 
restriction of profits by price control with an increase 
in the volume of sales. 18 
This development strategy seemed coherent with the 
political strategy that sought to broaden support for the 
blueprint among the middle classes. Dependent sectors 
among the latter would be the direct beneficiaries o the 
redistribution of income while independent sectors 
merchants and manufacturers) would benefit indirectly ro 
the extent that their production and sales increased at 
the rate of demand. This would make i possible 'o 
isolate the groups affected socially ar. a poll iticalill, 
18 Programa bäsico de gobierno de la Unidad Popular. 
hhlý 
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the expropriations needed to bring about stave ccitrcl of 
strategic economic sectors. 
All these presupposed popular support expresseJ ýý 
mobilizations within legal party and union organizational 
frameworks. In addition to growing support from The 
middle classes they would provide social and political 
backing for the government allowing it to isolate the 
dominant classes and neutralize their opposition 
activities within the political system. 19 
The alternative to this point of view, which 
developed throughout the process, came from the 
inevitability of confrontation. Hence the tasks of 
legitimation lost their importance in face of the need to 
achieve rapid and profound changes. Thus, the limits of 
expropriation should not be determined by strategy aimed 
at the middle classes, but by the urgency of achieving 
the organization and mobilization of urban and rural 
working class sectors. This required the creation of new 
forms of organization and of government support for 
recovery that would reinforce consciousness of the depths 
of the changes. Thereby, leaving to demons-ra-ior. s of 
social power thus accumulated, the resolution. of miii e 
19 Marin, Gladys. "La clase obrera y su politica de alianzas" in Los 
mil dias de revoluciön, Editorial Paz y Socialism, Praga, 1978, pp. 
88-105. 
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class inclinations b-, 7 demonstrating the ýr: evýýabiIit of 
those changes or, as it was called, the "irreversibility, " 
of the process . 
20 The coexistence of these two approaches 
to tactics defined government action but not in the sense 
of one of them being chosen by the government and the 
alternative being external to it, but rather as both 
coexisting within the government. Even though one might 
predominate, the other acted in part outside the 
government but always attempting to improve positions 
within it. This situation determined the ambiguities of 
government action and of the forces supporting it. 21 
2.3 Government action and its ambiguities. 
The situation posed by Allende's victory in 1970 
revealed the contradictions that would frame his 
administration. On the one hand legitimacy was derived 
from acting within the rules of the system and, on the 
other, support was obtained from expectations of change 
in that very system. In a previous chapter it was 
pointed out that there existed a duality in the political 
forces of the right and of the left. This .. as 
20 See the speech by Nelson Gutierrez, member of the MIR Secretariat 
and president of the Federation of Students of the University of 
Concepciön in 1971. Reproduced in MIR Mcuvement, Op. ci*. pp. 22-26. 
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constituted by the presence in them of some actors 
seeking to situate their action within the system with to 
the aim of dominating it and others who, from outside the 
system sought its destruction. In the case of the left, 
with the prospect of becoming an elected government, 
subordination of factors external to the system 
(basically the MIR) was reinforced at the outset. 
If the content of the program and the style defining 
the campaign had left MIR without alternative banners 
other than of exploring ways of taking power, the 
electoral victory contradicted any arguments brought 
against the electoral route as a valid political path. 
However, the hegemony of the strategy which acted within 
the system was accentuated to the extent that the period 
from the election to Allende's inauguration was marked by 
acts from the right that sought by legal and illegal 
means to prevent that accession to the presidency. In the 
face of that eventuality, MIR and other smaller groups 
acting outside the system considered the possibility of 
having to participate in a confrontation in which they 
would defend the legitimacy of the electoral vicLor;,. 22 
' In this respect, see the ambiguity of the Political Resolution at 
the Socialist Party Congress at La Serena. Maurice Najman (Ed. ) Le 
Chili est proche, pp. 37-40. 
`` MIR: "Anälisis de la significaciön de las consecuencias de la 
eleccibn de Salvador Allende... " Op. cit. 
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Throughout the entire period of Un a- _cc''l: r 
administration these ambiguities meant the tactical 
subordination by the government of the 
parliamentary left, but not the loss of its relative 
independence which was expressed practically on all 
points of encounter between the administration and the 
opposition. Among them it is necessary to examine at 
least four fields of action. These were the electoral 
processes, as tests of strength between the government 
and the opposition; the mobilization of masses; the use 
of legal recourse by the administration in its 
confrontation with the opposition; and, finally, policy 
toward the armed forces. 
On the organizational level, the duality of actions 
(within and outside the system) constituted a middle 
ground in which some parties, acting within the system 
and forming part of the government, began to be 
influenced by positions and factors that had situatei 
themselves, until then, outside it. 23 This was . iüe to 
changes that had begun before 1970, but the importance of 
`-' The parties that received these cadres were principally, the 
Socialist Party and to a lesser extent, MAPU (Movimiento de Aý--iön 
Popular Unitaria). 
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which was reinforced after the electoral viiýor, a 
affected all levels of the political system. 24 
Among the professional leaders, some of thee. :. a 
since the sixties adopted a position which, in a ver1i 
broad sense, might be characterized as "Castroist. iý5 
After 1970 this position became, in general, what has 
been defined as "pro-rupture, " and was reinforced by new 
adherents. The most important representatives of this 
position are unquestionably Carlos Altamirano, who became 
Secretary General of the Socialist Party in its National 
Congress at La Serena in 1971, and Oscar Guillermo 
Garretön, Secretary General of MAPU after the death of 
that party's founder Rodrigo Ambrosio. 
Something similar, and perhaps even more important, 
occurring at the rank-and-file level of party membership 
was the entry into the Socialist Party of cadres, and 
even complete organizations, coming from the extra- 
parliamentary left. 26 However, this is not the only 
tendency that was reinforced at this level. One TM. ýýst 
also consider the reactivation of generally passive 
members of the parties and the recruitment of new members 
2" See Yocelevzky, Op. cit. and, by the same 
Cristiana Chilena y el gobierno de Eduardo 
`5 See for example the lecture delivered by 
return from a trip to Cuba and published bý 
N° 31,2"j fortnight of June, 1967. 
author La Democracia 
Frei, 1964-1970. 
Carlos Altamiran« on his 
r the journal Punto Final, 
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brought about by access to the goverr_rr en t by left V4 
organizations and their consequent expectations of 
obtaining posts and emoluments at all levels of the 
public sector. 27 
At the third level, that of party clienteles, there 
were other changes at the rate of the general increase in 
social mobilization caused by the 1970 election. Among 
worker, campesino and shantytown dwellers there was a 
veritable explosion of organization and mobilization 
which, in many cases, significantly strengthened the pro- 
rupture position within and outside the parties of Unidad 
Popular. In this case, the principal beneficiary of the 
phenomenon was MIR. 28 
Under these conditions, the political problem facing 
the government could be formulated in abstract terms as 
follows. It should transform the economy, the State and 
the political system without breaking the State's 
regulatory framework and by reinforcing the political 
system to the extent that the parties in the government 
were part of it. In this formulation, governmenr strategy 
and tactics were defined as strengthening the parries of 
` The Movimiento Revolucionario Manuel Rodriguez (MR-2). 
27 Part of the rooting of the parties in society was due to the 
capability of professional politicians of all parties to dispense 
patronage, that is, in the interest of promoting individual or grc-gip 
interests. 
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Unidad Popular. By ^. plementirg a re-i-s`riblýtve 
29 policy, their social basis of support woül be exten, Aed 
by deepening their influence on working class sectors an 
would even reach the middle classes. Thus, economic 
policy would make it possible to further political change 
without rupture but rather by a self-transformation of 
the political system. 
Economic policy became the preferred field of 
confrontation between government and opposition but also 
the point of concentration of demands promoted among 
working class sectors by cadres committed to the pro- 
rupture position. For those cadres, leading that type of 
mobilization was justified by the level of consciousness 
attained through them in the mobilized sectors, and at 
the same time, it allowed them to broaden their degree of 
penetration and influence among social sectors considered 
strategic to the victory of the socialist blueprint. In 
this way, new developments appeared in the labor union 
struggle among campesinos and among shantytown dwellers. 30 
28 Najman, Maurice. Op. cit. pp. 14-22. 
" Cortes, Fernando and Ricardo Yocelevzky, "la distribuciön del 
ingreso en el gobierno de la Unidad Popular (1970-1972)", Demogralia 
y Economia, N°43, Mexico, 1980. 
30 Growth of union affiliation is a good example. During the three 
years of Unidad Popular government, the number of union mer ers 
increased in absolute terms to a level similar to that achieved in 
the previous eight years. Campero, Guillermo and Jose A. Valenziuela. 
El movimiento sindical en el regimen militar chileno, 197_? -1981, 
ILET, Santiago, 1984, p. 154. 
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All these mobilizations were ambýyu--s. Or. the one 
hand, the extra-parliamentary left seemed to strengthen 
its mass support in mobilization. But, at the same time, 
it refused to enter the system, resulting in its 
clientele supporting the government at the polls even 
though this occurred via the vote for candidates who, 
acting within the system, identified themselves with the 
pro-rupture position (basically the Socialist Party). 
On the other hand, given the corporative nature of 
the demands around which the pro-rupture sector organized 
its mobilizations, there was no guarantee that political 
consciousness developed in these sectors would coincide 
with the expectations of the political cadres who 
organized them. Depending on achievement and not on 
demands, the effect might be integration or, at least, 
greater contact with the political system, its 
professional cadres and its functional channels. This is 
quite clear in the case of industries in which the 
demands of workers were for their integration into the 
social area of the economy, and of campesinos who 
demanded incorporation of land into the agrarian reform, 
and shantytown dwellers demanding housing a-. d -rban 
services. Even though the movement was organized with the 
participation of the extra-parliame-. }ar; Y left, --he midi. le 
mký 
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sector, the pro-rupture forces within the system aote as 
negotiators of the demands and their satisfaction 
depended on the government. Thus, it may not to be said 
that all corporative movements amongst the working class 
sectors -- that made demands querying the tactical limits 
established by the government for the application of its 
program -- would necessarily strengthen the pro-rupture 
position or weaken the government or those who supported 
its tactical version of the general strategy. 
Given their content, the accumulation of demands 
became a problem for the government. At least in the most 
general sense, this was one of the components of the 
principal tactical dilemma that it sought to resolve in 
1972 by changing the Minister of Economy and short-term 
economic policy. 31 However, this reflection in the sphere 
of economic policy disguised another, perhaps deeper, 
problem. By virtue of their content, as much as of their 
methods of mobilization and action to achieve their 
demands, these movements brought tension to relations 
between the government and the State apparatus, in 
particular, the police, the armed forces and she judicial 
branch. For the opposition, the point was to be able to 
demonstrate that the administration tolerltei The 
Im, _ 
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overstepping of legality by its supporters an la`er, 
that the government's own acts were outside the law. 32 
This point leads to unstable ground if it may not be 
affirmed that all actions in support of demands outsi, Je 
the administration's tactical limits would strengthen the 
pro-rupture position. It is equally unclear that 
government policy to avoid repression, if at all 
possible, placed it outside the law as the opposition 
claimed. As it is unclear that the result of any 
mobilization not controlled by the government would, by 
providing fuel to the right, reinforce the opposition. 
Both accusations were formulated and supported by 
inconclusive proof. 33 However, this point in the 
ideological struggle was resolved in favor of the 
opposition at a deeper level. Not because its statements 
were true, but because they deepened the gulf between 
State and administration. This was ultimately crucial in 
resolving the opposition's own internal situation in 
favor of another, successful rupture: the coup d'etat. 
Undoubtedly, the whole process increased popu'ar 
participation and developed the consciousness of working 
31 Mistral, Carlos. Chile: del triunfo Popular al golpe fa ,; st-3, Ed. 
Era, Mexico, 1974. pp. 67-73. 
32 Echeverria and Frei. (Compilers), Op. cit., Volume IT, 'Acusaciones 
constitucionales. " 
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class sectors in terms of a strategic option for 
socialism. This may be seen in patterns of social and 
political conduct little remembered today. 34 
Nevertheless, in terms of explicit tactical options what 
is clear is that, in practice, the pro-rupture option had 
to subordinate itself to the government and to the 
alliance of parties supporting it until the end. 
Consequently, its actions were situated within the 
system. 
If this took place at a level of mass clienteles 
that could be mobilized by social organizations and for 
electoral purposes, expressions of contradiction between 
tactical options that co-existed reached their greatest 
ideological and practical virulence at the intermediate 
level, that of the militant party rank-and-file. It is 
here that the sense of the irreducibility of this 
contradiction most obtains, yet the ambiguities visible 
at this level have already been pointed out. 
It was at the top level, that of the professional 
political elite that contradictions were resolved in 
favor of the political system. Evidence in this respect 
See for example, the report to the plenum of the Central Party o 
the Chilean Communist Party, August 1977, Op. cit. pp. 22-23. 
3a As an example, see the story of textile workers of the Yarur 
industry told by Peter Winn, Weavers of Revolution, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1986. 
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is certainly not abundant. Not even actors who toa,, - 
assume positions similar to or distant from those that 
identified them then would be very willing to accept this 
conclusion. However, the very endurance of this 
political elite to this day may be considered a good 
indicator of this resolution. On the other hand, we have 
already mentioned the ambiguity characteristic of the 
actions of leaders seeking to improve their position 
within the system by the use of pro-rupture discourse. 
In part they fulfilled the task of subordinating sectors 
which, on all three levels, situated their action as well 
as their discourse outside the system (the other part was 
fulfilled by direct contact at the upper levels among 
leaders of the two positions). 35 
The real subordination of the pro-rupture position 
to the government and to those supporting the tactic of 
maintaining the institutional system is obscured by two 
factors leading to consequences beyond their real 
significance in the correlation of forces within the 
left. These were the policy toward the armed forces and 
the impact of the 
intellectual sectors. 
ideological confrontation in 
35 Alain Touraine seems to point to the same type of events without 
this supposing that he would be in agreement with the analysis 
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In the light of their actions in the co,,; Ü ' e--a} 
the armed forces have been the object of controversy it 
almost all subsequent commentaries on the Ch ea: -_ 
experience. Emphasis has been given to the contradiction 
between the policies of the government and those of the 
pro-rupture sector toward them. Apparently, the duality 
was expressed in the government's intent to maintain the 
structure of the armed forces as part of the 
institutional system and obtain, if not their adherence, 
at least their obedience and their forbearance from 
politics as a result of direct government influence on 
the high command. 36 Pro-rupture policy sought influence on 
the basis of the social composition of the armed forces, 
calling upon non-commissioned officers and other ranks to 
adopt a class stance, 37 and seeking to attract officer and 
non-commissioned officer sectors to activities of a 
conspiratorial nature in expectation of a crucial 
confrontation. 38 It is important to recall that all these 
activities were far from new. They acquired a different 
significance in the situation of the Unidad Popular 
proposed here. See, Vida y muerte del Chile Popular, Siglo XXI Eds., 
Mexico, 1974, p. 21. 
36 Altamirano, Carlos. Op. cit., p. 153. 
3' MIR, Op. cit. pp. 84-85. 
"' The best known cases are, before the coup d'etat, that of he 
sailors, and subsequently, the trial in The air force. Fcr the 
former, see Politzer, Patricia. Altamirano, Ediciones Melquiades, 
Buenos Aires, 1989, pp. 133-140. 
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administration, but each could appeal -o a : raditiori in 
Chilean politics. As for an evaluation, it mal- only be 
stated that, in the negative sense, the fac: : ha: : he 
coup did not occur earlier may be taken as indicative of 
the predominance of government policy over the policy of 
the pro-rupture sectors. However, the image that the 
opposition sought to project was precisely the opposite, 
and that was part its policy toward the armed forces. As 
to the significance of left policies toward the military, 
it may be said that they reflected consciousness of the 
separation between state and government that 
characterised the situation. Nevertheless, they were 
incapable of producing adequate action on those grounds, 
whereas the opposition, after Allende's victory, (as will 
be seen below) focused its tactics precisely around that 
point. 
It is important to indicate that the role of the 
intellectuals was twofold, contributing to a blurring of 
a tactical duality within the left. On the one ha-.:, i} 
was they who, during and after Allende's administration, 
expressed the ideological conflicts and therefore, 
defined the views that predominated with respect to him,. 
However, on the other hand, they were ýivi1 ýe vors 
in more senses than simply functioning as ideol-: g. '>s. In 
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the general sense of the term intellectual, the ý'ri 
Popular government produced an unprecedented poly--ical 
mobilization of the intellectual sector. Both the r. ee-J to 
provide personnel for the multiple tasks of government 
and the intensity of the ideological struggle created new 
tasks for intellectuals and threw them, though not for 
the first time, into unusual political activity. Here, it 
should be remembered that these kinds of personnel were 
characteristic of the professional elite of almost all 
parties and, in this sense, there is a clear tendency 
toward radicalization and the taking of pro-rupture 
positions among the intellectual sectors of shorter or 
lesser integration into party dominated politics before 
1970. Undoubtedly, criteria for the duration of the 
integration was affected by age, underscoring a 
generational break that places the components of the 
newer organizations, generally directed by university 
students of the sixties (MIR, MAPU and, to a lesser 
degree the Christian Left) among the pro-rupture sectors. 
t cri However, there is also a degree of radical ion 
pro-rupture stances among intellectuals of earlier 
generations. These older intelle, tuals had r. ct -, ade =. 
career as professional politicians. They stepped from 
academic or technocratic activities into the pr--ý, c-. 
ice of 
95 
government and, from there to the political' parties to 
which they might have been affiliated before but in which 
they had not been active leaders. 
Ultimately, it does not seem possible, from the 
point of view adopted here, to attribute the defeat to 
the existence of two tendencies, nor to the predominance 
of one over the other. Available evidence shows that the 
breach between them was not absolute and that, on the 
contrary, contact between the two introduced a degree of 
ambiguity to their activities. On the other hand, though 
the predominance of the government and institutional 
positions among those who supported it is quite clear, it 
may not be deduced therefrom that defeat was the product 
of this correlation of forces on the left. At least it 
seems reasonable to accept that if defeat did not occur 
before, it was due to the tactical predominance of the 
government. Doubts about the strategic validity of this 
position endure, nevertheless, inasmuch as what deci; ed 
the confrontation was that in a division of the 
opposition similar to that described here ir, the case of 
the left, it was the pro-rupture position that prevailed 
over the other forces. 
2.4 Opposition strategies 
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Within the political symmetry that has been 
postulated in terms of division within the government and 
within the opposition, the situation of the latter 
reveals clear differences on other levels. From the 
social point of view, the problem of the new right was to 
create a base of electoral support that would take the 
place of the rural vote, the loss of which had determined 
the crisis of the traditional right in the middle of the 
previous decade. Recourse to urban middle sectors as 
clienteles nevertheless required a radical change in 
organizational and ideological models of political 
action. 39 This, which seemed far from clear before the 
1970 election, became the predominant feature of 
opposition to the Allende administration. 
The fact that there never was an agreement between 
the right and the Christian Democrats to face the 
"Communist threat", represented by Unidad Popular in 
1970, in a co-ordinated manner, indicates that the right 
either had not correctly assessed the real danger of an 
electoral victory from the left, or did not limit its own 
options to those that appeared within the legality that 
ruled the political system. The two reasons are not 
mutually exclusive. Subsequent evidence as well as other 
-, "I See Yocelevzky, Op. cit. pp. 258-263. 
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indicators suggests that the co-existence of both 
positions antedates 1970.4° What did change for good 
after Allende's victory was the correlation of forces 
between both. In this sense, if the history of the 
administration is the history of ambiguity produced by 
the prominence of the institutional position, the 
subordination of the pro-rupture position and the 
relation between them, then the history of the opposition 
is the change from the predominance of an institutional 
position to a position of rupture. However, this is not 
only a change in opposition opinion. These are 
ideological and organizational changes and part of a 
process of social and political mobilization which, 
finally, translated into both deliberate and inadvertent 
support for the destruction of the political system. 41 
From the outset of the 1970 election and until 
resolution of the conflict, the opposition tried 
ideologically to project a movement we shall call "pro- 
40 In 1967, the Christian Democrat government ordered the arrest of 
the National Party leaders accusing them of promoting a coup d'etat. 
The courts released them unconditionally. This attitude on the part 
of the judiciary is adduced as proof of innocence by Sergio Onofre 
Jarpa (in an interview by Silvia Pinto and reproduced in Jarpa's 
book, Creo en Chile, Sociedad Impresora Chile, Ltda., Santiago, 
1973, p. 79. Even so, the antecedents of this arrest are revealed 
by the Minister of the Interior of the time, Bernardo Leighton, in 
an interview about his political life. See Boye, Otr . El hermano 
Bernardo, Editorial Aconcagua, Santiago, 1986, pp. 150-112. 
L. 
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restoration. "42 Opposition discourse thereb;, effe.: -: i1ve1; - 
formulated the government and the forces supporting it as 
the threat to the system. In this sense, ideo cica1 
expressions (just as in the casez of the left), obscured 
the view of the true correlation of forces ir. the 
opposition. 43 
As to the characteristics of the cadres making up 
the rank-and-file and the professional elite of the 
opposition, the same principles of differentiation may be 
observed on the right as were noted for the left. On the 
one hand a generational break that delimits a new elite 
and a sector with a militant rank-and-file that aspired 
to fit into the professional elite of the period but was 
only partially successful. 44 On the other hand, cadres 
became active who had remained on the periphery of the 
main course of political events, dominated as they were 
41 See Yocelevzky, Ricardo. "Agrupamiento corporativo y estrategia 
politica: el golpe de estado en Chile, " International Review of 
Sociology, Serie IIe, Vol. XIX, N° 1-2-3, Rome, 1983, pp. 137-154. 
', Even at the moment of the coup d'etat, the junta committed itself 
to "restoring the fractured institutionality". See Decreto Ley i%" 
1, Acta de Constituciön de 1a Junta de Gobierno del 1' de sepriemhre 
de 1973, Editorial Juridica de Chile, 100 Primeros Decre*os Leyes 
dictados por 1a Junta de Gobierno de la Republica de Chile, 
Santiago, 1973, pp. 6-8. 
a1 The principal dupes in this sense were the Christian Democra'_s whc 
supported the coup believing that "restoration" woul carry 
back into power. On the contrary, they had to wait more than 16 
years. 
Among these sectors principal attenti`n must be paid '_o the 
"gremialistas" of the Catholic University and r' e youths --r -m -he 
Partido Nacional. 
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by parties and the established system of Y: ego±ia}icns 
among them. 45 
The ideological content of this renewal of the right 
shared a common point with its corresponding number on 
the left: those expressing a tendency toward pro-rupture 
considered the achievement of its strategic objectives to 
be incompatible with maintenance of the political 
system. 46 However, they enjoyed nothing like the common 
ground that unified the left. If on the left agreement 
was based on the definition of socialism as a desirable 
model of society and a road to development, on the right 
the proposals were more varied. There was criticism of 
economic development and the political system, but they 
did not necessarily become unified in an alternative 
proposal. Largely ideological criticism were brought to 
bear as nationalists of widely diverse beliefs coincided 
in their view of the current period of Chile's history as 
"decadent" . 
47 Proposals of all kinds for the 
"reconstruction" of the country, from corporativist to 
°ý Included here are the Nationalists, who made up the Partido 
Nacional since 1965, as well as those who became active as a resul± 
of the left victory in 1970, like those of Patria y Libertad. 
a'' This too is subject to nuance, beginning with Jarpa who considered 
it necessary to outlaw the Communist Party (Op. cit. p. 75) to Pablo 
Rodriguez Grez, who proposed replacing the political system with one 
of a corporative nature. See his book Entre 1a democracia y la 
tirania, Self-published, Santiago, 1972, pp. 121-130. 
°7 Perez de Arce, Hermögenes. Comentarios esccyidos, E iciones 
Portada, Santiago 1973, pp. 325-359. 
bl.. 
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liberal approaches, were made, het it is unclear wh. e:: er 
undertaking the formulation of an alternative program 
would have been the way to create an opposition bloc 
capable of defeating the Unidad Popular administration. 
This overwhelming diversity was reflected in the 
Alessandri "movement's" program48 and in its candidate's 
speeches. Nevertheless, the very context of the 
presidential campaign caused this feature to remain in 
abeyance. Alternatives were only and suddenly revealed 
after the electoral victory of the left in September 
1970. Between that date and Allende's inauguration in 
November 1970, all actors and all positions that would 
later become involved in the overthrow of the Unidad 
Popular administration were brought to light. 49 
Nevertheless, between those dates and the moment of the 
coup, two important changes took place, one in the 
consolidation of all these expressions into one single 
political bloc and, the other, a predominant shift of 
opinion within that bloc in favour of the break p of the 
political system. Both changes were the result of 1 
48 Garces, Joan and Frederic Debuyst. "La opciön de 1970 y is 
ideologia, anälisis de los tres programas presidenciales, " in Chile: 
el camino politico hacia el socialismo, op. cit. pp. 79-143. 
"' This period witnessed terrorist acts that included 1ý: -. e 
assassination of the army commander-in-chief, General Schneider 
even parliamentary manoeuvres to elect the second place ca 7iäa- , 
Alessandri, as well as military conspiracies for a coup 1'eta`. 
101 
complex process of maturation in the practice of a 
consolidated opposition vis-a-vis the government. 
Reactions to the results of the presý enti l 
election reveal the lines of development that the 
opposition would have to follow. These were situated both 
within and outside of the system. The first contacts 
between the right and the Christian Democrats occurred 
within the system as they searched for a constitutional 
way to forestall assumption of power by the winning 
candidate. The first movement for an economic boycott 
(supported ideologically by the incumbent government) 
appeared outside the system. The first terrorist attempts 
came from right wing groups (even though, from the 
outset, they tried to attribute them to the left). The 
first conspiracies involved the military, with a view to 
abetting a coup d'etat (one of these resulted in the 
assassination of the Commander in Chief of the Army, 
General Schneider) . The active support of the United 
States government for these expressions must also be 
noted. 50 
"0 There is a great deal of literature on all these, but one 
testimony that carries great force in proving the occurrence of 
these events, even though their veracity in many details is 
questionable, is Kissinger, Henry. White House Years, Little, Brown 
and Co., Boston, 1979, pp. 670-678. 
102 
Amongst both the right-wing and new-, forme 
Christian Democrat factions, the practical 
impossibilities facing more extreme endeavours at this 
stage, on the whole gave predominance to institutional 
procedures. Adherence to the political system among 
Christian Democrats was unquestionably predominant, 
within which the very existence of the party made sense s' 
Christian Democrat participation in these manoeuverings 
was limited to a search for a formula that would make it 
possible to swindle Allende out of his electoral victory 
but that would preserve the legitimacy and the 
functionality of the system. Not finding a formula that 
would guarantee that result, they opted for an encircling 
strategy vis-a-vis the new administration. To secure the 
Christian Democrat votes in Congress, in order to confirm 
Allende's victory, senators and deputies of the Left had 
to support the previous approval of the constitutional 
reforms known as the "Statute of Democratic Guarantees". 
This generally limited presidential powers, but perhaps 
ultimately even more significant, sought to make the 
state independent of the acts of the goverr.. er. t. The 
51 Otto Boye, Op. cit. pp. 160-168, presents an analysis written by 
Bernardo Leighton in 1970, at the time of the events, but 
unpublished until 1986. 
Lý 
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intent to forestall the changes contained In Urifad 
Popular' s "Basic Program of Government" was explicit. 
Separation of the state from the government may seer 
an unnecessary abstraction for understanding the final 
result of the confrontation. However, to understand the 
developments that led to that result, it is important to 
examine how ideological and practical conditions came 
together within that confrontation. To begin with, 
foremost among the ideological aspects is the sense of 
the legitimacy of Allende's government being limited by 
the relative majority that led to his victory. Even 
though the vote permitted Allende to legitimately occupy 
the presidency and organize his government, it denied, in 
the absence of an absolute majority, that his government 
might legitimately embark on the changes contained in its 
programme. 53 On this point, the attempt is made to 
preserve the political system from the transformational 
activity of the government, but, as mentioned above, the 
` See the text of the Constitutional Reform contained in the 
Statutes of Democratic Guarantees and its principal forerunners, 
including the discussion and vote in the Senate, in Echeverria and 
Frei (Compilers), Op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 29-101. 
53 The first to publicly express these arguments was the most 
traditional voice of the Chilean right, the daily, El Mercurio. Its 
editorial of September 23,1970, described the paradox represented 
by a solid democracy allowing, with less than a third of the 
electorate, to open a way for a revolutionary change in its 
institutions. The same argument is picked up by Jaime Castillo 
Velasco, ideologue of the Christian Democrats, in an interview 
bl- 
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measures proposed for this included the seýara: ior_ of a 
state apparatus as important as the armed forces. ' 
The ambiguity of this argument is revealed in the 
April 1971 municipal elections. In these, the forces of 
the government won 50% of the vote. Nevertheless, being 
an election to renew municipal governments, any action 
the government might undertake could not be seen as a 
substantial increase in its opportunities. Hence, the 
opposition was not disposed to concede any meaning to the 
vote beyond the institutional consequences that might 
derive from the election itself. 55 The notion of a dual 
significance to the vote, institutional on the one hand 
and as expression of social force in favor of or against 
the change, was on this occasion taken by the government, 
but without noticeable consequences anywhere but in the 
context of ideological argument. 56 
granted the same newspaper a few days later, (El Mercurio, Santiago, 
September 27,1970). 
54 See the reform of Article 22 of the 1925 Constitution contained in 
the statutes of Democratic Guarantees mentioned above, Echeverria 
and Frei (Compiladores) Op. cit. p. 35 
In its comments on the results of the April 1971 election, El 
Mercurio declared that Unidad Popular increased its share of the 
vote by 5% with respect to the 1967 election for councillor and 
failed in its attempt to achieve an absolute majority. See, FLACSO: 
Chile, cronologia del periodo 1910-1973, Santiago, mimeographed, p. 
IV. 87. 
''6 According to some, due to the result of the election destabilisi:. g, 
the internal correlation of forces within Unidad Popular by virtue 
of the Socialist Party's increased number of votes, the Communist 
Party's share remaining stable and the v -e _`cr the radicals 
dropping. Boye, Op. cit. p. 172. 
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In the opposit o, or. the -her "-, an ,± his elect- o 
had the effect of reinforcing The predomir, an, e of the 
"institutional" position, rec esen ted :^ ,- the Chrýs _ian 
Democrats. When that party received the greatest nmher 
of votes against the government, ýt appeared to be a 
hegemonic force over the opposition as a whole. Fr-1m 
this correlation of forces in t -. e oppc si}ion a: ý. i the 
increase in the government's electoral support, 
opposition strategy began to concentrate on the attempt 
to limit implementation of the government's program by 
institutional means. The center of activity for this 
strategy lay in the parliament where the dominant form ot 
organization lay with the parties and within them, and 
predominance in the opposition camp unquestionably 
belonged to the Christian Democrats. 57 
In appearance, the right, represented by he Partido 
Nacional, was subordinate to Christian :: ý-. rat 
institutional strategy. However, the Partido Nacional was 
not the limit of ideological and organizational options 
for the right. Outside the party system, a fascist style 
group called Patria y Libertad was being organise 
linked to the Partido Nacional . -, youýthhi orgar: iz tion -_ha 
in its actions tenieä to be coT. = i : yea wig -ý Patria ;r 
57 See Echeverria and Frei (compilers), Op. cit., Vol. II, Acusaciones 
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Libertad, called the Comar. c Rolando 1s58 .ß,.: roher.: re, 
the "anti-political system" position was also e: -- pressed 
in a "gremialista" movement which arose in the 
Universidad Catölica and represented an ideological model 
that would lend coherence to a form of organization later 
decisive in mobilizing corporative groups and social 
movements outside the party system against the 
government. 59 
All the same, the opposition looked mismatched and 
ambiguous and, like the government forces, points of 
contact between the various forms of organization caused 
forces within the opposition to redefine their 
characteristics in practice even while preserving their 
several ideological positions. It was particularly in the 
opposition's field social mobilization that it was 
possible to resolve otherwise insurmountable ideological 
problems. 
The first occasion on which the opposition 
demonstrated the new course it planned to take was the 
"march of the empty casseroles. " It demonstrated the 
mobilization of a given social sector, women, that was 
Constituciovales. 
5e Parker, Dick. La nueva Cara del fascismo, Ed. Quimantü, Santiago, 
1972, pp. 150-151. 
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not directly controlled by the parties. 
criticism of the government's economic policy, and of 
scarcity, it did not imply an alternative to that `clic1 
and could therefore be supported by all sectors of the 
opposition. Street demonstration opened the wa for 
action by paramilitary groups from within and outside of 
the party system and, finally, created a climate of 
agitation in which even some terrorist acts failed to 
provoke clear repudiation on the part of the opposition 
sectors closest to the political system. 60 
The strike by employer groups (from October 11 to 
November 5,1972) marked a new stage in the conflict. It 
was at that moment that repudiation of the part of the 
government's strategy that rested on support from the 
private sector's economic power made itself visible, but 
in this instance as a mass organization mobilising middle 
and small entrepreneurs of all kinds as well as members 
of the liberal professions. This was the first time that 
the organised opposition within the party system lost i -s 
leadership of the opposition movement as a whole. 
c'° This line of ideology and action was promoted in editorials 
published in El Mercurio even before Allende assumed the presidency 
as a reaction to the result of the presidential election. 
60 The march took place December 1,1971, giving rise to incidents 
that lasted for almost a week in Santiago leading the government to 
declare the capital a 'Iona de emergencia. " In t hie same month . 
=. e 
Christian Democrats undertook their First elect,, ral a liar: ces with 
the Partido Nacional. FLACSO, Op. cit. pp. IV. 163-IV. ä70. 
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However, that sector's main strength, the --h. rist an 
Democrats, failed to realize the importance and future 
significance of this event. 61 
The government, aware of the danger and already on 
the defensive, fell back on the power of the state to 
stop the strategic confrontation by incorporating the 
heads of the armed forces into the cabinet. This move, no 
matter how unquestionably successful it was in the short 
run, would have a contrary effect in the long run. For 
the moment, however, the inclusion of the commandants of 
the armed forces contributed to ending that particular 
confrontation. It also temporarily stabilized the system 
until the parliamentary election in March 1973 whereby, 
at least in appearance, the hegemony of the opposition 
bloc returned to the hands of the political parties 
acting within the system. 62 
It was apparent in this last change that the 
election became a confrontation between electoral blocs 
in which the Christian Democrats appeared to be le, b; 
their most extreme right sector, Frei's. But also, wi~hir. 
61 See the chronicle and analysis of these events from the Christian 
Democrat point of view in Orrego Vicuna, Claudio. E1 paro nacic^al. 
Via Chilena contra e1 totalitarismo, Editorial del Pacifico, 
Santiago, 1972. 
62 See a version of this period in the postumous memoires of the 
Commander in Chief of the Army who became Secretary of the interior, 
Carlos Prats Gonzalez, Memorias, testimonio de un sc]d dc, Editorial 
Pehuen, Santiago, 1985, pp. 297-375. 
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the whole, the Confederacion Democrätica, CODE, in wriic'-. 
the Partido Nacional introduced a pro-rupture feature 
that was both intrinsic to it and, at the same time, 
linked the bloc as a whole to pro-rupture components 
acting outside the system. 63 The climate of electoral 
mobilization increased social mobilization, and though it 
did not bring about a strategic confrontation like the 
one in October 1972, neither was that possibility 
completely removed. It contributed to a radicalization of 
the opposition as a whole from the rank-and-file members 
upwards, a gradual and almost imperceptible process by 
which the Christian Democrats lost their ideological 
profile and became subordinated to other forces within 
the opposition. 64 
The result of the parliamentary election 
demonstrated the inviability of the opposition that was 
expecting to eliminate the government before the end of 
63 "During the entrepeneurs' strike of October 1972, the president of 
the Partido Nacional, Sergio Onofre Jarpa, changed the programme to 
include a `gremialista' or semi-corporative feature which produced 
closer relations among various manifestations of the right (Frente 
Nacionalista Patria y Libertad and Movimiento Gremialista). " 
Friedmann, Reinhard 1964-1988, La politica Chilena de la Aa la Z. 
Ed. Melquiades, Santiago, 1988, p. 103. 
'"' The analysis of the October, 1972, strike offered by Orrego 
(Op. cit. ) pp. 20-22 correctly posits the relation parties-gremios in 
the Chilean structure. However, in the events of that movement, it 
simultaneously overestimates the role of the par-. ies in general and 
of his party in particular. It is true that the strike grew and held 
thanks to the participation of gremios whose rank-and-`ile were 
identified with the Christian Democrats, but this was nn-, proof of 
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the presidential tenure. This fact accelerated the move 
towards a pro-rupture strategy. 65 To this end, the 
decisive steps were taken to increase the conflict 
between the other powers of the state and government on 
the one hand, and to grant independence of action and 
apply pressure to the apparatus of the state to bring it 
in line against the government on the other. This last 
stage saw completion of the subordination of the 
Christian Democrats to the right and the adherence of 
both to a pro-rupture strategy. The right sought its 
military and political arm in the armed forces, 
legitimated by a bloc of political and social opposition 
to the Unidad Popular regime, but not representing a 
clear ideological alternative. 66 The consensus in the 
opposition bloc was purely negative and the programme to 
be implemented by the government that would succeed 
Allende's had no part in its proposals. 
2.5 The coup d'Etat of September 11,1973. 
The foregoing section has concentrated on the 
formation of the social and political power bloc, which, 
the influence of that party in the movement, on the contrary, it was 
proof of its subordination to a strategy foreign to it. 
65 El Mercurio returned to the double character of the elections, 
this time declaring that it had been a 'plebiscite. " Editorial, 
March 5,1973. 
66 This is the clearest meaning of the declaration approved by the 
Chamber of Deputies on August 23,1973, with National, 'Christian 
Democrats and Social Democrats voting. 
by its support, made the coup possible. Teere is no 
question but that the coup in itself was the product of 
conspiratorial activity that complemented what vtias 
observable in the social, political and ideological 
spheres. However, due to the very nature of this part of 
the story, its reconstruction remains unsatisfactory in 
light of the information available today and it would not 
be surprising if it should always remain unsatisfactory. 67 
However, it is not simply curiosity that leads to 
inquiry about what happened at this other level of 
opposition activity. Part of what is observable in the 
opposition, as it has been described here, can only be 
explained by what remains hidden. The character of the 
future government, as indicated, could not be openly 
discussed by the opposition forces because broaching the 
subject would, most probably, have made formation of the 
bloc impossible. It was therefore defined at a level of 
"technical" activity which permitted the ideological 
subordination of part of the Christian Democrat cadres 
(in particular, economists) and allowed a plan for the 
reconstruction of Chilean capitalism to be discussed in 
67 Pinochet's "Memorias" are even more to be doubted than those of 
Kissinger. Nevertheless, see, Pinochet Ugarte, Augusto. El dia 
decisivo, 11 de septiembre de 1973, Ed. Andres Bello, Santiago, 
(fourth edition), 1980. 
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such in terms that the destruction of : ý_e political 
system was the sine qua non of the plan's execution. 68 
The organic form taken by the preparation of this 
alternative blueprint -- direct contact between private 
economic power and the economists in their role as 
technicians free of their political affiliations -- 
reveals the social and political costs that the model 
they were designing would incur. This went on beyond 
other forms of opposition organization, the heterogeneity 
of which, with respect to their view of the future became 
obvious in their earliest post-coup declarations. It was 
therefore clear that, with the exception of the Christian 
Democrats, the opposition accepted the elimination of 
political activity as such. This is part of the 
explanation of the bloody nature of the repression. The 
point was not only to overthrow the government and 
disperse the forces that supported it, but to redefine 
relations between classes. The repression was political 
68 "The profound economic crisis had to be reflected in a grave 
social and political conflict which should conclude in a change of 
government whose shape, of course, no one knew, but that obviously 
would clearly not be socialist... This conviction arose first among 
the economists rather than the politicians and it is therefore not 
to be wondered at that they would carry out a joint venture from as 
early as late 1971. During that time, economists of the technical 
departments of the opposition parties met without their leaders to 
advise the parliamentary deputies who specialised in financial an«i 
budget matters... When the change of government occurre (sic) on 
September 11,1973, there was already a well developed draft 
program... " Bardon, Alvaro, Camilo Carrasco and Alvaro Vial, Una 
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in general, in the sense of affecting the parties of the 
left and their cadres, but the true "terror" applied was 
social, directed at re-subordinating the urbar. and rural 
working classes so that their conquests of the last forty 
years might be destroyed. 
Another aspect that remains hidden is the process by 
which the armed forces came to intervene and the decision 
as to how they would do so. The position they occupied in 
the institutional apparatus, the social composition of 
the officer class, the ideological influences predominant 
among them, and the process of making them autonomous 
that they endured during the Unidad Popular 
administration, were conditions that facilitated their 
intervention. Political marginalisation of the armed 
forces and their personnel, which at the outset appeared 
to be one of the conditions for making Unidad Popular's 
blueprint viable, gradually became the principal 
instrument of its destruction. It can be said that the 
political process effectively forced the military to take 
cognisance of their position as the backbone o the 
state. The social composition of the officers, 
predominantly middle class, put them in contact w---h --'-. e 
mobilisation of those sectors proceeding toward the 
decada de cambi os econömi cos . La experi enci a Chi l ena 19-3--'983. Ed. 
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construction of a new right and inimical to the current 
political system. Anticommunist ideology became 
doctrine of their professional training. Linked to t eýr 
corporative interests of technical modernisation and 
equipment, it also made them dependent on the Uýiited 
States. This, added to their traditional inclination 
toward "order", had unavoidably to set them against the 
government's very strategy and, moreover, against the 
social and political mobilisation that would necessarily 
have to accompany extensive processes of change. 
Finally, the opposition was able to steadily develop a 
role for the armed forces in which it acted as part of 
the state apparatus yet operated independently of the 
government, and ended by legitimating and inciting it to 
intervene. The opposition thus constructed an armed 
apparatus that saw its "historical mission" as the 
reordering of a society that had become distanced from 
its "healthy" and "normal" channels of development by 
politics and the activities of "politicians. " 
Andres Bello, Santiago, 1985, p. 5. 
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Chapter 3. The rise of the dictatorship, destruction and 
replacement of a political system 
3.1. Introduction 
Two of the three basic elements essential to 
understanding the history of sixteen years of military 
dictatorship are also generally recognised as the 
enduring heritage of the dictatorial government. They are 
the change in Chile's economic model of development and 
the new political system established by the Constitution 
of 1980. The third, which conditioned and defined the 
entire process, refers to the participation of the Armed 
Forces as expressing a state apparatus in the 
restoration, reordering and stabilisation of social 
domination. This description is debatable, however, due 
to contradictions within some of its basic 
characteristics. From my point of view, to consider them 
a state apparatus implies establishing their role as 
guarantors of the relations of domination that constiiute 
Chilean society. That role explains their actions as a 
repressive force and defines an institutionaý 
responsibility in the crimes of the iictLtorshi .l 
1A radically different view of the significance of the Armed Forces' 
intervention in 1973, emphasizing however its character as a state 
apparatus may be seen in the Ensayc histöricc sobre 1a nociön del 
Estado en Chile en los siglos Xi. 1" %, 4X, by Vario Gcngora. 
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Besides, some basic political processes of the period can 
only be explained by army structures acting as political 
power. 
The relation between these three elements is basic 
to establishing a periodization that divides ` .e 
dictatorship into two parts. First, a period of ascent 
and the consequent destruction of the previous political 
system, with the very express intention of eliminating 
political parties and the system of which they were a 
part, the culmination of which was the imposition of the 
1980 Constitution. And a second part, one of erosion, 
decay and crisis of the dictatorship, the axis of which 
is the reconstruction of the system of political parties. 
This chapter will concern itself with the first phase. 
Controversy about Pinochet's personal participation 
in the conspiracy which led to the coup d' etat was aimed 
at to either enhancing or destroying him as an 
individual. However, for the analysis of this history 
this fact is of importance because the likelihood of 
Pinochet's prior non-participation brings to the fore The 
army's institutional participation in the movemer: t. 
2 
2 Patricia Verdugo, Interferencia secreta, Chapter 1 denies any 
participation on the part of Pinochet before the end of the week 
prior to the coup, quoting testimony by Generals 
Leigh and Arellano 
Stark. Pinochet himself dates the beginning of his preparations for 
the coup to June 23,197 2. See, El di a deci si vo, p. 
76. 
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This leads to the understanding that Pinochet's personal 
ascent to power took place on the basis of the 
institutional platform. The idea of his supp osed 
leadership is a subsequent publicity construct that 
sought to legitimate him outside the Armed Forces, since 
within them the source of power lies in the preservation 
of hierarchical structures. 
It is not to be expected that any of the actors who 
at different times were part of the political and social 
bloc that, in the first instance, made the coup d'etat 
possible, and that subsequently supported and benefited 
from the dictatorship, will accept this interpretation of 
events. But the plausibility of this interpretation does 
not depend on such confirmation, but on providing a clear 
view of the events and the processes that are equivocal 
and controversial but lie in the foundations of the post- 
dictatorial situation. Treatment of the three aspects of 
the process already enunciated is complex because their 
interrelations were changeable throughout the period and 
this implies changes in each one of them. 
3.2. Militarism and repression 
The repressive nature of the military dictatorship 
has been the object of denunciations from the vex; - moment 
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of the coup d' eta t3 and continues to be the ob j ec ` of 
judicial controversy, now at the international leve. Y 
The first characteristic of military violence was is 
objective of demobilization. It must be remembered that 
the Chilean politico-social process had been 
characterized as "hyper-mobilization. i5 Demobilising a 
society from the level of organization achieved in Chile 
by the political parties, labour unions and other social 
organizations required a terrorist government. The state 
terrorism inflicted on Chile is remembered today 
primarily for the number of dead and disappeared, and 
these are the figures most precisely recorded. But they 
are only part - the most irreparable part of the story. 
The data substantiating the massive scope of the 
repression also must not be forgotten. 
Justification for the repression was found in a 
supposed situation of civil war; an idea that some insist 
on to this day. However, it must be established that if 
indeed there were groups in favour of taking power by 
force of arms among those supporting Allende's 
government, they were subordinate to the administration's 
3 NACLA's Latin America & Empire Report, Vol. VII, No. 8, October 
1973, p. 29. 
See documents containing the accusations by judge Garzön in El 
Pais, on the Web, http: \www. elpais. es. 
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strategy in the first place. In the second, the arr. s at 
their disposal would have been insufficient to offer 
significant military resistance to the insurrec: onists. 6 
It is an established fact today that justification for 
the coup d'etat and the subsequent political repression, 
contained in the "Libro Blanco, " principally Plan Z, 
published after the fact, constitutes a historical 
falsification by its known authors. ' 
The massive aspect of the demobilizing repression is 
what gives the Chilean dictatorship its terrorist 
character. Under conditions of exception, state of war, 
state of siege, etc., with a curfew that lasted years, 
the numbers of victims of the regime are unquestionably 
shocking. Fugitives granted asylum in embassies during 
the first months of the dictatorship, numbered 10,000 
before the end of 1973. In 1979, the United Nations 
special rapporteur for human rights in Chile reported 
`' Henry Lansberger and Tim McDaniel: "Hyper-mobilization in Chile 
1970-1973". 
6 "The battle on September 11th lasted almost four hours, " Augusto 
Pinochet interviewed by the journal Ercilla six months after the 
coup. Ercilla N° 2015,1974. Quoted by Nancy Guzmdn J., in J:: yrito 
desde e1 silencio, pp. 44-45. 
Libro Blanco del Cambio de Gobierno en Chile, 11 de Septiembre de 
1973, Diario la Tercera, Santiago, Abril 11,1999. Reportaje 
Nacional, "Gonzalo Vial Correa, chastised by the left and 
recriminated by the right. The misunderstood conservative". This 
fact which is public today, i. e. Vial's participation in ýýcishinq 
the "Libro Blanco" in 1973, and in the publication of the report of 
the Rettig Commission in 1990-1991, was insinuated by general `"'an',: el 
Contreras (Ret) in his response to the Rettig Report, in an 
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that up to mid-1975, between 40,000 and 50,000 Chileans 
had been arrested for more than 24 hours, a figure 
representing around one in every 125 economically active 
adults in the population. 8 The dictatorship's official 
figures coincide only partially with this report. None of 
the data can reflect what massive repression meant for 
the victims. In October 1974, the Minister of the 
Interior declared those as arrested pursuant to an 
administrative measure, in view of the state of siege 
(that is without formal charge or trial of any kind) 
numbered 748. The following figures were released in 
March 1975: arrested since September 11,1973,41,759; 
released, 36,605 (among them 9,167 expelled from the 
country or living as refugees abroad); persons condemned 
in some form of judicial procedure, 1,557; persons 
awaiting trial, 1,780; persons detained under the state 
of siege, 1,116.9 It should be noted that between the 
two dates quoted, the number of political prisoners was 
still increasing. 
interview for the daily La Tercera, published March 26,1991. In it 
he insists on a version of Plan Z, (See p. 3). 
8 Data quoted by C. G. Brown: 10 Anos de atropelos a 1^s derechos 
humanos en Chile, report of America's Watch Committee, p. 44. 
9 La documentation Francaise, notes et etudes documentaries, .`:. 
4421,4422,4423. Cronologie du Chili, Septembre, 1973-Decembre 
1975, pp. 31 and 34. 
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After emptying the stadiums and spots Facilities, 
improvised as detention and interrogation centres for the 
suspect during the early months, concentration camps were 
established. It is important to highlight the ambiguities 
attached to the treatment of prisoners in Chile. To 
begin with, mistreatment and torture became routine 
procedure in the handling of the enemy from the very 
moment of their arrest. Also, mistreatment and torture 
were neither in principal nor in general, methods of 
investigation, but rather forms of punishment. And 
finally, although officially denied as a practice, part 
of its effectiveness was gained through a public 
awareness that such a threat existed. Therefore the 
spread of information regarding the frequency and degree 
of such incidents was not hindered, especially as 
disseminated by former victims who had either been freed 
or, though under detention, were no longer incommunicado. 
The following figures come from the concentration 
camp established in the former Chacabuco saltpetre mine 
and from its operation between November 10,1973 and 
August 17,1974.10 The total number of prisoners he--d 
10 Chacabuco is situated almost 110 kms from Antofagasta in the 
middle of the Atacama Desert. Abandoned in 1938, it was used for 
army manoeuvres. It functioned as a prison camp from early November 
1973 to April of 1975. Dossier on Human Rights in Chile, El Pais, on 
the Internet http: //www. elpais. es. 
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there during that period was 1,253, with the average 
length of stay in the camp eing 177 days. It should be 
remembered that this was only part of the ceriod of 
detention. Only exceptionally was one of them tried, as 
indicated in the official figures quoted above. The 
average number of prisoners in the camp during the period 
was 802.11 Later, the dictatorship counted more than 300 
of them (including this author) as released, who were 
expelled from the country and denied the right to return 
for more than ten years (authorization to do so began as 
late as 1983). 12 And this was not the only prison camp. 13 
Repression became a very complex phenomenon. To 
maintain its extensive character and to prolong itself in 
time and acquire a character that was no less terrifying 
for being more selective, was to define several different 
but complementary objectives. The first of these was to 
establish the necessary unity and discipline within the 
Armed Forces. This objective implied several types of 
11 All these calculations are based on the register kept by the 
political prisoners themselves of those detained and released from 
Chacabuco, where they came from, and where they went. 
12 The first list of those authorized to return to Chile contains 
1,160 names of exiles and was published in E1 . 'er` : rio in Santiac--, 
August 28,1983. 
13 The previously quoted dossier of the daily El Pais of Madrid on 
the Internet, also describes the camps at Pisagua, Melir. ka 
(Puchuncavi), Ritoque, the prison ships at Valparaiso, Tejas Verdes, 
Colonia Dignidad and the Quiriquina and Dawson islands. Furtherm,: re, 
in another chapter, it describes detention and torture centres in 
Santiago. 
12) 
actions. First, direct repression of any ie-. ons ` ra : _o:: of 
disagreement with actions undertaken since he couN. 14 
Second, to involve the irresolute in ac ` io-. s of 
repression against the civilian population. 15 Third, to 
exercise measures exemplary of the decisiveness with 
which those in command were prepared to act. lc A problem 
that arose later on was the anomaly within the strct. ýre 
of the Armed Forces of an apparatus of repression and 
intelligence, specialized and obedient to the military 
high command in its political function, the DINA. This 
implied structural and functional ambiguities such as the 
involvement of civilian personnel. 
The other level of the demobilizing repression was 
the "selective" level, aimed at cadres of organizations 
defining themselves as armed or capable of arming 
themselves against the dictatorship. It is in this area 
that systematic disappearances o indiviýi, ials look place 
`' Pinochet recounts in El dia decisivo, p. 131, "... my Aide, who 
expressed his disagreement to me with what was going to be carried 
out. I accepted his position and ordered his immediate arrest 
in a 
room of the Army Telecommunications building. " 
15 "Another fear that also played a role in the consolidation and 
impunity of the group [DINA] was its high degree o efficiency 
i:. 
manoeuvring within military spheres and particularly 
in the arm,. - 
paralysing or cutting off the professional careers of `. 
hose who 
opposed them (and who were called "softies"). Parallel 
to these, it 
was noteworthy that high ranking officers considere 
"so lies" were 
peremptorily summoned, court- martialed, 
dismissed from 
commands, and even subjected to physical abuse ar. 
d loss of their 
careers. " Informe Rettig, p. 11 
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after the first wave of summary executions. -isbec ar. e 
a circle of horror of repeated detentic-: s, s1ys-eTat c 
torture and the most horrible murders. '' Thss the 
level that is best documented, case by case, }ranks to 
the organization of relatives of the victim. `, the 
churches and other human rights organizations and, 
finally, the Committee for Truth and Reconciýiation. ls 
The degree of compliance with the coup and the 
dictatorship on the part of both individuals d 
organizations may be determined by the type of 
justification they offer for repressive practices. At 
one extreme, were the committed supporters of the 
dictatorship who continue to affirm the thesis of a civil 
war and the providential intervention of the Armed Forces 
that saved them from communism. However, this is an 
example of political primitivism rare among the 
professional political elite. More common among the ohJi 
and new right is the habit of blaming the victims, a more 
sophisticated version of the former. The -. s- wiiesprea 
"' With respect to the trial of the 'Caravana de la Muerte" by judge 
Guzmdn, he has revealed the facts already published by the 
journalist Patricia Verdugo in her book Los zarpazos del puma. 
1 The earliest cases, recently documented, affected the MIR, 
Bautista van Schowen and Patricio Munita, Lumi Videla Sergio 
Pere , Edgardo Enrique _7 and many others. 
Later, some of the m: s: 
notorious cases affected the Communist Party, as was the case of 
'Operaciön Albania" and those whose throats were cut. 
18 Report of the National Committee for Truth and Reconcilia-i;: -. 
(Rettig Report). 
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conciliatory view is that of "excesses, " Üoýr `i-.: _o 
individuals guilty of abuses. The most hypocriiical 
clouds the facts by appealing to the as -s 
followed by condemnation of the political use of claims 
for abuses against human rights. 19 
The evolution of the repression and of the apparatus 
that within the Armed Forces specialized in it, is a 
record of the evolution of the dictatorship. The first 
important change subsequent to the coup i'etat was the 
rupture in the consensus within the insurrectionist bloc 
and the appearance of a political strategy adopted by the 
dictatorship as its own that went beyond The restoration 
of a normally functioning political sys}e.; and indicated 
a replacement. This change was expressed in the loss of 
the sense of temporality of the dictatorship and the 
construction of institutions that lengtheneJ the prospect 
of its hold on power. This was e:.. pressed first ir, the 
appearance of DINA as an apparatus of intelligence and 
repression that was new and alien to the it elligerce 
services of the several branches of the Armed Forces. 
The origin of this organ is bi : rred. I. la -e ý7?, 
massive repression, the object of which was social and 
: :. political demobilization of the masses, 
`. 1 : pr- z' 
1° Jaime Guzman Erra: uri., Escritos personales, pp. 
133-156. 
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accumulation of detain ees for co- ldeoloü - a- 
reasons without indict: i: ent or trial possible Y: er 
current iegis atior:. the various it telly e .ýe services 
participated in this without achieving any real 
coordination amongst them. The 11M, _ itary . ', ýnta aper e 
the secret decree creating the National Executive 
Secretariat for Detainees (SENDET), that Col`, -., el Jorge 
Espinoza was appointed to lead. It is only possible to 
approximately deduce the date fr: ý the seü,. iential number 
assigned to it, 117. SENDET would uni`y and organize 
records, advise the families of e`. ainees, grant 
information, authorise visits to prisoners etc. 
"However, article three of decree law 117, had sown the 
seed: the Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA) 
would now be a dependency of SENDET its -mission would 
be to establish rules for interrogation, class if icari, ýr, 
of prisoners and coordination of intelligence 
functions ." 
20 The point was that, although in the decree 
DINA appeared as a subordinated parr of SENDET, it became 
}. he main apparatus of repression. 
DINA's growing independence in spite of humble 
legal status seems to have been due to three factors. 1) 
A change in the nature of the repressions which shifted 
20 Ascanio Cavallo, Manuel Salazar and Oscar Sepulveda, La historia 
127 
from its first stege, in , ýhich the objez give of ss 
demobilization was predominant, to a new stage in which a 
kind of "dirty war" camle to the fore foc,. ised on cer ýi i 
organisations that had been partly ini}iate,: i by 
intelligence services of one or the o--her Armed Forces. 21 
2) Its partial conformity to the organization of the 
Armed Forces (with a colonel i: command, when the 
intelligence services of other branches were usually led 
by a general). 3) Incorporation of civilian collaborators 
who, adhering ideologically to the bloc opposing Allende 
and supporting the dictatorship, represer: ted a particular 
kind of action and political strategy albeit discarded 
more or less rapidly and who may be characterized as 
generally nationalist but who might also be the most 
ludicrous examples of Creole fascism. `' All this has been 
explained by the direct subordination of the entire 
apparatus to Pinochet, and its leader, the then colonel 
Contreras, who seemed to enjoy the absolute confidence of 
the dictator and was answerable only to him. 
At that time, the transition and transformation of 
the repression expressed the first sigr: s .t the 
political process of the dictatorship was abandoning the 
oc ul to del regimen militar, Chile, 1973-1988, p. 44. 
21 Ricardo Boizard: Proceso a una traici6n. ý'etalles Jrtimos del 
sumario de la FACH. 
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restorative sense of the coup d'etat which drew together 
the consensus of the bloc opposing Unidad Popular. 
Elements began to appear that were outside the structure 
of the Armed Forces, but which, protected by their stat_Is 
of belonging to the state apparatus, sought to prc: <<cte 
political projects aimed at replacing the previous 
political system, particularly that of parties and their 
personnel, the politicians. 
The most visible of these processes is the 
concentration of power in the person of Pinochet who from 
primus inter pares in the Military Junta became President 
of the Republic, monopolized executive power and 
relegated the other commanders to the role of 
legislators. According to Leigh, at the moment of the 
coup, the rotation of the Presidency of the Military 
Junta was established by a "gentlemen's agreement" that 
was never fulfilled. 23 "Decree-law 527 of June 17,1974, 
reserved the exercise of executive power to the President 
of the governing Junta, without prejudice to the other 
members of the Junta collaborating with him in its 
exercise by assuming, for the purpose: 'the highest 
direction of the activities, areas ar: i fu:: ctions that he 
might charge them with'. Later, this situation was 
22 Manuel Salazar, Contreras, Histcria de un intocable, pp. 73-74. 
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regulated by Decree-law 806 of December 16,1974, which. 
referred to the ruler by the title of President of the 
Republic. " 24 
Pinochet was subject to determining factors that 
operated as limits. Of these, the most important is the 
preservation of the military institution, its source of 
power and legitimacy, which nevertheless had to be 
controlled so as to maintain loyalties that went beyond 
the simple line of command. Though the Armed Forces were 
never entirely depoliticised or entirely devoid of 
ideology, now, political decisions that ought to have 
been made by officers at various levels of state 
administration threatened to instigate ideological 
allegiances, even party allegiances held with discretion 
in normal times. 
A second element that changed the apparatus of 
repression into an instrument of government, was the 
political move to reduce the scope of the insurrectionist 
bloc, in particular the dismantling of the Christian 
Democrats, which was symbolic of the decision to 
eliminate the political parties in general. In this 
case, repression was always the lesser and selective 
evil. However, since the spirit of the coup was 
'j Florencia Varas, op. cit., p. 56. 
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perpetuated in the theory of an internatior_aI co=u nis L 
conspiracy against Chile, those Christian Democrats who 
repudiated the coup and participated in denouncing the 
dictatorship's abuses became DINA's targets. 
Intelligence gathering was broadened to take in any 
expression of dissidence including from personnel of the 
Armed Forces that had nothing to do with the left or the 
Allende government. Foreseeing rejection and possible 
opposition to some of the measures, the intelligence 
community was included in some of the crucial decisions 
taken by the dictatorship. 
An important element in the analysis of the 
relations between the political components of the 
dictatorship is that civilians linked to the apparatus of 
repression constituted by DINA represented an ideological 
contradiction. They also presented a sociological 
problem, forming a case of cultural, ideological and 
political marginality. Both on the national level and in 
international contacts, civilians linked to DINA, 
inasmuch as it has been possible to identify them, were 
largely recruited from the extra-parliamentary fringe of 
the right . 
25 This included some individuals from The le- 17i 
4 Luis Valencia Avaria, Anales de la Republica, p. 1-711, note 206. 
25 A noteworthy group consisted of lawyers incorporated as 
functionaries, recruited among people linked to nationalist 
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who had attained notoriety but who shared with their 
peers of the right the marginal characteristic o `~ýeir 
political participation. 26 Predominant among them were 
individuals with an inclination towards violence and 
political intrigue, largely not members of political 
parties but of sects, lodges and other models of 
organization with conditions for clandestine action. 
Another noteworthy feature is their explicit rejection of 
politicians and their models of action. The 
psychological profiles of these individuals appear to be 
too stereotyped. What is of interest is their almost 
permanent existence and availability for use under 
conditions such as those created by the dictatorship in 
Chile. 
The activities that from the ideological and 
political point of view lent the more fascist-like 
nationalists notoriety, must have been yet another source 
of frustration. The nationalists whose ideological defeat 
in this sphere led to their marginalization but not to 
publications such as Tacna, Tizona and Orden Nuevo. Salazar, Op. cit. 
p. 65. An ideological feature that identifies the civil elements 
collaborating with DINA is its nationalism. The marginality of the 
nationalists and their subordinate place within the party s;, ste, -,, 
until 1973, has been pointed out in Chapter 1. 
`, The most notorious cases are those of Luz Arce, "Flaca" Alejandra, 
'Guatbn" Romo and, less cited because he did not survive, a militant 
member of the Juventudes Comunistas, Rene Basoa, who was exec'ed by 
his ex-comrades. Cases of left wing collaborators with DINA seem to 
Ii- 
their opposition, rejected the economic b li epr--. t set in 
motion by the dictatorship. The political model proposei 
repeatedly by them, the establishment of a civil-military 
movement that would replace the political parties, never 
found the conditions under which to flourish in spite of 
appearing to be considered by Pinochet more than once 
during those years. 27 
Civil participation in the repression, beyond the 
grotesque anecdotes represented by its members, reveals 
the ideological and political evolution of the 
dictatorship toward the search for a new political model 
of government and of social participation that would 
replace the political parties and the system formed by 
them. This signified the erosion of the anti-Allende 
consensus that had allowed the coup to take place, and 
eliminated the principal ally within the party' system, 
the Christian Democrats. The new negative consensus was 
anti-politicians and anti-party. It gathered together the 
most plebeian fascists, incorporated the dirtiest 
repressive tasks; extended to the most intellectualised 
nationalists, who sought not to mix in those kinds of 
have been the product of pressures on the individual, rather than an 
ideological affinity. 
`' The most typical example of this phenomenon, not personally linked 
to the apparatus of repression although some of his followers 
achieved notoriety in it, is Pablo Rodriguez Grez. 
13 3 
activities; and included the most el' List y: -ý`eIIec` Is, 
the "gremialistas, " represented by their forem. os} 
ideologue, Guzman, who embodied it better than an cne 
else. Guzman, in fact, formulated the new blueprint for 
the political system. 
3.3. Ambiguities of the victory and formation of a 
strategic alliance 
To this day, the Chilean military imagine themselves 
to have been the protagonists of a liberating geste that 
saved the country from the claws of communism. This 
belief is the cement of the bloc that supported the coup 
d'etat on September 11,1973, and the argument that seeks 
to legitimate it. It is also the justification for the 
repression and, among those who even today do not condemn 
the repression, a vehicle for shifting the blame to the 
victims. 28 The negative character of the consensus that 
permitted the simultaneous existence of such a 
heterogeneous bloc was expressed, with some logic, in the 
"restoration" tone of the first pronouncements of the 
insurrectionists. They declared the illegitimacy of 
N For the currency of these arguments see 'El engano, " by Arturo 
Fontaine in the journal ýQue pasa?, No 1444, December 1998. 
Fontaine was Director of El Mercurio in the worst period of 
journalistic falsifications aimed at hiding attacks on human rights. 
See also the speech by General Ricardo I: urieta (successor to 
Pinochet in command of the Chilean army) reviewed in the _jaily, La 
Tercera, of Santiago, June 8,1999. 
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Allende's government and defined the government 
established by the coup as "transitory" without 
committing to deadlines. The oft-cited Bando No 5, issued 
by the military Junta, declared that 
"the Armed Forces, have assumed the moral duty 
imposed upon them by the fatherland, to depose 
the government which, though initially legitimate 
has fallen into flagrant illegality, by assuming 
power only for the time required by 
circumstances, supported by the evident feelings 
of the great national majority, which by itself, 
before God and history, makes their action 
just 
." 
29 
One of the first communiques broadcast by radio 
during the coup d'etat and that had been signed by the 
conspirators the previous afternoon, stated, "Chilean 
workers may rest assured that their economic and social 
conquests to date will not be fundamentally changed. i30 
Leigh himself quotes Pinochet who, in the first interview 
he granted foreign correspondents in the Escuela Militar 
`9 Bando No 5 of the Government Junta, Libro blanco... pp. 248-249. 
This direct quote from the Bando No 5 has been incorporated into the 
secondary school "History of Chile" text by Francisco Frias 
Valenzuela, (p. 492). 
"' Florencia Varas, Gustavo Leigh, El general disidente, p. 55. 
r. 
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stated: "As soon as the country recovers, the Jun--a will 
hand over the government to whomever the people wish. 1131 
Undoubtedly, the restorationist position was most 
clearly expressed by the Christian Democrats in point 3 
of their declaration of September 12,1973. "The purposes 
of restoring institutional normality, peace and unity 
among Chileans expressed by the Military Junta of 
Government, interpret the general feeling and merit the 
patriotic collaboration of all sectors. Their success 
requires solidarity and just action, respectful of the 
rights of workers, that combines collective effort in the 
national task of constructing the future of Chile, alien 
to minority purposes of those who seek regressive models 
and those contrary to the democratic vocation of our 
people". 32 The other significant component of the 
insurrectionist bloc within the party system, the Partido 
Nacional, expressed its "unrestricted support" and called 
for "unreserved support of the rectifying activities of 
the Governing Military Junta. "' 33 These political parties, 
the ones that supported the coup, were declared in 
"recess, " a situation that was ordered in January 9+74.34 
The parties supporting the Allende government shifted to 
31 Op. cit. p. 56, (emphasis mine) . 32 Chile-America, No 4, Rome, 1975, p. 43. 
33 Rafael Valdivieso Ariztia, Crönica de un rescate, p. 13. 
wfiý 
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clandestine action as a consequence of the repression 
unleashed against their members. 
The presence of political actors alien to the 
parties that were legitimate by virtue of their 
participation in the system, appears to be insinuated in 
the Christian Democrat declarations. That suspicion was 
confirmed a posteriori by General Leigh when he 
attributed the restorationist position to himself. 
"Ideologues, advisors, courtesans and, mainly, economic 
groups of the greatest diversity began to emerge... Slogans 
began to flourish to the effect that: this is not a 
government of transition; goals, not deadlines; hands off 
the state, etc . // 
35 
The ambiguity of the Military Junta's position began 
to show within six months. "The Declaration of Principles 
of the Chilean Government, " released March 11,1974, 
signed by its four members, establishes its position with 
respect to these questions: 
The Armed Forces and the Forces of Order do not 
set deadlines for their leadership of the 
government, because the task of moral, 
institutional and material reconstruction of the 
country require profound and prolonged activity. " 
34 Chile-America, No 5, Rome, 1975, p. 48. 
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"The present government has been ca`ego-- ca it 
declaring that it does not pretend to limit 
itself to being a government of mere 
administration, which signifies a parenthesis 
between two similar party governments, in other 
words, it is not a matter of a "truce" for 
reordering toward return of power to the same 
politicians who had so much responsibility, by 
action or omission in the virtual destruction of 
the country. 36 
Today the authorship of Jaime Guzman and, consequently 
the "gremialista" tone of that declaration is recognised. 
In it the principle of the state as subsidiary and its 
intended "apoliticism, " stand out. However, the ambiguity 
of the situation persists to the extent that the 
processes of relocation of power centres continue their 
course. 
Relations with the Christian Democrat party 
appeared, in fact, the same as relations with. all 
political parties in general. The Christian Democrats, as 
the axis of the party system questioned the limits of ~.. e 
situation it defined as abnormal. Communications between 
the government and the Christian Derýccrats were answerer 
35 Florencia Varas, Op. cit., p. 53. 
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indirectly as resolut-o-: s wi respect to --'-. e col --cal th 
parties in general. Decree-law 27 of September 21,1973, 
had dissolved the National Congress, the centre of party 
activity. In December, it had been pronounced that 
members of political parties occupying public pos--s were 
required to resign their party affiliation in order to 
continue in their jobs. 37 
Junta members and other representatives of the Armed 
Forces had contacts with civilians coming from political 
parties integrated into the system, who continued to 
collaborate with the dictatorship on a personal basis, 
but also with political-ideological groups that were 
marginal to the system prior to 1973. Some of these had 
been very active in the opposition to Allende38 and others 
were of well-defined marginal ideologies. But they would 
find a place from which to collaborate in the apparatus 
of repression developed by the dictatorship. 39 
A second set of ambiguities generated by the victory 
and formation of the dictatorship occttrrei ire the 
contentious formulation of a new economic field. Here 
A`' Declaraciön de principios... pp. 28-29, emphasis mine. 
37 Ascanio Cavallo, Manuel Salazar and Oscar Sepulveda, La rris~oria 
secreta del regimen militar, p. 28. 
38 Of these, the one that achieved the broadest projection was the 
group known as the 'gremialistas" originating in the '_'niversiiiaa 
Catölica. 
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there was an ideological confrontation, the resoIt - ;. o 17 
which would be decisive for the historical significance 
of the dictatorship. From the 1970 pres -Aeý. tiaý 
campaign, in the candidacy of Jorge Alessandri, there was 
a confrontation between a group of economists and 
entrepreneurs later known as the "Chicago boys, " and the 
ideological leaders of the traditional right. The latter 
have been characterized as "the thinking minds of the 
captains of industry grown in the shade of import 
substitution. " 40 The latter were victorious during the 
first confrontation regarding the construction 
Alessandri's economic program for the 1970 campaign. 
After the coup, one of the heads of the "Chicago" group, 
Sergio de Castro, was appointed advisor to the Minister 
of Economy, General Rolando Gonzalez. However, Raül Säez, 
the principal economic advisor during the early stages of 
the dictatorship did not belong to the "Chicago boys". 
He arrived in Santiago toward the end of September of 
1973 and, on his recommendation, the Junta appointed 
Fernando Leniz Minister of Economy on October 10. This 
left the ideological conflict unresolved due to the fact 
;° Pre-existing fascist conglomerations like the MRNS [Movimiento 
Revolucionario Nacional Sindicalista], or the more ephemeral 
Avanzada Nacional are examples of this phenomenon. 
'''' Arturo Fontaine Aldunate, Los economistas y el Presidente Pinochet, 
p. 32. 
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that Leniz was an ex-executive of the Compan a 
Manufacturera de Papeles y Cartones and, during Allende's 
government, was chairman of the board of El Mercurio, all 
of which linked him to the most traditional right. 41 
For a time Säez functioned as referee in the 
conflict between the two groups of economic advisors. In 
that role, he was appointed Minister of Economic 
Coordination in July 1974.42 However, ideological 
development was uneven. The proposal of the "Chicago 
boys" that had matured during the Unidad Popular 
government into a document produced by a group of 
opposition economists that even included Christian 
Democrats, that became a legend known as: "El ladrillo" 
(The Brick). In actuality, these economists did not 
confront an ideological opposition but ideological 
inertia. In previous chapters43 it has been demonstrated 
how the ideology of economic development centred on 
industrialization by import substitution was the ground 
for a relative consensus that permitted the party system 
to function. In it, on other levels, models of global 
organization of society were confronted that, in a 
al Ibid. pp. 59-61. 
42 A ministry created by Decree-law 558, of July 8,1974, of which 
Raül Säez took charge three days later on the 11` Valencia Avaria, 
Op. cit., 1-713, note 208. 
4' See Chapter 1. 
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universal sort of language, were promoted by each parr, -. 
The consensus as to the model of economic development, 
however, reduced these differences to issues reJarinü 
the form and velocity with which changes ought to be 
implemented; the general spirit and goals of the new 
ideology were the object of basic consensus. This 
consensus made it possible to separate "technical" from 
"political" questions in the field of economic policy. 
Thus, one of the main objectives of the new economic 
ideology was successfully fulfilled 
The key political ally in this phase was Jaime 
Guzman, the "gremialista" ideologist, to whom a 
fundamental role in the writing of the above mentioned 
"Declaraciön de Principios" is attributed. In 1974, 
Guzman joined a group of neoliberal economists, despite 
the fact that in the first stage of the regime he felt 
closer to Alessandri' s entrepreneurs" . As advisor to the 
dictatorship, "as soon as it was practicable, he 
suggested announcing the line of economic freedom a-. d 
used the principle of subsidiarity to support the market 
economy. " Invited by these economists to a meeting in 
the offices of the Sociedad de Fomento Fabril, in 1974, 
"He noted that all, except Kelly, held the --i--le of 
advisors and exhorted them to take over executive posts. 
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Guzman was convinced that it was a"solu.: tel-- necessar;; 
that the economists carry forward their ideas and plans 
by themselves. " 44 
An alliance between Jaime Guzman and the group of 
economists was emblematic of the significance of the 
whole period of dictatorship. At first glance it is 
impossible to establish their connections or affinities. 
It was even considered an abdication or "betrayal" by 
Jaime Guzman of his declared principles. 45 Guzman and the 
neoliberal economists, brought about two of the most 
radical changes subsequently produced during the 
dictatorship. These were the new constitution and the new 
model for economic development. Under conditions 
prevailing before the coup, that is, conditions that 
included a political system, a party system and an 
ideological model that constituted both as such, neither 
the new constitution nor the new model for economic 
development appeared as a viable blueprint. To implement 
these new blueprints, it was necessary to eliminate the 
political system, to place the parties on recess, to 
suspend their actions and clear the scene. That world 
only be possible under conditions of dictatorship, by 
government that was not responsible `o anoie arg; in 
4d Fontaine, Op. cit. pp. 84-85. 
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which the "technical" elements could be presented as 
"apolitical. " Once these conditions were created by the 
military coup and the subsequent repression, politics 
took on a different aspect from the normal interplay in 
parliament. Guzmän's clandestine contact with the 
economists is an example that clearly illustrates the 
conspiratorial shape assumed by politics. 
Renewal of political cadres of the dominant class 
during the dictatorship reflected a change in social 
structure due to replacement of the interests of 
industrial capital with the interests of financial 
capital as a strategic axis. These were represented by 
technocrats who nevertheless had to ally with political 
cadres of the right who, defeated in the field of 
economic ideology, entrenched themselves in the design of 
a new political system. 46 The ideological victory by 
economists of the new model took place in April 1975, 
when on renewing the cabinet in light of the prospect of 
his first economic crisis, Pinochet handed over command 
of the economy as a whole to this group and adopted their 
"shock treatment" as official economic policy. 
The power structures of the dictatorship are 
revealed in accounts of meetings at Vina del Mar where 
45 Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt, El Chile perplejo, p. 238. 
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crucial decisions were made. Fontaine writes that the 
presence of "Colonel Manuel Contreras and other officers 
of the Direcciön Nacional de Inteligencia [DINA] ý. Tas 
mustered to contribute their appraisal of the effects of 
the plan on public opinion. " 47 The same meeting saw the 
replacement of Raul Säez as principal economic advisor to 
the government, his tasks were thereby practically 
reduced to negotiating the foreign debt. 48 
The depth of the economic policy change as a break 
with the past can be seen as a rejection of the previous 
political system. The Christian Democrats were the only 
political party that was not proscried (as parties on the 
Left were) and the Right had dismantled themselves after 
the coup to support the military. 
As late as the end of 1975, a pamphlet written by 
Eduardo Frei Montalva, adopted a decisive distance 
between the party that represented the axis of the 
previous system and the dictatorship. 49 Relations between 
the dictatorship and the Christian Democrats are the best 
This is the case of Alessandri, but not that of Guzmdn. 
47 Fontaine, Op. cit. p. 89. 
i8 Cavallo, et. al., op. cit., p. 87. Furhtermore a Decree-law of 
April 10,1975, number 966, called Säez's ministry 'Economic and 
Development Coordination" Decree-law, 1263, completely erased the 
ministry. Sdez, resigned November 3,1997, and his resignation was 
accepted from February 10,1976 (D. S., 25-XI-1975). See Valencia 
Avaria, Op. cit., p. 1-713, note 208. 
49 El mandato de 1a historia 5- las exigencias del porvenir, in Chile- 
America, No. 14-15, Roma, January-February 1976, pp. 92-110. 
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indicator of the progress of the byuetirirt to repýhce The 
previous political system, because the parties of the 
left were subject to implacable persecution ara those of 
the right had subscribed their unconditional support. 
Thus, the interests of the Christian Democrat party 
became identified with the interests of the party system 
as a whole inasmuch as it represented the right to exist 
of any and all parties. The Christian Democrat party was, 
however, in an ambiguous situation. Its legitimacy as 
interlocutor of the dictatorship rested on its support 
for the coup d'etat. Consequently, its denunciations and 
protests with respect to the repressive character of the 
dictatorship were limited to those affecting the party 
directly and referred only in a general way to the worst 
aspects of the repression affecting the parties of the 
left. The alliance between the "Chicago" economists and 
the "gremialistas" faced still other alternatives before 
consolidating as a blueprint for the military. On The 
one hand, the nationalists were ideologically influential 
in a diffuse sense among the military, and P'nochet toor'. 
them into account when he thought of a civic-military 
movement to replace the parties. On the other, he 
ambiguity of the Christian Democrat's position allcw. tiwed 
some of the party's technical cadres to c c-: '- y nue con'-ac-- 
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with the dictatorship and some officers, par` cc-arly 
generals, recalled their earliersympathy for them. This 
multiplicity of unresolved ideological pcsi`iors 
unleashed a covert struggle between conspirators, 
government functionaries installed by the dictator, who 
sought to gain influence over him through conspiracies 
and intrigue. 
The "gremialistas" were affected by scandals that 
arose from the collapse of the "La Familia" co-operative 
for savings and credit. When a group of savers brought 
suit for fraud, it was revealed that among the directors 
of the cooperative were some of the principal 
"gremialista" leaders including Jaime Guzman, who 
remonstrated that he had nothing to do with the co- 
operative after he was confined to the city. 50 
In 1977, the Christian Democrats suffered the 
closure of their radio station, Radio Balmaseda. In the 
financial field, it is supposed that pursuit of the 
Fluxa-Yaconi economic group was due to the fact thati it, 
through the offices of Banco Osorno y La Union, was a 
channel for CDP financing. Finally, on March 11,1977, 
decree was issued dissolving all parties so far in 
recess, aimed explicitly at forestalli:. g a Christian 
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Democrat conspiracy. Two internal party documerts drawn 
up by Andres Zaldivar and Tomas Reyes were drawn in as 
proof of the conspiracy. 51 
With the elimination of all political parties, the 
road to normalizing the nation's political life seemed to 
be abandoned. However, in that same year, outlines of the 
new system that would eventually be imposed by the 
dictatorship began to appear, along with the stages that 
it would go through, and a tentative timetable of that 
transition. All of this was specified in what was known 
as the "Discurso de Chacarillas" read by Pinochet July 9, 
1977, on the hill of that name in a ceremony organized 
by the National Youth Secretariat, an organ of the 
General Secretariat of Government, and a Frente Juvenil 
de Unidad Nacional, organized by the "gremialistas" of 
the Universidad Catölica. The speech, written by Jaime 
Guzman, according to available information, repeats the 
essence of the "Declaraciön de Principios" of 1974, but 
defines the new regime toward which the country was 
advancing as: "... a new democracy that Will be 
authoritarian, protected, integrative, `technified, ' arg 
of authentic social participation. " Transition `o this 
50 The lawyer for the defrauded savers was the nationalist leader 
Pablo Rodriguez. See Cavallo, et. al. Op. cit. p. 157. 
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new system of government was designed to take placei- 
stages: 
The process, conceived as gradual, provides for 
three stages: recovery, transition and normali- or 
consolidation. These stages differ in the changing 
roles assigned to the Armed Forces and the forces 
of order on the one hand, and the civilian 
population on the other. They are also 
distinguished by the legal-institutional 
instruments that will be created and employed in 
In the stage of recovery, political power has 
had to be entirely assumed by the Armed Forces and 
the forces of order with the collaboration of the 
civilian population, however, later its most 
contingent aspects will be shared with the civilian 
population, which will thus shift from 
collaboration to participation. " 
Finally, we will enter into a stage of normality 
and consolidation. Power will be exercised directly 
and basically by the civilian population, it being 
reserved constitutionally to the Armed Forces and 
forces of order to provide care for the essential 
bases of institutions and national security in 
their broad and decisive modern projections. 52 
Other characteristics of the stages and the 
timetable associated with them, referred to the kind of 
regulatory ordering that would rule them and the degrees 
and forms that civil participation would assume. The 
first stage, of "recovery, " would last until December 31, 
1980, when the abrogation of the 1925 Constitution and 
its replacement by "constitutional acts" would be 
completed. In the second stage, that of " transition, " 
51 The documents appeared in a special supplement of the daily La 
Tercera, March 12,1977. 
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beginning in 1981, the Constituent power of the -', -: ---a 
would be exercised in consultation with the Coincil of 
state. A mixed legislative chamber of a "tripar: i`e 
nature" would be installed, though without the 
participation of parties traditionally designated as the 
"three parts. " Instead, one third would be designated by 
Pinochet and the reminder would come from the twelve 
regions with prior approval of the government. 
The third phase of "Constitutional Normality" would 
begin in 1985. Power would return to the civilian 
population. This implied an offer of free and direct 
elections in eight years time. In this third stage of 
the period of transition, two thirds of the legislative 
chamber would be elected by popular and direct suffrage 
and one third, would be appointed by the government. That 
same chamber would elect the next president for six 
years. 53 The new constitution would also enter into effect 
on that day. 54 
The circumstances of the ceremony in which the 
speech was read and its content, marked a total victor; ' 
for the "gremialistas" over nationalists an-. 
5: Extracts from "Discurso en el Cerro Chacarillas 9.7.1°-, -". In 
Pinochet: Patria y Democracia. 
53 Caval lo, et. al . Op. cit. p. 162. 4'' Genaro Arriagada, Por 1a razön o la l.: zrza. Chile bajo Pinoche*, 
p. 91. 
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corporativist tendencies. Staring Fron. the supposed 
success of the "Chicago boys" economic program, ý! -: e 
"gremialistas" would see their political struggle 
culminate in Pinochet's assumption of their program of 
institutionalisation. The contents of this speech are 
cited by Pinochet as being among the first elements of 
conflict with General Leigh which culminated a year later 
in his removal from both command of the air force and the 
governing Junta. 5 From here on, political conflict would 5 
centre on the characteristics of the new political order 
and the forms and deadlines of its being put into effect. 
3.4. The bases of a new political system, a new 
Constitution 
It should be noted that, with respect to regulations 
during this process, the Governing Junta in its "Act of 
Constitution" of September 11,1973, "Declares that the 
Junta... will respect the Constitution and the laws of the 
Republic to the extent that the present situation of the 
country permits. " 56 A decree-law clarifying the meaning 
and scope of Article 1 of Decree-law No. 1 (the act 
quoted above), established that from the coup forwar the 
Junta had undertaken to "exercise Constitutional, 
Legislative and Executive powers, " se`: ir: g --o---h 
its 
55 Florencia Varas, op. cit. pp. 41-43. 
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ability to reform the Constitution by reans of Ae. -ree- 
laws. By December 1975, fifteen such decrees were ha--de-'A 
down, all reforming the Constitution of 1925. : _---er 
December 31 of that year, four Constitutional Acts were 
issued and, thereafter until July 1,1980, seven Decree- 
laws were issued reforming the Constitutional Acts. 57 On 
that date, the Council of state (created by 
Constitutional Act No. 1, of December 31,1975) handed 
down its report on the draft of a new Constitution to the 
military Junta. On August 10 1980, Pinochet announced 
that a plebiscite would be held on September 11th to 
approve that draft. 
Study of the new Constitution had taken five years 
in the committee framing the draft; twenty two 
months for the `Report to the Council of State"; 
forty two days for its approval by the Military 
Junta; but allowed only thirty days for 
presentation, discussion and vote by the people in 
the plebiscite. 58 
There has been much discussion among jurists 
regarding the characteristics of this Constitution. 
However, the central question was not technical except in 
a secondary sense. The central purpose of the entire 
draft never varied: to avoid at all costs the possibility 
of a repetition of the Unidad Popular experience. There 
"' Valencia Avaria, Op. cit. p. 268. 
57 Valencia Avaria, Op. cit., pp. 269-330. 
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was also a negative consensus from the outset. 
Subsequently, implementation of the central idea inspýrei 
a variety of views, and interests became diversified just 
as had occurred in the case of the economic blueprint. 
Pinochet and the Armed Forces ultimately imposed a draft, 
written by their civilian supporters, which could not 
have been approved if the political party system had 
still been functioning. Moreover, this draft was 
explicitly designed so that its proposals for the general 
participation of the population would go into effect only 
after any threat of resurgence by the pre-coup d'etat 
political actors had disappeared. In Pinochet's words: 
To step abruptly from the present regime to full 
democracy, with the generation of authority by 
election, would only meet with former political 
groups and parties as prepared actors whose 
activities were fatal for Chile. 
We must not only create new institutions that 
favour the sustained spiritual and material 
progress of the country. It is not enough to 
promote practices that confer solidity on these new 
institutions. It is just as indispensable to 
promote the development of a new civil generation 
impregnated with these values. 9 5 
Six years of dictatorship, equivalent to the 
duration of a constitutional administration, were about 
to end. Beside the guarantees that could be included it 
58 Genaro Arriagada, Op. cit., p. 107. 
59 Clase magistral de Su Excelencia el Presidente de la Republica, 
General de Ejercito Don Augusto Pinochet Ugarte con mc, ýivc e is 
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the regulations, they now include per cis of trai: sitio-. 
that could last for an indeterminate period in vie,.,, of 
the goals imposed. What is significant about the new 
political order established by the dictatorship's 
Constitution is the way in which it sought to ensure 
certain strategic ends. Among them was the ideological 
exclusion of the left and a guarantee by force of the 
stability of the domination. Another was to grant the 
advantage to a new elite sponsored by the dictatorship. 
Fulfilment of these objectives implied facing grave 
ideological obstacles. Universal suffrage was finally 
included in the new constitution, but not without 
opposition to it. Jaime Guzman, for one, did not adhere 
to the idea of popular sovereignty. Even so, there were 
those who proposed a right to vote conditioned by 
property or income . 
60 
From the outset, the work of the designers of the 
new order was directed toward limiting party activity. 
The Committee to Study the New Constitution61 held its 
inauguracion del ano academico de la Universidad de Chile (Santiago, 
April 6,1979), p. 46. 
`"' The minority vote, signed by Pedro Ibanez and Carlos Caceres in 
the Council of State "Established the discrepancy of both with 
respect to several points of the draft, of which the most noteworthy 
was its opposition to universal suffrage and its suggestion that the 
highest authorities be elected by indirect vote. " Cavallo, et. al. 
Op. cit. p. 314. 
61 The information and quotations that follow have been taken from 
the work of Rafael Larrain Cruz and Leopoldo ti..: ne 'ome, Pro'ecci; -. 
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first session September 24,1973, witi-, Enri; -.: e Or-, :r 
presiding. On November 26, of the same year, }he; ' 
presented a "Memorandum of Constitutional Intentions" for 
the consideration of the governing Junta. This was the 
first result of intense ideological labour. 62 
However, all this fell short of the draft that was 
finally imposed. The Committee was gradually purged of 
members that might have represented views linked to 
political parties. Three of its members who had resigned 
were Alejandro Silva Bascunän, Enrique Evans and Jorge 
Ovalle. The former two were linked to the Christian 
Democrats after the dissolution of political parties by 
decree-law in 1977. The third was associated with 
Democracia Radical, through his association with General 
Leigh63 and probably held the position generally 
attributed to the air force that it was sufficient to 
reform the 1925 Constitution, and that little need 
existed for a new one. 64 "The Committee was reconstituted 
with Don Juan de Dios Carmona who had been a Christiar. 
Democrat but was already politically supporting the 
de la democracia. ýDeben proscribirse los part *dos marxistas--ý, pp. 
13-15. 
62 See Appendix 1 for relevant extracts from report of CDmrr, -ttee to 
Study the New Constitution 
63 Cavallo, et. al. Op. cit. p. 310 and Pinochet himself quoted by 
Florencia Varas Op. cit. p. 41. 
64 Cavallo, et. al . Op. cit. p. 
22'4-''36. 
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regime (... ý. Among other new members there were professors 
of constitutional law without a given political 
affiliation like Raul Bertelsen and Luz Bulnes. "gis 
The Committee's labours were intense, 417 sessic r: s, 
and the discussion in the Council of State required "5? 
plenary sessions and an unrecorded number of Committee 
meetings and interviews with specialists. il66 
These discussions demonstrate most clearly the 
thinking of the framers of the new Constitutions' What 
is even more important the clearly expressed idea that 
the penetration of political parties in society is 
undesirable for the maintenance of the regime of 
government. 68 The Constitution of 1980 sought to restrict 
ideological and social representation of the new party 
system that it expected to come into being. Ideological 
exclusion was established in Article 8,69 and in Article 
19 it is established that to preserve the independence of 
65 Jaime Guzman interviewed by Juan Pablo Illanes, in Jaime Guzman, 
Escritos personales, p. 163. 
°` Quoted by Rafael Valdivieso, Crönica de un rescate, p. 218. 
67 For example, the statement by Jaime Guzman on October 25,1973, in 
which he declared that 'to speak of pluralist democracy is 
conflictive as long as the precise limits of pluralism are not known 
and there is a risk of falling into contradictions. " (Ibid. p. 15). 
68 See the previous chapter. 
69 A comparison of the three versions of Article 8, the presents, 
by the Committee, the one by he Council of S-. ate and ý. e one -ha- 
was finally incorporated into the Constitution, may be seen in 
Larrain y Nunez Op. cit. pp. 207-209. 
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labour organizations, it is prohibited tra` -hey "aý. 
their leaders" intervene in party politics. 
The principles guiding the framing of these articles 
are contained in an order from Pinochet to the chairman 
of the "Committee to Study the New Constitution, " Enrique 
Ortüzar, on November 10,1977.70 Point No 5, contained, 
"certain ideas that I (Pinochet) consider basic to 
establishing the politico-institutional criteria that 
guide the government. " 71 
If this resulted in a discourse that seems to be that of 
a puppet manipulated by a gremialista ventriloquist, the 
explanation is that the official copy editor, Monica 
Madariaga, Minister of Justice at the time, enjoyed the 
advice of Jaime Guzman, a member of the Committee and, 
therefore, also a recipient of the same document. '` As 
mentioned above, articles 8 and 19 of the Constitution: 
established regulations of ideological exclusion as well 
as the principle of separation between society and 
politics manifest in the prohibitor. of parties 
participating in gremial activities and by labour leaders 
in party activities. 
70 Reproduced in Constituciön de 1980. Comentari; s de juristas 
internacionales, pp. 137-143. 
71 See index for citation of relevant passages. 
Cavallo, et. al., Op. cit., p. 310. 
hlý 
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The rules of the new Cons `u`ic: _ a fec i ig 
political parties were among those that most worried the 
critics at the time of their approval by plebiscite in 
1980. The Committee for Constitutional Studies presiJed 
by the lawyer Manuel Sanhueza, known as the "Group of 
24, " had been questioning the Constitutional draft from 
the moment it was made public by its delivery to the 
Council of State. On January 27,197q, the daily El 
Mercurio, published the document of the "Group of 24" 
entitled "Observations on Ortüzar's draft, , 73 in which 
"This Committee undertakes to warn the country about 
aspects that it esteems most grave in this attempt to 
hand down a new Political Constitution for the State" 
From the present perspective, it is of interest to 
set down the central points of the critique of the graft 
as it was finally approved. These were that the draft: 1) 
established the crime of opinion (Article 8, to which 
reference has already been made); 2) "subordinate-the 
principle of the people's sovereignty to the higher 
control of the Armed Forces"; 3) increased presiient-aý 
power to a point incompatible with a democratic: sys'_em; 
4) distorted the function: of the judiciary c, li stir:, i, 
with respect to Military Tribunals in matters of crimes 
7: Reproduced in Chile-America, N° 50-51. 
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of terrorism, and mixed the J udiciar, - in political 
questions with reference to the Constitution., --l Trib na 
and the Tribunal to Evaluate Elections; 5) :i ~oT 
recognize legal status under Public Law to political 
parties and did not preserve the Consti`u. ýtional guarantee 
of autonomy allowing them to organise as they will; 6) 
and finally, its intent was to prevent a change in the 
current economic model. Furthermore, the absence of 
opportunity for public debate on the approval of the new 
Constitution wsa also questioned. 
Approval of the Constitution in the plebiscite of 
September 11,1980, marked the culmination of the 
dictatorship's victory and the consequent defeat of the 
political parties. In his enthusiasm for the victory 
that night, Pinochet announced the creation of "a great 
civil-military movement of Chile, " (Membership in which 
would require registration in the municipalities). 
74 El 
Mercurio expressed it thus: 
"The politicians who allowed or generated the state 
of affairs that brought about the failure of 
Chilecyn 
democracy were defeated by an alliance o -he 
military and the economists. The cont-,:. 
ts o` the 
Thursday 11th plebiscite may A --e s : nn i ýe as follows. 
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The Tr ilitary provided order, sec , -r- ýy and co ide-ce, 
the economists provided new ideas capable o` 47 -* raising 
tree nation from i}s prostration a-., ibera ina he 
energy to undertake a speedy march towar 
development. The military and the economists of This 
regime fulfilled the task that was not carried ou-- by 
the politicians who -o7ti : mss: era}eiy 1e the 
opposition... such is the meaning of he noteworthy 
alliance between the military and the economists. "'S 
This triumphalism was based on perception of the 
success of the economic policy. Ninetee-. seve.. ty-nine is 
still remembered as the year o` uncontrolled 
expectations. On September 11,127 Pnochet declared 
that "by 1985 or 1986 every Chilean worker will have a 
car, a house and a television set . i76 In June the United 
States dollar was pegged at $39 pesos and a wave of 
imports of consumer goods and äo lar debt was unleashed. 
This situation may have influenced the decision to hol, 
the plebiscite in 1980, and certainly was part of The 
explanation of its result, which the de eated accep i 
and, largely, eventually, legitimated. 
''' Cavallo, et. al . Op. cit. p. 
331. 
's "La Semana Politica", El Mercurio, September 21 , 1980, q.: e by 
Genaro Arriagada Op. cit. p. 103. 
'" Quoted in La Tercera August 21?, 1999, Reportajes, *1979: El ano 
del cuesco Cabrera. " 
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The irregularities surrounding the entire plebiscite 
were denounced in multiple locations and by several 
media. 77 However, accepting to carry out a ýriýe 
campaign in favour of rejecting the draft Constitution by 
the party elite as a whole - formally outlawed at the 
time - provided all the legitimacy the dictatorship 
needed to impose its Constitution. 78 In fact, those who 
opposed the Constitution made up a heterogeneous bloc 
that included such diverse representatives as General 
Leigh, expelled from the governing Junta by Pinochet, to 
members of the the left who had no other option but to 
join Frei's call. The Christian Democrats rejected an 
alliance with the left preferring instead to lead a 
project in which the Left would have to play a 
subordinate role. At the only public act of opposition 
to the draft Constitution authorised by the dictatorship, 
Frei was received by an audience shouting Unidad Popular 
slogans. 79 This was but one example of the capacity for 
survival in the consciousness of the masses, in view of 
the fact that the parties of the left were passing 
through their worst moment of doubts and vacillatio-. s. 
" See, Cavallo et. al., Op. cit., pp. 322-332, and Chile- Ai erica N 
64-65, June-September, 1980, and 66-67, Oct-Nov, Dic. 1980. 
See Jaime Guzmän, Op. cit., pp. 102-106 and Enrique Carlas Kirny, 
Proceso politico en Chile: 1973-1990, pp. 92-93. 
79 See Cavallo et. al. , Op. cit. pp. 
327-329. 
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Chapter 4. Crisis and erosion of the dictatorship: 
reconstruction of the right 
4.1 Change in the correlation of forces and reac-iva: io- 
of the political elite 
The euphoria that followed the 1980 plebiscite amo=ng 
supporters of the dictatorship provoked two kinds of 
concern that would become the source of conflict. On the 
one hand, the participation of civilians in the 
government lacked an institutionalised structure and, on 
the other, the most controversial part of the new 
constitution was at the outset that of the transitory 
articles regulating the gradual enforcement of the new 
political order and its normalization. It was in these 
articles that the extraordinary powers at the disposal of 
the dictator and the Military Junta were established 
along with the opportunity for them to perpetuate 
themselves in power for another sixteen years. This 
possible period was divided into two presidential tears 
of eight years each (the period established by the 
Constitution for the position of President of the 
Republic) . The first of 
tr: e two wcul, i begil. -. March 
1981, with Pinochet in the Presidency and the sec, --, nj 
would be subject to ratificatior. by a :: lebiscite 
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the Military Junta would propose a candidate gor 
consideration by the electorate in 1988. 
The idea and design of this set of transitor7 
articles was the inspiration of Jorge Alessandri as 
president of the Council of State. ' Pinochet's advisors 
and the Military Junta, however, designed the version 
approved simultaneously with the Constitution. 2 The 
interpretation and application of these rules provided 
more issues of contention among tendencies supporting the 
dictatorship rather than with the opposition. Given the 
political retreat and the absence of formal organization, 
the members of distinguishable ideological currents 
within the bloc supporting the dictatorship were 
characterized by journalists, analysts, and ultimately, 
among themselves, as "hardliners" and "softies. i3 Among 
the problems facing them was state economic activity. In 
this the "hard-liners" appeared to have been defeated 
since the launching of the economic model in 1975. But, 
all the same, they had obtained within it a small victory 
by ensuring the preservation of big copper mining in the 
1 Jaime Guzman, Op. cit. pp. 171-172. 
Cavallo et. al. op. cit., pp. 316-318. On the other han: _i, Alessandri 
in 1983 said: "I claim for myself the honour for the `a:, '^-1t a 
political charter had been composed. I do not agree with the changes 
introduced into the project approved by the Council o` State, 
less with the rules of transition introduced into the text. " Quoted 
by Andres Allamand, La travesia del desierto, p. 36. 
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hands of the state in the new constitution. eTM. ýyning J 
unresolved was the question of a new structure for 
political participation. This, linked to the cura`ion of 
the dictatorship and the terms for gradual normalization, 
shifted to the foreground. 
The "hard-liner" sectors included nationalists, 
corporativists and supporters of permanent militarisation 
of politics via a civic-military structure. However, as 
noted by a contemporary analysis, "General Pinochet's 
recent announcement of the creation of a civic-military 
front had barely been formulated when it lost its 
vitality. Without serious political change, it did not 
seem probable that such a political movement would be 
formed mainly because of the resistance it would probably 
encounter in the Armed Forces themselves. i4 The idea of 
a "movement" had been posited previously in 1975, by the 
Movimiento de Unidad Nacional, MUN, S in which some union 
leaders in the opposition to Unidad Popular took part and 
was announced in the "Declaration of Codegua. " Later, in 
1978, an attempt was made to create a "Pinochetist" 
Movement. In 1980, Pinochet himself, in his victory 
3 Sergio Fernandez, "Genesis de la Constituciön de 1880". 
4 Taller de Anälisis Politico, Informe Mensual de Coyuntura Politica 
N°4, October, 1980, p. 3. 
5 Later, there would be another movement with he same acronym but 
different in all other respects. 
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speech after the plebiscite called for the crea`ion of a 
Civic Military Movement by registration in the 
municipalities. In 1981, Pinochet's advisor, Fe. Jerico 
Willoughby, campaigned to organize such a movement, 
visiting cities all over the country and, even in 1982 
and 1983 nationalists like Pablo Rodriguez and Willoughby 
himself insisted on the project. 6 
Though victory in the plebiscite meant prolongation 
of the dictatorship, civilians involved in the government 
perceived the beginning of a first term presided over by 
Pinochet on March 11,1981, as the beginning of a 
different stage. This brought about an acceleration of 
the process of change called "'modernizations" by the 
dictatorship's publicists' and was accompanied by a 
"hardening" of the regime in late 1980 and early 1981.8 
There was a degree of ambiguity among the forces 
supporting the dictatorship, repeating in some senses the 
6 This brief summary appeared in El Mercurio, May 29,1983, p. D3. In 
August 1983, Federico Willoughby with Gaston Acuna and Pablo 
Rodriguez published a pamphlet entitled, ZQue es el nacionalismo 
hoy? in which they did not insist on the idea for the time being but 
rejected parties as a model of political participation. 
"... while the social security reform was under study, precisely in 
his message of September 11,1979, Pinochet solemnly proclaimed `he 
`Seven modernisations': a labour plan; social security reform; an 
educational directive; restructuring of the health sector; 
modernization of justice; agricultural development; administrative 
reform and regionalisation. " Victor Osorio and Ivan Cabezas, Los 
hijos de Pinochet, p. 76. 
8 For example, the designation of officers on active service as 
delegate rectors in almost all universities, at a time when it was 
hoped that there would be a return of the academic variety, see 
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bloc that had opposed the Allende administration. 9 At 
that time, it was the process by means of which forces 
acting from outside the political system and the party 
system subordinated those who operated within both 
systems to their strategy. Now it was on one hand those 
who saw the prospect of institutionalising the regime as 
a process in which former allies ought to have a role, 
and on the other those who thought the old system should 
be replaced by another that was radically different. This 
difference created breaches through which "soft" sectors 
communicated with sectors of the right in recess and even 
with representatives of the Christian Democrats formally 
in recess and in opposition to the dictatorship. 1° The 
arbiter of all these movements was Pinochet himself, who 
at times seemed to favour the "hardliners" and 
nationalists, or at least that is what one is led to 
believe by his daughter Lucia, spokeswoman for a "Studies 
Centre. " 11 
Informe Mensual de Coyuntura Politica, N° 6, December 1980, p. 4. 
" See the previous chapter. 
10 Testimony to these contacts between the Minister of the Interior, 
Sergio Fernandez and ex-Senators of the right and Christian 
Democrats appears in the interview with Francisco Bulnes San Fuentes 
in the journal ýQue pasa? of December 5,1979, reproduced in part in 
Chile-America, N° 58-59 Nov. -Dec. 1979, p. 149. 
11 The 'Corporaciön de Estudios Nacionales". This model organization 
the Center for Studies, became of considerable irc; rt nce as a 
refuge for ideological activities among intellectuals of ail sectors 
in the absence of political parties. Furthermore, some of them, 
particularly those linked to opposition to the dictatorship assumed 
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The Christian Democrat opposition . ainta rei ;: s 
traditional ambiguity, rejecting calls from the Ccr munist 
Party to join a united opposition front, manoe'.: vrinc ý.,; i--h 
ex-Christian Democrat sectors who were themselves joining 
the Socialist Party, and holding themselves available for 
any contact that might come up with government sectors 
via the former party system right-wing. This situation 
implied a moderate and unsteady reactivation of the old 
political elite that had led the parties ("the gentleman 
politicians" in the dictator's words) who moved, in 
expectation of the institutionalisation of the regime 
upon entry into effect of the new Constitution. However, 
a parallel process in the social base marked the limits 
of this opposition strategy. Particularly among students, 
the most active social opposition in the early eighties, 
there appeared a unity of action in the left opposition 
and the Christian Democrats. 12 
The forces supporting the dictatorship di, j not 
remain long in a state of withdrawal. Even though they 
did not form political parties, their ideologi_- " 
the status of non-governmental organizations (NGO), serving to 
channel foreign solidarity funds aimed at supporting the opposi'ion 
of a variety of tendencies. 
12 An anecdotal example of this is found in Jorge Lavandero, El 
precio de sostener un sueno, p. 59. On the o -er hand, r ri. = ian 
Democrats politicians and others of the left participatei in 1981 in 
the formation of a Committee for the Defense of Labour Union Fr ed: n 
backed by the Catholic Church. Cavallo, e--. al. Op. cit. p. 357. 
WL- 
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tendencies generated organizations of various L-, -es. 
Beginning in the seventies, the "gremialistas" Jevote, J 
themselves to recruiting young people through the 
National Secretariat for Youth, a government organ, and a 
front for secondary school students, Fren}e Juvenil 
Unidad Nacional. In 1981, they also set up an "Instituto 
para una Sociedad Libre. " 13 We have already mentioned 
nationalist activity in this area. All these alternatives 
to the organization of political parties were explored as 
channels of ideological activity, including the formation 
of cadres, in the expectation of a political activation 
for which there was no timetable. In the same absence of 
party organisation, some sectors of the opposition also 
explored the possibilities of armed struggle and 
clandestine military organisation, which were answered 
with repression by the apparatus of the dictatorship, 
renamed CNI. This hardened the regime in its relations 
with social and political opposition and tipped the 
balance in favour of the "hardliners" and nationalists ire 
the internal confrontation within the dictatorship's bloc 
of support. 
What finally set in motion a process of real iqnre-: t- 
among the factors we have considered so far, was the 
13 "Nuestra Historia, " on the UDI's Web page. 
&6. 
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economic crisis which made the bloc in peer vacillate 
and reactivate the opposition at a level li-limagined a 
short time before the most spectac, lar events took c , ce. 
These were the national protests of 1983. However, they 
were a reaction to the by then undeniable effects felt hj 
the vast majority of the population as an economic crisis 
that in the intervening time has been termed a 
"collapse. i14 The first symptom of weakness in the 
economy, until then the source of the triumphalism we 
have already described, was the bankruptcy of the 
Compania Refinadora de Azucar de Vina del Mar (CRAV) in 
1981. This was the result of the vulnerability of the 
industrial sector in the face of Chile's trade opening; 
low prices for sugar on the international market and the 
company's errors of financial strategy. Connections 
throughout the financial arena caused the collapse to 
resonate through the economy. Furthermore, the policy of 
a fixed rate of exchange with open trade made the economy 
as a whole vulnerable to an external recession. 
An attack by the nationalists was not long in 
coming. Their expectations were not only to step into the 
political foreground but also to hinder progress in he 
establishment of the economic blueprint '_ei The 
14 Ricardo ffrench-Davies, Macroeconomic Peformance and Achievements 
i, 
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"Chicago boys. " The doctrinaire cb, (racter of he 
inspiration for the Chicago boys' policies made it very 
difficult for their implementation to be flexible. As a 
result, The devaluation of currency in 1982 and the 
termination of fixed parity policy was a dramatic 
experience for some of them. 15 The most important 
political effect was that the crisis brought about the 
disappearance of the "'internal consensus of the 
government in respect to the policies involved. " 16 
Nevertheless, opposition continued to be centred on 
advancing the institutionalisation and application of the 
guarantees defined by the new Constitution. The full 
weight of the cost of the crisis fell, of course, on the 
weakest sectors, the workers and small indebted 
entrepreneurs, while the state concerned itself with 
saving the financial sector in spite of the fall of some 
economic power groups. 
The conditions of defeat and disarray in which the 
opposition in all its forms and expressions found itself 
made it impossible to foresee what in fact happened. 
Workers in the copper industry attempted a moveme-. t ar: i, 
despite the prospect of failing in their mobilization as 
in Chile, ECLAC, 1998, p. 4. 
15 Joaquin Lavin, Miguel Kast. Pasicn de vivir, pp. 86-8°. 
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a union, sent out a call for "a day of national protest, " 
on May 11,1983. Its success an-, i--s repercussions 
transformed that day into a watershed of she national 
political process. Days of national protest became 
monthly occurrences, each one marking a change in he 
correlation of social and political forces. As a result 
of the first protest, a second was called, in June, by a 
National Workers' Commando. A third protest was convoked 
by social organizations and opposition political parties, 
marking the full reactivation of the political elite 
based on the axis constituted by the Christian Democrats. 
These events had a marked effect on the right and the 
fourth protest, in August, 1983, coincided with the 
designation of Sergio Onofre Jarpa, as Minister of the 
Interior, thereby reactivating the political elite of the 
right which had been part of the party system prior to 
1973. 
In a sense, this was the beginning of the end for 
the dictatorial regime or, in other words, he beginning 
of the transition to full application of the new 
Constitution. Although this was the res',. il} of an ongoing 
process, analysis will show that it was not the only 
possibility nor the only strategy possible, b1ý_ the 
1` Edgardo Boeninger, Democracia en Jhile. Lecciones para la 
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result of the composition of forces that had begýLlr. `o 
take shape. Civilian participation supporting the 
dictatorship from a variety of positions and -'n several 
forms requires careful analysis because the situation 
changed with such great speed that the positions the 
diverse actors were adopting were determined by the 
prospects as and when they appeared. In a sense, the 
process became pendular, oscillating between the power of 
Pinochet and the Armed Forces, while at every turn new 
sectors of the right were integrated that became active 
more or less rapidly. 
Jarpa epitomised the confusion that took hold of the 
dictatorship's bloc of support in the face of the social 
protest. The bloc's response to it could only be 
amguious. Jarpa represented the nationalist positions 
that had entered the right within the party system after 
the crises of conservatives and liberals in the sixties. '7 
He formed, therefore, in a sense, a bridge between the 
nationalists associated with the dictatorship and the ohJA 
political elite of the National Party, that had dissolved 
itself after the coup. He represented a move to revive 
the bloc of opposition to Allende that had promoted the 
gobernabilidad, p. 297. 
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coup, but this time, the Christian Democrats were on the 
other side. Jarpa at first tried to negotiate, owever, 
with an informal interlocutor, the PRODEN, via his old 
friendship with Jorge Lavandero, even offering himself as 
the eventual replacement for Pinochet. 18 Subsequently, 
negotiations continued with the political parties which, 
although they continued to be formally illegal had been 
reactivated in a greater number than before the coup. 
With the Christian Democrats as the axis, the party 
system reactivated its elite leadership, making 
agreements with parties of diverse sizes and diverse 
degrees of communication with the government and separate 
from the social process. They took into account, however, 
the identification of social movements with political 
parties and the designations which lent them authority to 
speak in the name of the overall social opposition. 
The events of 1983 signified the opening of a 
prospect for the end of the dictatorship or, at least, 
for its transformation into a form of government with a 
greater formality for civilian participation. The right, 
feeling the stability of the dictatorship threatened, 
reactivated itself in the dictatorship's defence, yet 
17 Sergio Onofre Jarpa had been a leader of the Juventud Agrario- 
Laborista, President of the Accion Nacional Party in 1963 and vice- 
president of the Partido Nacional when it was formed in 1966. 
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with a different set of aspirations; their aiTM. -.,. --s to 
constitute an eventual replacement if the continuation of 
Pinochet and the Armed Forces' became untenable. It was 
under these circumstances that those who would finally 
became the principal axis of the reshuffling of the righ 
appeared. These were the Union Democrätica Independiente 
(UDI) and the Movimiento de Union Nacional (MUN) which 
would come together later (1987) as the Renovacion 
Nacional, from which the UDI would subsequently break 
away (1988), recovering its independence as a party. 
The processes that constituted these two parties, 
making up the right of the new party system that would 
replace the dictatorship, and of other organisations 
sharing positions with them, may be analysed in terms of 
their varying and changeable adherence to the three basic 
elements of long range action projected by the 
dictatorship. Again, these were: first, the new model of 
economic development; second, the new political 
institutionality; and third, no less important though 
more conflictive, the repression that was required to 
impose the foregoing on the country. This last element 
would unfold in the course of the process, giving rise to 
different ideological questions, especially regarding the 
le Jorge Lavandero, Op. cit. pp. 100-102. 
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justification and affirmation of the legitimacy of he 
1973 coup d'etat, and the guarantee of impunity for those 
responsible for such acts of repression that might turn 
out to be punishable. Behind these elements were more 
general ideological issues, such as the relation that 
should exist between the parties and the social forces 
and, more immediately, the personal leaderships and their 
relation to the organizational models proposed for 
channelling political action. 
Those civilians that collaborated with the 
dictatorship rejected the idea of the very existence of 
parties as a form of organising political action and 
participation. Jarpa's appointment activated a part of 
the elite that had belonged to the Partido Nacional, 
leading to the collection of close to 60,000 signatures 
on his behalf. 19 They tried to portray the cabinet led by 
Jarpa as an "opening" in the dictatorship. The 
establishment of the Movimiento de Union Nacional [MUN] 
came about as the result of this campaign. It coexisted 
with the reactivation of the ex-parliamen--ary 
representatives of the Partido Nacional led by Francisco 
Bulnes, which still could not resolve the dilemma of 
whether to revive the party or create a new organization. 
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Another group tried to gather "Those who share the 
fundamental aspirations of the Armed Forces' government" 
into a new party . 
20 However, the "gremialista" group 
which retained its cohesiveness and whose ideology had 
served the dictatorship to generate the new Constitution 
took the lead, announcing the creation of UDI on 
September 25,1983.21 
The issue of organising civil support for the 
dictatorship could no longer be postponed. The principal 
goal was to reject the protest demonstrations, but this 
would draw attention to the problem of the dictatorship's 
intransigence. Officially, the implementation of the 
Constitution, ruled by transitory articles, lay in the 
future, but the instability introduced by the economic 
crisis, to begin with, and the social protest, later, had 
quickly ushered in unlimited prospects and the attendant 
ambitions. The two most immediate goals were to define 
the terms for the integration of civilians into the 
government of the dictatorship and, at varying intervals, 
to clarify the role that each would play in the new 
civilian-led political system. This implied redefining 
1° Reinhard Friemann, 1964-1988. La politica chilena de la Aa la Z, 
p. 91 and Andres Allamand, La travesia del desierto, p. 35. 
Allamand, Op. cit., p. 57. 
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the terms and periods of thhe transition, ass. -, -. -g 
positions and proposing to the government measures that 
would be evaluated by it and, particularly by the 
dictator. Furthermore, these proposals were cached il-: 
terms unusual for politicians such as "loyat" an 
"fidelity to the mission", which were part of the current 
military rhetoric. 
At the far right of the spectrum were the 
doctrinaire fascists, eternally and unquestioningly loyal 
to the military dictatorship, as well as extra- 
parliamentary movements whose existence went back at 
least to the 1960s. Some of these were linked to the 
dictatorship's apparatus of repression and to all 
projects aimed at organising civil support via 
"movements" of nationalist ideology. Only those most 
integrated into the tasks of the government or harbouring 
political or intellectual ambitions of other kinds, 
objected to the imposition of the economic blueprint. And 
in the context of 1983 they had the occasion not only to 
express their criticisms of the "Chicago boys" but also 
to enjoy the brief "populist interlude" re presen`ed b, 
the return of structuralist-inspired economic policies. 
" The new organisation named among its directives Sergio Fernandez, 
Jaime Guzman, Guillermo Elton, Javier Leturia, Luis Cordero and 
Pablo Longueira. El Mercurio, Internacional, Octubre 2,1983. 
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Jarpa and the UDI occupied a middle ground between 
those fascists and a more organic, and party-inclinei 
right seen as a continuation or renewal of the right 
represented within the system prior to 1973 by the 
Partido Nacional. However, both Jarpa and Jaime Guzman 
consistent opponents to the party system. It was only 
force of circumstances that led them to join Union 
Nacional, a movement with prospects for replacing the old 
Partido Nacional from which they would found Renovaciön 
Nacional in 1987, and from which UDI would retire before 
the end of the year. 
The proliferation of parties, movements and other 
organizations that followed on the reactivation of the 
political elite beginning with the "opening" provoked by 
the protest movement between 1983 and 1986, had several 
motivating forces. First, was the organisation of the 
defence and support of the dictatorship, the dictator and 
his "achievements". Subsequently, at the prospect of an 
eventual replacement of the dictatorship, came the 
dispute for its inheritance, and finally, before the 
assured prospect of the end of the dictatorship and the 
"normalization" of political life, arose the impulse to 
ensure oneself a role in the party system that would 
replace the inorganic civil support enjoyed by the 
061- 
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dictatorship. The pursuit of this range of obiec-ýives 
gave rise to a series of political events the distinctive 
mark of which was to assure a role and influence ir the 
"layout of the playing field" for the eventual return of 
politics. It was in that perspective that groups of many 
parties and organizations began to appear, leaving their 
mark on the long way of the transition from the 
dictatorship to the full application of the 1980 
Constitution. 
The reactivation of the elite began in the 
opposition where, in 1982, changes occurred in the 
Christian Democrat axis, the centre of the old party 
system. 22 The "Democratic Manifesto" was issued in March, 
1983, and in August, in the heat of the social protests, 
the Democratic Alliance was formed, representing the 
embryo of what would finally be the axis of 
reorganization of the party system, its centre and its 
centre-left. 23 As if reacting to these two events, the 
"Comite Nacional Constitucionalista" was formed, 
followed in August by the formation of the Frente 
22 On the death of Eduardo Frei Montalva, in January 1982, the 
leadership of the party fell to Gabriel Valdez, but at the same time 
there arose the PRODEN Blueprint for National Development, promoted 
by Jorge Landeros, a Christian Democrat with a 'movementist, " 
record. See above, Note 18. 
23 It included the following parties, Christian Democrat, Liberal, 
Republican, Socialist (Briones-Nunez) and a Popular Socialist Union. 
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Constitucional, to which 48 ex-parliamentarians of the 
Partido Nacional adhered. 24 At the time, controversy 
centred on the validity of the 1980 Constitution, 
questioned in the Manifiesto and by Alianza Democrätica. 
By early 1984, the right was reactivated in the Grupo de 
2 los 8.5 Jarpa' s incumbency bore no more fruit than as a 
stimulus to the reactivation of political parties with 
the abiding problem of alternatives to transition. The 
proposal that got the most support was the "Acuerdo 
Nacional para la Transiciön a la Plena Democracia, " 
drafted in August 1985, on the initiative of Juan 
Francisco Fresno, archbishop of Santiago. This was 
subscribed to by parties of the New Right, seeking to 
distance themselves from the dictatorship, and by parties 
of the opposition. 26 There was never any dialogue with 
the government about the bases of the Acuerdo, and 
24 Reinhard, Friedmann, op. cit., p. 186. 
Movimiento Union Nacional (MUN), Democracia Radical, Movimiento 
Social Cristiano, Movimiento Acciön Nacional (MAN), Talleres 
Socialistas Democräticos, PADENA, Partido Nacional and Union 
Dembcrata Independiente (UDI). 
6 The parties signing the "Acuerdo" on August 25,1985, were: Social 
Democracia, Union Nacional, Democracia Cristiana, Nacional 
Republicano, Radical, Union Socialista Popular, Liberal, Socialista 
(Nunez), Socialista (Mandujano), Izquierda Cristiana and Socialista 
Histörico. Subsequently the MAPU subscribed to its postulates. 
Reinhard, Friedmman, Op. cit., p. 177. 
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Pinochet's response to the archbishop became famous, "Let 
us turn the page. " 27 
Pinochet never participated in the negotiations or 
lent his support to the idea of "opening" the 
dictatorship. He made ample use of the faculties granted 
him by the transitory articles of the Constitution 
declaring a state of siege and implementing massive 
repression of the protests and selective repression by 
means of the murder of well known militants of the MIR 
and the Communist Party. His strategy remained firm in 
the fulfilment of the itinerary for transition which 
divided it into two presidential periods, separated by a 
plebiscite with a single candidate proposed by the four 
commanders in chief, who in case of defeat would bring 
about direct election of the President. All the proposed 
alternatives sought to change this route. They ranged 
from those offered by UDI reviving the idea of a 
"termali28 Congress, to the first proposal by Alianza 
Democrätica demanding Pinochet's resignation and a 
Constitutional Congress. They were only the preparations 
to form a complex of organizations that would carry out 
Reinhard, Friedmann, Op. cit. p. 178, Andres Allamand, Op. cit., p. 
104; Ascanio Cavallo, Et. al., Op. cit. p. 488; Edgardo Boeninger, 
Op. cit., p. 311. 
,8 Reference to a Congress appointed solely by the dictator himself, 
which is what Carlos Ibanez did during his incumbency. 
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an intense ideological and political str'-g^le. The res,, -: -'-- 
was the constitution of a party system whose limits woul, 
be marked by overall recognition of the 1980 
Constitution, a transition linked to the schedule 
stipulated by the transitory articles and a mutual 
recognition of the participants in the negotiations. 
The composition of the Acuerdo Nacional marked the 
limits of left and right for the nucleus of the future 
party system. Members of the Movimiento Democrätico 
Popular (MDP) on the left were excluded, as was the UDI 
on the right, which did not participate in the Acuerdo 
and requested a Declaration of Unconstitutionality of 
those organisations from the Constitutional Tribunal 
pursuant to Article 8 of the 1980 Constitution. The 
Acuerdo excluded the Communists and the socialist groups 
that continued to be allied with them (particularly, the 
MDP). It included those socialists prepared to ally 
themselves with the Christian Democrats, thereby altering 
the trajectory the Left had followed since the 1950s. The 
parties of the Acuerdo, considering social mobilisation 
(such as the protests) dangerous and inefficien}, aimed 
for the demobilisation of the social forces of the 
opposition. 
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As a system in reconstitution or re-articuya-ýiion, 
this complex of parties occupied itself with the 
establishment of their internal relations and fy_. ing 
their external limits. The difference in tactics between 
UDI and MUN was more their differences in opinion of the 
role of political parties than strategic differences. 
What UDI wanted from the Constitutional Tribunal, the 
exclusion of the left, the MUN requested from the signers 
of the "Acuerdo, " achieving only the legitimation of the 
exclusion for its acts and not for the ideas, in a 
paraphrase of Article 8 included in the "Acuerdo" . 
29 For 
the rest, even though the "Acuerdo" accepted the 
adherence of other organisations, under the operative 
conditions, the parties of the MDP rejected that 
possibility. 30 
The border between the party system and the social 
movement was more difficult to establish and the process 
was less clear. On one hand, the border was blurred as to 
alliances that were not coincidental at all levels, for 
example, alliances of parties in the student movement did 
not coincide with the limits of the alliances of The 
party leaders. On the other, Union Nacional was against 
29 Andres Allamand , Op. cit., pp. 92-97, telephone 
interview with 
Luis Maira, September 29,1999. 
'Q Edgardo Boeninger, Op. cit., p. 311. 
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opposition social mobilization, and especially against 
the public demonstrations that continued. The achievement 
of the dictator and his supporters was that the 
opposition parties abandoned the social mobilization and 
condemned both street violence and the armed struggle 
against the dictatorship carried on by organizations 
close to the Communist Party and the parties of the MDP. 
In this they were aided by the inversion of the situation 
that began in 1986. The economic team led by Hernän Büchi 
returned to pre-crisis policy, but in a less doctrinaire 
and more pragmatic manner, with signs of recovery 
beginning after the economic results of 1985. 
Concurrently, repression wore out social protests and, 
particularly after the failed attempt upon Pinochet's 
life in 1986, all conviction in the efficacy of armed 
struggle against the dictatorship was eroded. 
Under the new conditions, the dictatorship's and 
particularly Pinochet's political actions, centred on 
recovering their own schedule for transition, and 
included a plebiscite in 1988. To this end, activity 
centred largely on defining what the regulations would be 
for the existence and functioning of political parties 
defined by the "political laws", that is, the organic 
constitutional laws laid down by the Military Junta as 
184 
legislative branch, between late 1985 aid l98, ' arý d 
alternatives offered by the Constitution to face the 
plebiscite. In the month following the the legislation of 
political parties, the organization uniting all the 
forces of the right, Renovaciön Nacional, was registered. 
It included MUN, UDI and Jarpa's creation, the Frente 
Nacional de Trabajo. The group that the Partido Nacional 
intended to revive, and the groups seeking to constitute 
a Liberal Party, remained outside Renovaciön Nacional. 
Its declaration of principles reaffirmed its adherence to 
the legitimacy of the coup d'etat of September 11,1973, 
to the Constitution of 1980 and to a market economy. 
With respect to the repression, the distance taken from 
the dictatorship went no farther than a conditioned 
condemnation of Letelier's assassination once Fernandez 
Larios had confessed in the United States, 32 and persisted 
in the defence of the 1978 amnesty as the solution to 
what was called "the problem of human rights. " 
The precarious unity of the organization was 
reinforced by designating a consensual president, Ricardo 
31 The principal laws are: Law 18.460, Ley Orgdnica Constitucional 
sobre el Tribunal Calificador de Elecciones, November 12,1985. Law 
18.556, Ley Orgänica Constitucional sobre Sistema de Inscripciones 
Electorales y Servicio Electoral, Octubre 1', 1986. Law 18.593, Ley 
de los Tribunales Electorales Regionales, January 9,1987. Law 
18.603, Ley Orgänica Constitucional de los Partidos Politicos, March 
23,1987. Law 18.700, Ley Orgänica Constitucional sobre votaciones 
populares y escrutinios, May 6,1988. 
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Rivadeneira, and assigning a vice-presiders T to e 
member organizations, each one to be occupied by 
recognised leaders. These were Andres Allamand for the 
MUN, Jaime Guzman for UDI, and surprisingly, Juan de Dios 
Carmona for the FNT, he being subsequently replaced by 
the real leader of the group, Sergio Onofre Jarpa. This 
attempt at consolidation would end in the break away of 
the UDI in less than a year, due to "differences in 
style, " revealing the political culture that is an 
attribute of the party system and of the individuals 
created and participating in it. Renovaciön Nacional's 
internal elections in 1988 provoked accusations and 
counter-accusation between its MUN and UDI sectors 
centred around the use of improper methods in the 
elections of delegates. In Allamand's account of these 
events emphasis is placed on the popular character of 
UDI's strategy (mobilization of shanty town dwellers), 
and support from the dictatorship (official organs at the 
service of Jaime Guzman) and quotes descriptions of the 
methods used by the UDI in the party's internal politics 
as "nazi-like" and, even, "communist. "33 A broadsiJe, 
entitled "La historia de la Union Democrätica 
Independiente, " declares that, "There was no real 
32 Andres Allamand, Op. cit. pp. 123-124. 
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interest in changing the political style on the par` of 
the other two members. i34 UDI persisted as a movement. 
Only in the following year did it achieve legal 
registration as a political party. Prior to that, 
however, both the Renovacion Nacional and UDI parties 
took part in a campaign in favour of the "Yes" in the 
1988 plebiscite, thaat is to retain Pinochet as president 
until 1996. 
To have mutually lent their support to Pinochet in 
the plebiscite is proof that even in 1988 the new parties 
of the right were incapable of decision in the face of 
Pinochet's leadership and manoeuvring. The transition 
designed by his advisors included a plebiscite in which 
the electors would approve or reject a candidate proposed 
by Commanders in Chief of the Armed Forces and 
Carabineros. Both, Renovaciön Nacional and UDI itself, 
the latter being closer to the dictator, offered 
alternatives to this plebiscite, ranging from a candidate 
that was not Pinochet, to him as candidate but in a 
competitive election open to other nominees. Ultimately, 
Pinochet had himself nominated as the sole candidate by 
the other commanders and lost the plebiscite despite the 
support of the two parties that would constitute the 
33 Andres Allamand, Op. cit. pp. 140-147. 
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right in the new party system represented in the chambers 
beginning in 1990. 
After the plebiscite, UDI completed the requirements 
for registration as a political party. The governing 
Junta issued a law that completed the election law and 
contained stabilizing features for the system from which 
both parties have benefited: the binominal system for 
electing deputies and senators and the configuration of 
districts for deputies in light of the plebiscite's 
results. 35 
4.2. The new right in the new party system 
UDI and Renovaciön Nacional though constituting a 
two-party right, nevertheless, was different from the 
right constituted by liberals and conservatives. Both 
parties shared a true "national blueprint". This they had 
been able to impose on the party system as a whole via a 
complex ideological struggle that had taken place in the 
substratum of political struggle framed by the process of 
transition from the dictatorship to the implementation of 
the 1980 Constitution. This national blueprint is made 
explicit in a large part of the declarations of 
principles of both parties, which literally have more 
than half of their texts in common. This could not be Jue 
i' Political propaganda from UDI, undated. 
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simply to a lack of time, since RN has a revise. version, 
dated November, 1994. This national blueprint is 
composed of some general principles: 1) Legitimacy of the 
1973 coup d'etat, 36 2) Legitimacy of the Constitution of 
the 1980 , 
37 3) Immutability of the dictatorship's -,. c--del 
for economic development. 38 
Other safety catches of this kind are contained in 
the Constitution and its complementary laws. The 
legislation on political parties isolates them from the 
social movement, and the electoral system favours a 
minority that prevents the legislature from changing this 
state of affairs. Furthermore, the reconstitution of the 
political sphere raises doubts about the commitment to 
35 Law 18.799, May 26,1989. 
36 In both declarations it is affirmed: (UDI or RN) "Emphasises the 
patriotism and spirit of service of the Armed Forces and the forces 
of order of Chile whose origin and glorious traditions are 
identified with the rise and defence of Chilenism, throughout the 
entire history of the country, including their liberating action of 
September 11,1973, which saved the country from the imminent threat 
of irreversible totalitarianism and foreign domination, thereby 
culminating a valiant civilian resistance and taking up an 
overwhelming and majority popular clamour. " Declaraciön de 
Principios, UDI, p. 6; RN, p. 4. 
37 Their adherence to the Constitution of 1980, includes a 
restatement of exclusion for ideological reasons (Article 8, 
abrogated in 1989). "The democratic system can only be stable if 
the electoral options competing for power share essential features 
and maintain a minimum of reciprocal respect. No election or 
plebiscite may represent threats to the fundamental values of 
Chilenism, nor threaten legitimate principles that are essential to 
the members of society. It must be accepted therefore that political 
pluralism has limits. " 
The elevation to principle of the characteristics of the model for 
development, called "Economia social de mercado, " is specified in the sections 
entitled "Sistema econcmico-social" and "The State, economic and social 
sphere, " Nos. 14 and 15 for RN and 16 and 17 for UDI. 
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change some anti-democratic features 0 his =: ir. d. 
Paradoxically the corporative interests of the polticil 
elite appear to be protected by the same laws that it 
would be desirable to change if what were wanted were a 
democratisation of the system. 
Out of the formation of this new system, it is 
interesting to note the dialectic that imposed the 
organisational model of the political party as an 
instrument of action on the anti-party winners. And upon 
the defeated who rejected the legitimacy of this new 
order, first de facto and later de jure, it imposed not 
only the new order, but limitations on their own 
organisation and action. It is thus that one comes to 
understand this complex movement, in which the social 
protest which caused the dictatorship to hesitate, 
reactivated the political elite in pursuit of the 
strategic goal of demobilising social protest. It also 
contributed to the reconstruction of the political party 
system by imposing upon it the limits mentioned above. 
Personal or collective ideological inconsistencies cannot 
explain this result, which lies rather in t :e 
constitution of a political arena, the limits of which 
would be drawn by relations between those who par_icipate 
in the game of alliances and negotiations and by means of 
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Chapter 5. The Christian Democrats and Pinochet's 
Dictatorship 
5.1 Introduction 
The study of relations between the Christian Democrat 
Party and the dictatorship may be framed in the following 
periodisation: 
1}Subordination of the Christian Democrats to the 
social and political bloc supporting the dictatorship, a 
situation that arose from the PDC's participation in the 
opposition to Allende, and to the party's support for and 
justification of the coup d'etat. This initial phase 
covers from 1973 to the PDC's expulsion from the 
political bloc supporting the regime by declaration of 
the illegality of the party in early 1977.1 
2ý Subordination of the Christian Democrat rank- 
and-file to the social bloc supporting the dictatorship 
while the party remained outside the political bloc 
defending itself from the government's attempt to 
identify it with the "Marxist" opposition (ie., the 
"enemy") . This phase 
lasted until the 1980 plebiscite in 
1 Decree-Law No 1697, March 12,1977, dissolving all political 
parties maintaining their legal existence as legally in `political 
recess. " 
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which Pinochet's new Constitution was approved. This maäe 
it possible to force the party to appear beside the Left 
and, according to official interpretation of `: ~: e 
plebiscite results, nullified Christian Democrat 
influence on the social bloc supporting the government. 2 
3) Retreat of the party, re-composition of its 
leadership (further precipitated by the death of Eduardo 
Frei Montalva) and social and political activities 
independent of the dictatorship but with no capability of 
initiative. During this phase the conditions were created 
for a shift to the offensive that was observed in 1983 
and that reversed the overall situation of the period 
begun in 1973. Basically, this transformation was brought 
about by the decomposition of the social bloc supporting 
the dictatorship, a deterioration instigated by a crisis 
within the imposed economic development model. This 
decomposition provided the opportunity not only for 
reactivation of the Christian Democrat party but also 
instigated initial attempts at reorganisation of a right 
wing political representation relatively independent of 
the dictatorship. 3 
See chapter 3. 
3 This period saw the beginning of re-grouping of right wing sectors 
outside the government. Isolated elements, such as General Leigh, 
had been breaking away from the bloc supporting the dictatorship, or 
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4) Participation in the political opposition (tý_e 
various party groups) and the social opposition 
(principally the protests); competition for leadership 
with the forces of the Left; contention with respect to 
strategy for putting an end to the dictatorship. In 
particular, disagreements were expressed regarding armed 
struggle, social mobilisation and acceptance of the 
timetable and terms of the transition designed by the 
dictatorship itself and contained in transitory articles 
of the Constitution of 1980. However, the solution of 
these controversies marked the limits of the new party 
system, reconstructed upon the central axis constituted 
by the Christian Democrats. 
5ý Recovery by the Christian Democrats, beginning 
in 1986, of their role as axis of the system of political 
parties. Under the leadership of Patricio Aylwin they 
were able to subordinate the complex of political 
opposition to their strategy, marginalising the Communist 
Left and subordinating the reconstruction of the 
political system to the dictatorship's strategy. 
expressing their opposition to some of the dictatorship's plans, 
such as Hugo Zepeda who announced publicly that he would vote 'No" 
in the 1980 plebiscite. The political right organised itself to 
support the dictatorship, envisaging, at the same time, its 
replacement, for which reason they tried increasingly to -is`ance 
themselves from Pinochet and the military character of the 
dictatorship. See the previous chapter. 
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This periodisation is built upon the basis of the 
dictatorship's actions with respect to the Christian 
Democrats, which persisted in defining the PDC's actions 
as subordinate, defensive and reactive during the first 
phase of the dictatorship's ascent to power. 
Nevertheless, during the second phase of decay and 
decadence of the dictatorship, the Christian Democrats 
were significant protagonists. Analysis of each one of 
these phases should focus on Christian Democrat action, 
considering the characteristics already mentioned, both 
in respect to the government and to other political and 
social actors (fundamentally the Left and the social 
movements). 
5.2 1973-1977. The subordinate participation of the 
Christian Democrats in the dictatorship's bloc of 
support. 
Upon joining the victors of September 1973, 
Christian Democrat action was based on two suppositions 
that proved to be false. First, the neutrality of the 
Armed Forces as political actors and, second, the 
possibility of a restoration in the short term of a 
political system, even with the exclusion of at least a 
large part of the forces that had supported the Unidad 
Popular government. The two suppositions are relate,, The 
ibil. 
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first being a condition of the second. That is, the 
restoration of the political system (with any number of 
changes) supposed that armed action would operate 
"neutrally" and not as part of strategic demolition of 
the political system and its replacement by another of a 
different kind. However, it was impossible for the 
Christian Democrats to perceive this while they based 
their expectations on an evaluation of the situation 
before the coup that placed them, without a doubt, as the 
principal force of opposition within the institutional 
system. This wrong perception by the PDC miss the fact 
that the opposition "within the system" was by then 
subordinated toe the opposition "outside the system", 
willing to replace it. For the PDC, the problem lie in 
that the political system, as constructed by Pinochet and 
upheld by the armed forces as state apparatus, led to a 
general dismantling of legitimat processes of opposition, 
consigning any forms of resistance to an extra-political 
role. On renouncing defence of the political- 
institutional system, the Christian Democrats renounced 
their position as leaders of right wing opposition to 
Allende. 
Once the Military Government was established, the 
supposition of "neutrality" of the Armed Forces cause 
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the Christian Democrats to define `heir strate. q-, - ;r teris 
of constructing an alliance with the Armed Forces i^ 
which the latter would guarantee exclusion of the eft. 
Based on a reconstruction of the political system 
"normalised" by the military and political defeat of The 
Left, it would then be possible to carry out the 
programme that could not be implemented during Frei's 
administration 4. During the final months of 1973, 
conditions seemed entirely favourable. The Left had been 
proscribed and the Right had dissolved itself leaving the 
Christian Democrats the only important political party 
able to bring about a restoration in which it would 
ideologically subordinate the working class sectors and 
assume political representation of the dominant classes. 
However, the more visible advantages of the Christian 
Democrats' position belied its true weakness: it was the 
only political party because the very system of parties, 
linchpin of the former political system, had practically 
disappeared. If they saw themselves as an op--ion for 
creating social support for the military government 
within a restorationist strategy, the ic-atorship saw 
them as the last obstacle to recreating the Chilean 
See Ricardo Yocelevzky, La Democracia Cristiana chilena yy e1 
gobierno de Eduardo Frei 1964-1970. 
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political system on an authoritarian: bass ir: ,. ý icy: the 
political parties, if they were included at all, would 
play a subordinate role. 5 
Greater Christian Democrat participation in the 
government under the conditions created by the coup 
d'etat implied the dissolution of the party itself into a 
political bloc without a clearly defined organisational 
model. Diverse ideological tendencies were 
distinguishable among those who, supporting the 
dictatorship, operated within the administration as 
individual cadres and struggled to occupy positions in 
the administrative apparatus, or worked as advisors to 
the military executives. The crudity of these connections 
implied that the victors were primarily interested in the 
spoils of victory. Concerns to construct new channels of 
political participation would be postponed until 
sufficient systems of repression existed to exclude 
subordinate social sectors. 6 The matter of political 
5 On the 'foundational character" of the dictatorship see Manuel 
Antonio Garretön, El proceso politico chileno. On the other hand 
with respect to political participation and its regulation, the 
pertinent laws were handed down at the end of the dictatorship. 
6 It is important to note that, among the cadres of the 'new Right" 
who had achieved notoriety during the Unidad Popular administration, 
those, like Pablo Rodriguez, who aspired to leadership roes, found 
themselves sidelined during the dictatorship by such 'ideologues" as 
Jaime Guzmän. Those who sought to be 'concessionaires" of the 
political organisation in support of the dictatorship, or of the 
1b... 
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restoration, that is, the re-opening of an even ýiT. ýte 
interplay of parties, would imply a re-opening of social 
and political participation to the middle an working 
sectors. This appeared to the Christian Democrats as a 
matter of some import since prolongation of the 
conditions imposed by the coup weighed doubly against 
their own political interests due to the fact that they 
appeared to be associated with the military dictatorship. 
On the one hand, their participation in the government 
was limited to those cadres who, individually, occupied 
administrative posts. This meant that, in theory, the 
dictatorship was not disposed to take into account the 
political interests of any organisation as such that 
might have belonged to the destroyed political system. In 
practice, the party was being subjected to erosion by 
virtue of the cooptation of its cadres by the 
dictatorship, which sought to weaken and, eventually, 
integrate it within a bloc that would support the 
dictatorship. On the other hand, the prospects ±or 
preserving and increasing their working class clientele 
by "staying in the game" from which the Left (or at least 
its most radical part) was excluded, was being weakened 
dictator himself, never saw plans come to fruition. See the previous 
two chapters. 
ILI 
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by the prolongation of the exceptional ciitýons (`~e 
repression and social and political exclusion) that 
threatened to become the norm, and with which : he- 
appeared to be associated. 
This uncomfortable situation appeared to have few 
possible solutions. To accept the strategy of the 
dictatorship and subordinate itself even further meant 
the disappearance of the party and its political 
interests. This seemed an unviable alternative, even if 
they had been reduced to a minority sector rejecting the 
coup d'etat. On the other hand, to denounce the purposes 
of the dictatorship implied taking cognisance of the role 
which, objectively, they had played against the Unidad 
Popular government and in its overthrow (recognising 
along the way that the only real option for the 
preservation of the institutional system ought to have 
been an alliance of the PDC with Allende's government). 
This, in turn, would have implied assuming the position. 
of a minority tendency within the party and situating 
itself, suddenly, in opposition to the dictatorship at a 
moment when the party rank-and-file itself would not have 
followed suit. 
As a means of avoiding this rather uncomfortable 
outcome the PDC chose to adhere to the supoosiiion of "he 
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political neutrality of the armed forces. Accord rýü -Lo 
the view they propounded, the dictatorship's action was 
based on the resolution of an ideological conflict 
amongst the civilian elements that supported the 
dictatorship and in which the most reactionary sectors 
were victorious in politics and voracious in the field of 
economics. In this situation, in which they defined 
themselves as losers in the ideological conflict among 
civilians, the Christian Democrats appealed to the 
Military Junta and its leader, Pinochet. They intended to 
point out that the government's economic policy, the 
repression and the political consequences of both made it 
difficult to restore the political system. This situation 
appeared irrational from the point of view of those in 
the PDC who were interested in capitalising on popular 
support available after the recent defeat of the Left. 
For them, instead of allowing a capitalisation of support 
in a political opening aimed at restoration, the 
prolongation of conditions created by the coup 
d'etat 
strengthened the most extreme positions in the opposition 
which, per force, ought to have developed 
in clandestine 
circumstances that would contribute to reinforcing t-. er 
politically unsuitable radicalism. 
' "We are convinced that the absolute inactivity of 
the democratic 
WýI. 
200 
This entire supposed misunderstar: -Aa. allowed the 
Christian Democrats to establish a distance between 
themselves and the dictatorship without being pushed into 
the opposition. This was a way to define their identity 
in terms of a political strategy different from the 
dictatorship's without forcing their rank-and-file to opt 
for one or the other. From this first moment, criticism 
of the government's actions established three lines along 
which it would develop from then on: economic policy, 
human rights and the construction of a political system. 
These lines of critical argumentation each developed 
differently also shared common limitations, which it is 
necessary to clarify in order to justify the 
periodisation proposed as a mode of analysis of the 
evolution of the Christian Democrat's strategy under the 
dictatorship. 
Of the Christian Democrats' three lines of criticism 
directed at the dictatorship, none questioned its origin. 
That is, the legitimacy of the government was not 
questioned in terms of its relation to the institutional 
sectors facilitates the clandestine operations of Marxist groups, 
without orientation from its leaders, our rank-and-file and its 
supporters remained at the mercy of rumours, tricks, and even 
infiltrations of which they might be the object. " Letter of Patricio 
Aylwin, National President of the PDC and Oswaldo Olguin first Vice- 
president, addressed to General Augusto Pinochet, January 18,1974, 
published abroad in February of that year. 
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system it destroyed, but only in terms of `re ccss b=e 
consequences of prolonging the situation defined by its 
presence. This is central to undersea . dir. e 
characteristics of the Christian Democrat's strategy for 
reconstruction. 8 However, here it is important `o 
emphasise that the limitations to an openly politica 
critique of the dictatorship determine limitations to the 
other two aspects of the same critique (human rights and 
economic policy). It is necessary to stress that what 
explains the cohesion and persistence of the PDC is the 
clarity with which its leaders perceived their common 
political interests and how they tried construct a 
strategy around them. It is for this reason that their 
position vis-a-vis the dictatorship was subordinate. 
Their political interests led them to support the 
overthrow of the government without taking cognisance of 
the consequences that this might have for the political 
system as a whole, of which they were a part. Now, after 
"We understand the need for an effort of moral, economic and 
political rectification of the crisis at which the country had 
arrived (... ) such an effort, though by its nature it cannot go in 
indefinitely, requires time. It would be a mistake to constrain it 
to a very short term. (... ) Our history shows other periods analogous 
to the present such as that of Portales or the first term of 
President Ibanez, which allowed Chile to rediscover its path to 
democratic institutionality and progress. " Letter by T. lwin and 
Olguin quoted above. It should be noticed that Ibanez dictatorship 
is changed to "first term" and that the dictatorship "allowed" what 
followed as if one of the remotest antecedents of the Christian 
Democrats was not involved in the overthrew of Ibanez in 1931. 
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the coup d'etat, their proposal for reconstruct; c- of The 
system (correcting the "defects" that had permitted the 
victory of the Left in 1970), was an alternative to The 
current dictatorship. Their arguments, therefore, 
centred on affirming that the exceptional conditions 
justifying the coup (the presence of the Unidad Popular 
government) no longer existed and therefore, the 
prolongation of the military government and the 
conditions imposed by it - both the repression and the 
measures of the economic policy - hampered a return to 
the "normality" that appeared to them to be necessary. 
The PDC's critique of the dictatorship's economic 
policy suffers two kinds of limitations. The first, to 
which references have already been made, arises out of 
the limits to political criticism which led to evaluating 
the consequences of the dictatorship's actions in the 
economic field only as a function of the strategy for 
political reconstruction. The second limitation stems 
from the prevalence of a "negative" economic policy, in 
the first phase of the dictatorship, that is, one iefined 
more in terms of a negation of Unidad Popular 
achievements. Thus, what is criticised is an action 
defined as the vengeance of the powerful economic sectors 
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voraciously seeking to recover what they hai los-- i-. ri : rig 
the prior period. In addition, the deterioration of 
living conditions among urban and rural working class 
sectors hampered a rapid return to normality. Their 
demands could lead them to support Left wing tendencies 
instead of allowing the capitalisation of that social 
support, apparently available to moderate tendencies like 
the Christian Democrats (Aylwin, Olguin letter already 
quoted). 
Criticism of human rights under the dictatorship 
also suffered two limitations. The first was the need, 
imposed by the Christian Democrat's political position to 
refrain from referring to the coup d'etat itself but to 
the prolongation of its repressive measures over time. 9 
The other limitation stems from fear that that repression 
might be indiscriminately extended to members of the PDC. 
This, besides the obvious consequences, would have hai 
the effect of pushing them into the opposition or at 
least into a situation shared with the Left. Converselj, 
9 Even a year after, the coup d'etat, the differences between the PDC 
and the dictatorship being explicit, the chief leaders of the party, 
Frei and Aylwin, were particularly careful to justify the coup by 
attacking Allende and Unidad Popular. Aylwin did so in his report 
on the Chilean situation before the meeting of OCDA, the original 
Latin American Organization of the Christian Democrats, held at 
Curacao, August 24 to September 10,1974. Frei does the same in the 
prologue he wrote for a book by Genaro Arriagada, De la "via 
Chilena" a la "via insurreccional" pp. 9-31, published in 1974. 
lk- 
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the same reasoning may explain the moderation with wich 
the dictatorship repressed the Christian Democrats. 
This, however, produced an ambiguous situation in which 
the Christian Democrats appeared to be defending human 
rights but always based on cases affecting their members 
who did not constitute the severest transgressions of the 
dictatorship in this field, making these protests appear 
even ridiculous on some occasions. 1° 
The moderation with which the dictatorship repressed 
the Christian Democrats, is a corollary of the ambiguous 
relations between the two. Fundamentally, repression 
affected those who signed the declaration condemning the 
coup with later repression aimed at controlling the media 
owned by or at the disposal of the party. " At no time, 
10 Letter from Claudio Orrego to General Pinochet, dated March 31, 
1975. In it he complains of the destruction of his book while on the 
printing presses carried out by government personnel on March 27 of 
the same year. Every paragraph about freedom of expression cannot 
but sound ridiculous coming from someone who, until then, had kept 
complicitous silence about all the violations of human rights 
perpetrated by the dictatorship. The full text of the letter was 
published in Chile-America, N° 8-9, Rome, 1975, pp. 73-74. 
11 Repressive action against Christian Democrat leaders reached the 
following extremes: September 17,194, first arrest of Claudio 
Huepe; October 7,1974, Bernardo Leighton forbidden to return to 
Chile; October 15,1974, second arrest of Claudio Huepe, who is 
finally expelled from the country on February 12,1975; November 2E, 
1974, arrest and expulsion from the country of Rendn Fuentealba; 
October 6,1975, attack in Rome on Bernardo Leighton; August 6, 
1976, arrest and expulsion from Chile of Jaime Castillo Velasco; 
October 17,1980, Andres Zaldivar is prohibited from returning to 
Chile. To this must be added the self-imposed exile of Radomiro 
Tomic which seemed reasonable in view of attacks against him in the 
pro-dictatorship press. It is noteworthy that until 1976, those 
affected were all signers of the declaration that rejected the cc -p. 
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was repression exercised in a way that could be ascribed 
to the purpose of eliminating the organisation as such 
or, even preventing the functioning of its leadership. 
This is due not so much in the political subordination of 
the Christian Democrats as to the significant role the 
participation of their rank-and-file and their clientele 
played in the social bloc supporting the dictatorship. 
The military government's objectives with respect to the 
PDC were to eliminate their structure by absorbing their 
rank-and-file into the government's social bloc of 
support and of its cadres in its corresponding political 
bloc. However, the subordination to which the Christian 
Democrats had been reduced in the bloc opposing the 
Unidad Popular government did not guarantee the success 
of these objectives since the very nature of the party 
and its existence depended on the political system 
previous to 1973. Therefore, the true nature of the coup 
could not be expressed without pushing Christian 
As to the mass media controlled by the Christian Democrats, or 
influenced by them, the principal events are as follows: February 
21,1974, the theoretical journal of the PDC, Politica y espiritu is 
closed indefinitely; March, 1976, Radio Balmaceda is closed for six 
days (for the fourth time); at the end of that same month, number 
21-21 of the journal Ercilla still under control of the Christian 
Democrats at the time, was confiscated; also in 1976 the director of 
Radio Balmaceda, Belisario Velasco, vanished to Putre. To all this 
must be added the raid carried out on TV channel 13, property of the 
Universidad Catölica, by the delegate rector, retired Admiral Swett, 
from March 18 to 29,1974, in which numerous Christian Democrats 
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Democrats into the field of the opposition. Objec`ive'y, 
the coup sought to destroy the entire political system 
but, for the purpose of creating a supportive social a 
political bloc, it was presented as a reaction against 
the Allende government and its programme. Now, after the 
military government had been established, the strategic 
goal shifted from the objective of "restoring normality" 
(shared by the Christian Democrats) to "eliminating the 
conditions that made possible the Unidad Popular 
government, ". This meant to the Christian Democrats 
restoration of the system in the short run with exclusion 
of the Left or part of it. Whereas to the Armed Forces 
and the social sectors dominant in the government it 
meant destruction of the whole political system existing 
up to 1973 particularly, the elimination of the party 
system. 12 
To make its true objective explicit, the government 
had to be sure that the Christian Democrats would not 
abandon their social bloc of support, which was only 
possible if its potential for political action was 
were expelled from their jobs. (Chile-America, several numbers) 
Rome, 1975 and 1976. 
1` The first programmatic expression making the intent of completely 
recreating the political system explicit was the ' eclaracibn de 
Principios" of the Military Junta of March 11,1974. The first 
schedule for the implementation of this purpose appears in a speech 
by Pinochet on July 19,1977, on Chacarilla hill. 
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neutralised. To this end it was sought to ne. i`ralise the 
media belonging to the Christian Democrats at the same 
time as they were being confronted on l ec-og cai 
grounds. Little by little the "enemy" in official 
rhetoric, ceased to be the "Marxists" and became 
"politicians" in general. If the Christian Democrats 
sought to disseminate an image of "normality" having been 
lost because of Allende coming to power, for the 
dictatorship, the loss of "normality" was due to the Frei 
administration losing control to the Marxists in 1970. 
The Military Government's success in this 
ideological confrontation is difficult to evaluate. It 
appears, however, that its own evaluation was 
satisfactory, in view of the fact that in 1977 it decided 
to eliminate the Christian Democrats from its political 
bloc by means of a decree prohibiting all political 
parties "in recess" since the coup d'etat. In the event, 
this only affected the PDC. The explicit reasons for 
this measure point to the objective of adding the PDC to 
the "enemy bloc, " to the "politicians" with international 
connections who acted against the nation represented by 
13 the military government. 
13 In his speech on the third anniversary of the coup d'etat, 
September 11,1976. Pinochet announced 'That the government has 
lil . 
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5.3 1977-1980: The struggle for political indeper: ence 
and 
the recovery of the rank-and-file. 
For the Christian Democrats to be expellei fror. the 
government's political bloc represented a complex of new 
problems due to the ambiguity of their position (but not 
their elimination). The government's action raised 
questions about the significance of the expulsion in 
itself, as well as the reasons or motives that led to it. 
As to the significance of the political act itself, 
it seemed plausible to interpret the outlawing of the 
Christian Democrats as a reaction by the government to 
criticisms of its administration coming from that party. 
However, the limitations of those criticisms, to which we 
refer above, did not seem to justify the apparent 
severity of the decision. Furthermore, the government's 
justification in terms of the participation of the 
Christian Democrats in an international conspiracy 
against Chile and its government had different effects 
both within the country and abroad. On the national sce-. e 
resolved to drastically regulate the political party recess. " That 
under the 'new institutionality" it would have to be 'very clear" 
that the traditional political parties, today in recess, could not 
and would not fit in because their structure, leaders, habits and 
mentality all grew under the inspiration of an institutional regime 
that had already died once and for all. " (Chile-America, N5222,23 
and 24, Rome, August, September, October, 1976, p. 69). 
L. 
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it was sought to coalesce the social bloc of supcorL, for 
the dictatorship as the representative of nationality, as 
opposed to the unscrupulous "politicians" who never 
hesitated to associate with foreign forces to achieve 
their egotistical objectives. Abroad, the effect was the 
opposite, as the Christian Democrats appeared tarnished 
by their support and justification of the coup d'etat 
thereby incommoding their foreign associates (like the 
European Christian Democrats). Now they would appear to 
be victims of the dictatorship, their strategy an 
alternative to it (no longer a variant of it) and, 
therefore, deserving of open solidarity from 
ideologically like minded governments and parties. 14 
For the dictatorship, this decision meant expelling 
a critical sector from its political bloc, while at the 
same time seeking to preserve its social bloc of support. 
In this sense, the presence of the Christian Democrats, 
though a party in "recess, " was the last link that joined 
la In the early days of the dictatorship, the Chilean Christian 
Democrats tried actively to justify the coup d'etat before their 
colleagues in other countries. This line is illustrated by Frei's 
letter to Mariano Rumor of November 1973, and the international 
tours of such Christian Democrat leaders as Enrique Krauss, J'ýan d? e 
Dios Carmona y Juan Hamilton, in October 1973. Not withstanding, the 
international Christian Democrats became progressively more critical 
of the dictatorship, reaching the point in 1975, of a specific 
denunciation of the political repression affecting Chilean ChristiaF. 
Democrat intermediate cadres. (Chile-America, N° 8-9, Rome, 1975, p. 
18). 
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the dictatorship to the destroyed political systems: -1n e 
that had made it possible to interpret the the eventual 
re-establishment of normality expressed at the : Women-_ of 
the coup as a promise to restore the system. The decision 
therefore reflects a need on the part of the dictatorshic 
to intensify its action in the area of economic policy 
and the design of a new political system. Furthermore, 
and as a function of those necessities, it may be 
supposed that the decision to formally eliminate the PDC 
was based on the assumption that doing so would not 
fundamentally affect the government's social support. 
That is to say, the decision assumes that the separation 
between the party organisation and its rank-and-file was 
deep enough and that not much value was placed on the 
intent to co-opt its cadres individually. 15 Thus the 
15 The most distinguished cadres among the Christian Democrats co- 
opted by the dictatorship were Juan de Dios Carmona, who played a 
particularly ambiguous role during the first period trying to 
subordinate the party to the Military Junta's policies before 
abandoning it completely, and William Thayer, who accepted The 
appointment to represent the dictatorship at UNESCO. Both of them 
were later leaders of a Social Christian Movement situated within 
the dictatorship's bloc of support. Nevertheless, there are many 
Christian Democrats who supported the dictatorship beyond the 
position of their party. For example, among Chilean politicians who 
publicly protested against the condemnation of the dictatorship for 
its violations of human Rights, voted by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations in 1974, were the following Christian Democrat ex- 
Ministers: Ramon Valdivieso, Carlos Figueroa, Modesto Callado, 
Eduardo Leon and Sergio Ossa Pretot; ex-Senators: Juan de Dios 
Carmona (also an ex-Minister), Jose Mausalem, Alejandro Lorca, Jose 
Fonseca, Luis Papic, and Jorge Lavanderos; ex-1 ep:: ties: ': 'actor 
Gonzalez, Juana Dip, Carlos Garces, Gustavo Ramirez, Enrique Krauss 
(also an ex-Minister) and Javier Lira Merino (Chile-America, N° =-7, 
Rome, 1975, p. 62). To the foregoing politicians must be added some 
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military dictatorship installed in Sepýem er 973, 
"jettisoned ballast" and advanced in its struct''ring of 
the strategic blueprint that inspired the he3e~. onic 
sectors within the opposition to Unidad Popular. 16 
The dictatorship's victory was enhanced by aiding 
the Christian Democrats to the field of the defeated. 
There was no need to destroy it, in view of the fact that 
it could not activate its clientele since the mechanism 
that made that relationship possible (the elections) had 
disappeared along with the dismantled political system. 
Nor could it act efficiently on its rank-and-file since 
such action, already proscribed under the conditions of 
political "recess" was now illegal. The party 
organisation being forced into "recess" and control of 
the mass media being in the hands of the dictatorship, 
the rank-and-file continued as a social bloc of support 
for the dictatorship. As it was sufficient to simply 
threaten the Christian Democrats with destruction, the 
dictatorship's victory over them was different -from its 
of the most outstanding technocrats linked to the PDC or -o Frei who 
collaborated with the dictatorship such as Raül Saez, Jorge Cauas 
and Carlos Massad. 
"' In the speech at Chacarillas quoted above (Note 12) Pinochet 
announced a schedule to apply his blueprint for if-: stiý'ationaiisa-ion 
along those lines. On the importance of the latter, the changes in 
plans and timetable for the transition that was finaly proposed see 
the preceeding chapter. 
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actual and physical defeat of the Urii. ad Fýýýlar 
government and its supporting parties. 
Situated in the field of the political opposition on 
the initiative of the dictatorship, the Christian 
Democrats found themselves obliged to redefine their 
position. An obvious alternative was to join the Left and 
establish a political bloc for restoration (or an anti- 
fascist front as proposed by the Communists). However 
this did not seem acceptable to the party leadership. The 
objective reasons for this evaluation are important to 
understanding that the rejection of an alliance with the 
Left was not a product of ill will or Christian Democrat 
sectarianism, but of the social nature of the party and 
its ideology. 
If the party was isolated from its social base, 
which remained subordinate in the social bloc of support 
of the dictatorship, by associating with the Left it 
could only deepen that breach. This was due to the }act 
that even if an alliance with the Left had not imposed 
unacceptable practical conditions, an alliance at this 
juncture, might have implied unacceptable ideological 
contradictions. On this course, the Christian Demccra'ýs 
would have become an important force, though not 
hegemonic, within an opposition bloc consti ted or: the 
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basis of that alliance. By the same token, si tua `i -- g 
themselves in the same place as the Left, could change 
them into the target of repression similar to that 
suffered by the Left. This would ultimately lend 
credibility to the view disseminated by the dictatorship 
of a single opposition constituted by politicians seeking 
to return to a past that would make repetition of the 
Unidad Popular government possible. 
For the PDC, the priority was to recover influence 
over the social base that was still supporting the 
dictatorship. For that purpose it was fundamental to 
define a political identity that could not be confused 
with that of the Left and that would not allow 
ideological distortion by the dictatorship which 
presented socialism as the only alternative to its 
blueprint. 17 
17 In a review of the situation of the PDC at the beginning of 1978, 
Chile-America, pointed out the following: 'In the PDC's judgement 
pro-Pinochet opinion occurs in a variety of areas founded on fear, 
mental inertia, ignorance, prejudice, social interests and also on a 
great disappointment with the political parties, the democratic 
governments and the extremist lines of political action [... ]. This, 
always in the opinion of the PDC, affects a great number of Chileans 
and the task, therefore, is to attract them again to democratic 
methods. Unidad Popular plays its role with those who have reasons 
to be more clearly against the government. The Christian Democratic 
Party plays its role first with individuals who are openly against 
but also with those who are not. This last, Unidad Popular cannot do 
and it is impossible to do so if the PDC were to appear sharing the 
line of the UP. " 'The Christian Democrats and Their Viewpoints on a 
Political Agreement with Unidad Popular, " Jhile-America, N° 39-40, 
Rome, January-February, 1978, p. 80. 
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This period encompasses the dictatorship's greatest 
advances in consolidating its projects in both the 
economic and political fields. Conversely, i-ýi pro. Juced 
the lowest point in relations among the political parties 
in general and their former rank-and-file. Obviously, the 
process most affected the organisations of the opposition 
which now included the Christian Democrats. However, the 
particular forms in which this process affected the Left 
in general in general and the Christian Democrats in 
particular, must be indicated. What for the Christian 
Democrats implied a separation from their rank-and-file 
and its clientele, for the Left meant a much deeper 
disarticulation. The homogenous composition of the cadres 
and of the rank-and-file of the Christian Democrats and 
their unified political interests preserved the 
organisation even when it was isolated from the sectors 
it represented or sought to represent. Altogether, the 
same characteristics caused its future and strategy to be 
defined and, with the exception of the eventuality of 
dissolution of the party, assured its importance. Both, 
the Left and the Christian Democrats faced the problem of 
keeping the political parties alive in the absence of a 
political system that would link the parties -ýo each 
other and to the social forces they represented. For the 
lb. 
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Left, given the clandestine conditions imposed by the 
situation, the model of insurrectional organisation, 
strategy and tactics appeared as a "natural alternative. " 
For the Christian Democrats this alternative did not 
exist. Therefore, they could only concentrate on 
intellectual criticism of the projects developed by the 
dictatorship and on working out theoretical alternatives 
for them. 
An important effect of the disarticulation between 
the political parties and their rank-and-file during this 
period was the autonomy acquired by the intellectual 
cadres with respect to their organisations. This process, 
which should be studied in depth some day, produced an 
ideological field where cadres of the Left coming from 
the former political elite and from the social base where 
it was recruited, found forms of activity similar to 
those of the Christian Democrats. On this ground, it 
should be recalled that discussion of drafts of the 
Constitution, proposed by the dictatorship, was 
undertaken by opposition jurists. What is most important 
in this development is that it gave the Christian 
Democrats a field in which to preserve the potential of 
converting themselves into the axis of a re-articulation 
of the party system in the eventuality of a political re- 
hk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activation. The intellectuals of the Lef`, however, b1 
rejecting the alternative of constituting revolutionary 
organisations based on what remained of the parties, 
situated themselves in an area in which they could only 
be subordinate to the ideological initiative of the 
Christian Democrats. 18 
This general retreat of the parties as organisations 
was also reflected in other, non-intellectual sectors. 
Amongst workers, it was unsuccessfully attempted to 
construct political unity in the trade unions. The 
parties continued to act, but principally through cadres 
who, like the intellectuals, acquired progressively more 
autonomy with respect to the parties and their 
ideologies. 19 Pinochet caused the Constitution, as well as 
the regulations for its gradual entry, to be approved and 
brought into effect. With it he legitimated his 
continuance in power until at least the end of the 
eighties and within the content of the Constitution that 
was approved he consolidated the bases for reformulating 
1N The group of Estudios Constitucionales, known as 'Grupo de los 24" 
was the first important case of open Christian Democrat 
collaboration with some people of the Left and, at the same time, 
with representatives of the old Right (Chile-America N° 64-65, Rome, 
June-September, 1980, p. 27. 
gab s 19 During the period of the dictatorship's ascendancy t -e 
movement was the object of an extremely close study by Guillermo 
Campero and Jose A. Valenzuela, El movimiento sindical en e- regime: 
military Chileno, 1973-1981. 
L, 
217 
all mechanisms of social an political represer. _a 4 on. 
The moment chosen for this confrontation, the 190 
plebiscite, had the added sense of culminating this sage 
of the dictatorship's strategy. It allowed the government 
to feel confident of its ability to consiier the 
historical experience of the prior political system as 
nullified, forcing everything remaining from. it, 
including most especially the Christian Democrats, to 
present themselves as united in opposition to the draft 
Constitution. The intention to elimnate Christian 
Democrat representativity from the social bloc supporting 
the dictatorship was expressed in official 
interpretations of the government's success in the 
plebiscite. 
5.4.1980-1983. The ideological struggle in the 
opposition. 
The very result of the plebiscite contributed to 
deepen the characteristics of the ongoing process of 
disarticulation suffered by the political parties in 
general and the Christian Democrats i. -, part lar e,, -er 
since the previous period. What to the Left had appeared 
to be a temporary weakening was now projec`eoo as a 
permanent condition. The theoretical and 
ideological 
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formulation of the situation assumed the fore. of 
proposals for sociological analysis in which i} was 
sought to constitute historical actors from soc si 
movements resistant to interpretation in defined class 
terms based on a structure of exploitation. From those 
social movements it was proposed to seek political 
alternatives to democratisation which would require for 
their development that the political parties could not or 
would not attempt to integrate them into defined projects 
from the perspective of any other type of analysis. 20 
Even though this kind of argument appeared to be 
more important to the Left, the Christian Democrats 
played a fundamental part in their production. In the 
overall conditions that caused this result it must be 
recognised that the intensification of ideological 
activity was due to the general retreat of the parties 
and, particularly of their disengagement from their rank- 
and-file and clientele. In the field of ideology, and in 
particular the area of activity of intellectual cadres, 
the party that preserved the greatest integrity was the 
Christian Democrat due to its social composition. 
20 A description of these positions and of their relation to what 
remained of the parties is to be found in Chapter X, 'La oposiciön 
al regimen militar, " in the book by Manuel Antonio Garretön, already 
quoted. 
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Moreover, the thesis of the incapacity of the parties of 
the Left to express the needs of social forces originated 
in Chile with the PDC. Since this was the period of 
greatest dissemination of discussion about this subject 
among Chilean intellectuals, it seems appropriate to 
recall its origins and development here. 
The limitations of the Chilean political system to 
express the interests of the complex of social forces 
were first perceived by the Left as obstacles to the 
independent participation of the campesinos. However, 
those parties could not break the barriers that 
guaranteeed over-representation of the parties of the 
Right. From the time of the Frente Popular, repression 
appeared immediately in response to any attempt at 
penetration by the Left in rural Chile or of any 
independent labour organisation of campesinos. 21 
To the Christian Democrats, the aforementioned 
limitations seemed circumventable by perfecting the 
electoral system. 22 Roger Vekemans, in his theory of 
21 %The communists, like all Chilean parties, maintained essentially 
an urban organisation. Rural activities were high risk. They were 
highly exposed attacks on the bastion of the Chilean oligarchy. " 
Brian Loveman, Struggle in the countryside. Politics and Rural 
Labour in Chile, 1919-1973, p. 206. 
2 At the end of Gabriel Gonzalez Videla's incumbency as President, 
(1946-1952), during the participation of Falange Nacional in the so- 
called %Cabinet of Social Sensitivity, " from 1950 to 1952, ýwc 
members of the party, Jorge Rogers and Gaston Saint Jean, designed a 
&k. 
220 
marginality, formulated the first `hesis tha e 
the "incapacity" of the party system, in its then-current 
organic and ideological models, to recresen` large 
sectors of society. His proposal was to change the 
relationship between party and social base, converting 
Democracia Cristiana into the expression of an alliance 
of social sectors organised in movements or fronts that 
would maintain the relation of clientele with the party 
and with an eventual government of that party (Promociön 
Popular). 
The failure of this project during Frei's 
administration, seemed to reinforce the party system. 
However, the political crisis in the Right, on losing 
control of the campesino vote, provoked criticism of the 
party system in that political sector. After reorganising 
itself into the National Party, the broadest Alessandrist 
movement, they reactivated the corporate organisations of 
the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie. Finally, after 
failing in the 1970 presidential election, the Right se` 
out to develop opposition to the Unidad Popular 
Government by means of "Social organisa--ions, 
neighbourhood associations, unions, etc. ". 
draft for an electoral reform that was sent to congress with the 
support of the government although it was later no` approved. George 
Grayson, El Partido Demöcrata Cristiano Chileno, p. 275. 
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Ultimately, after the 1973 defeat, `r<e Left, or 
better said, the intellectuals, also assumed criticism of 
the parties, questioning their capacity to promote 
development and further social movements. 
After the liquidation of the parties, the link 
between what was political and what was social would 
assume different forms for each one of these sectors. For 
the Christian Democrats it became a redefinition of the 
parties as areas in which to make social alliances thus 
passing from one multi-party system to a regime of only 
one party and of crushing hegemony by one party. For the 
Right, in its attempt under Pinochet to apply its 
blueprint, the alternative became de-politicisation, and 
a lengthy suppression of the parties and the system they 
constituted. Their eventual reconstruction would come 
only under conditions of subordination, not very clearly 
defined (whether corporative or ideological), but in any 
case, limiting the ideological spectrum they could cover 
under the requirements of exclusion of the Left. The 
alternative pointed out by the intellectuals of the Left, 
found no formulation beyond apologetic commentaries about 
social democracy in its multiple varieties, for it to be 
possible to review. 
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If criticism of the parties and the functioning of 
the party system as it existed in Chile until 1973, found 
formulas in all political sectors, the carriers of those 
positions in each sector also showed common 
characteristics. In the three sectors, Right, Christian 
Democrat, and Left, the cadres that assumed these 
positions were the intellectuals seeking their insertion 
into the professional political elite beginning in the 
23 
.3 
On the Right it was the Nationalists, gremialistas 
and other varieties of Fascists. Among the Christian 
Democrats it was principally the youth and, during the 
Frei government, the rebel and "tercerista" tendencies. 
Today's Left still remains made up of the same Christian 
Democrat rebels and terceristas, broken away from the PDC 
in 1969 and 1971 to form MAPU and the Izquierda 
Cristiana, plus Socialist cadres resembling them in their 
social, generational and professional composition. 
Other forms of criticism of the party system that do 
not extend to the party as organic model were represented 
by political cadres of the same generation of the `60s 
but that joined some form of "Castroism" proposing some 
variant of the "Leninist" view of the party. These 
`-j Though the analysis is not the same, the distribution between 
organisations of the Left in what Garretön describes as "matrices" 
of 'classic" and 'emergent" political action, coincides with the 
characterization of the cadres made here, at least for this sector. 
(Manuel Antonio Garretön, Op. cit., p. 188). 
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tendencies resided fundamentally in the R, some 
Socialist fractions, besides their traditional influence 
in the Communist Party not associated with Cas troisr., . 
24 
This digression aims at deriving meaning from the 
ideological activity that developed in this period and 
formed a major influence on the political parties. The 
results were significant for Christian Democrats, even 
though this may not be evident at first glance. For this 
to become clear it must be remembered that the Christian 
Democrats are a party of "professional representatives", 
linked among themselves by their common political 
interests which seek to represent social sectors that the 
party does not aspire to integrate into itself except to 
a limited extent. In this sense it is different from the 
parties of the Left. In them, popular sectors were not 
only integrated into the party organisation itself but 
could establish limits to the positions which, in theory, 
might be taken by the leadership, who share a social 
24 The quotes around "Leninism" refer to the role that the model of a 
revolutionary party played in the ideological debate in Pinochet's 
Chile. It should be remembered that in Chile questions relating to 
strategy and tactics of the Left and criticisms of real socialism 
appear mixed, starting from the supposition that the latter is the 
inevitable consequence of the adoption of Leninism in the former. In 
this discussion, facing the ideological offensive of the social 
Democrats is a Left that has fallen back on a kind of assumed or 
imputed Leninist "orthodoxy". Both positions are expressions of the 
defeat and "ideological disarmament" of the current Chilean Left. 
What is essential in the case of the Leninist model is that it makes 
it possible to justify the existence of the "party", as an 
organisational model, making a concrete situation into an 
abstraction, in the sense of its insertion or not in a party system. 
The position of those who imputed some form of "Leninism" to the 
Chilean Left is clearly expounded in the declarations of Ricardo 
Lagos to the daily Excelsior, Mexico, Jan. 6,1984, pp. 1,16 and 18. ) 
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composition similar to that of the Christian Democrats. 
This is particularly important in the case of the 
Socialist party. 25 Having each been members of a 
professional political elite, and the Christian Democrats 
expressing the "purest" kind of member of such an elite, 
the political interests all these groups of intellectual 
cadres enjoyed numerous points of contact. The issue lies 
with how they are perceived and how they are channelled. 
For the Christian Democrats the only model possible 
is a party. There the strategy continues to be a 
redefinition of the relationships between the rest of the 
parties, their rank-and-file and clienteles, making it 
possible to restructure the party system or eliminate it 
on the basis of the pre-eminence of the PDC. For 
intellectuals of the Left there were two perceivable 
possibilities. One, to restructure the party system 
making possible its reinsertion into politics, either as 
organisations and individual cadres or, two, the 
redefinition of its organisations around a revolutionary 
``' The degree of autonomy that the leadership of each party might 
exercise with respect to its rank-and-file and clienteles was, 
undoubtedly, variable from case to case. Determining factors also 
varied from party to party as indicated by the differing variability 
of voting in each party. Nevertheless, in the Left and even more so 
among the Socialists, everything leads to accepting as plausible the 
hypothesis that in the 1970 situation, subordination to the 
Christian Democrats, for example, in a Popular Front type alliance 
that might have supported Tomic, could have also strengthened the 
PDC, on one hand, and the "Castroist" Left on the other. This seems 
to be the reason for the agreements on which Unidad Popular was 
founded, particularly in the "Basic Program of Government" and the 
"Agreement on the style and conduct of the campaign". See chapter 
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strategy which could only be structured by a rilitary 
policy aimed at overthrowing the dictatorship. 26 The 
culminative effect of the defeat in 1973, and the loss of 
the plebescite in 1980, lead to the party reaching its 
political nadir in in 1982. Since then, the parties, 
tended toward recomposition around two axes. One of them 
assembled the most traditional organisations of the Left. 
These were the Communists, some Socialist fractions, the 
MIR, some fractions of organisations originating among 
the Christian Democrats and, also, the radicals. After 
recovery of their role as parties, they also recognised 
the need to reconstitute a system of party alliances, 
even though this might be reduced to only themselves. 
Even so, they maintained their call (by now permanent 
and also permanently rejected) to the Christian Democrats 
to join a unitary opposition bloc (antifascist front or 
whatever it might be called), and, at the same time, 
accepted at least the theoretical possibility, the 
26 Reference to the absence of "a military policy aimed at 
overthrowing the dictatorship", must be understood as a relative 
statement. In fact there were two military policies in progress, 
both the stemming from abstract considerations and being more the 
expression of desires than the product of analysis. It is clear 
that the Christian Democrats were always disposed to an agreement 
between the leadership and the armed forces from which a process of 
transition would derive. An abstract military policy naturally 
arises associated with the model of a revolutionary party, whether 
expecting this crisis (or another) to upset the armed forces and 
weaken them (as in Argentina after the Falkland Islands debacle) or 
that the construction of an autonomous armed apparatus begin which, 
in the long run, could challenge the control exercised by the armed 
forces on strategic grounds, a position that was always of little 
significance to the Left as a whole. 
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eventuality, of the use of violence to overthrow the 
dictatorship ("Call to unity and combat", Mexico, May 21, 
1982, signed by the Communist, PS-Almeyda, Radical and 
MIR parties. ) The other axis was constituted by the 
Socialist Convergence which assembled the most important 
intellectual cadres from the Left, who undertook the 
criticism of the parties and proposed the "recasting" of 
Chilean politics based on social movements. 27 
Everything that seemed irrelevant in political 
activity, characteristic of an opposition reduced to 
impotence, takes on meaning when examined as an 
ideological confrontation in the opposition camp. This 
opposition consisted largely, but not entirely of the 
defeated of 1973. Initially, the Christian Democrats 
unquestionably figured among the winners of 1973, but 
their proposal for restoration was subsequently defeated 
by the dictatorship. However, their subsequent shift to 
the opposition, on the initiative of the dictatorship (as 
stated above), did not automatically add them to the 
defeated of 1973. In their relationship to the Left, the 
Christian Democrats are situated in the winning camp. By 
not accepting proposals for unity in an opposition bloc 
defined by the Left, they set themselves to the task of 
assuming leadership of the opposition whose strategy 
7 "Nuestra propuesta, unidad y solidaridad frente a la crisis 
nacional", Santiago, May 1,1982. Secretariat of Socialist 
Convergence (24th Congress), MAPU, MOC, and Izquierda Cristiana. 
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would be defined by the Christian Democrat blueprint. 28 
This project has enjoyed noteworthy continuity if 
seen as proceeding from the experience of the Frei 
government, to the opposition to the government of 
Allende, and to Christian Democrat subordinate 
participation in Pinochet's bloc of support. In essence, 
it is the same project of redefinition of relations 
between social alliances based on PDC hegemony. As 
such, the PDC represents a social alliance offering a 
programme of economic development to its popular sector 
clientele and to sectors of the bourgeoisie whose 
interests will be represented by the party. The party, 
in turn, retains in its rank-and-file and its cadres a 
political and technocratic middle-class composition. 
In the context of the early 1980s, it did not seem 
possible or very fruitful for the Christian Democrats to 
struggle to represent a part of the bourgeoisie. The fact 
28 This has always been the position of Zaldivar, who in 1977 
concluded that "the formulation of a historical blueprint common to 
both the Communists and the Christian Democrats was impossible. 
Expressed more clearly, the Christian Democrats reject an alliance 
or programmes of government with the Chilean Communist Party. 
(Andres Zaldivar, "the construction of a new social blueprint is a 
process of gradual change", summary of the report presented to the 
Plenary Session of the Christian Democrats in early 1977, Chile- 
America, No. 28-29-30, Rome February, March, April 1977, p. 198) a 
few years later he declared: "We as Christian Democrats, if we wish 
to be consistent with our position and with what we are in that 
sense, I believe that the leadership is clear in that sense and 
there is a document of consensus which is also clear, we cannot take 
any action tending toward the search for an alliance to establish a 
government including the Communist Party, nor with any other party 
which as a party, as in organisation, has been committed to 
dictatorship as an ideological blueprint". (Andres Zaldivar, "La 
Otra Voz de la DC", El Mercurio, Santiago, April 1,1984, p. D3. ) 
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was that the latter as a whole was involved in support of 
the dictatorship and concerned with the future of its 
economic interests in the new model of depoliticise] 
development. However, on the side of the urban and rural 
working class sectors, the PDC's new situation in the 
opposition could be used to take on another, perhaps 
greater obstacle: resistance to the implementation of 
their blueprint. This was the political independence of 
the working class sectors voiced by the Marxist parties. 
The concrete task undertaken by the Christian Democrats 
in this, was the ideological disarmament of the Left. 29 
In this undertaking, the situation of the Left since 
the political and military defeat of 1973 was in their 
favour. Their task was then to inflict the only defeat 
the dictatorship was incapable of producing, the 
ideological defeat of the Left. Among the conditions 
defining the situation of the Left, the most favourable 
to the Christian Democrats was the disarray the parties 
were in and, in particular, the independence that the 
intellectuals (their ideological reserve) had acquired in 
respect to their organisations. 3° Upon joining the Left 
° The first to explicitly prescribe massive injections of 
"Eurocommunism" into the Chilean Left were Genaro Arriaga and 
Claudio Orrego, Leninismo y democracia. 
30 Under the conditions of the repression, organic links were 
strengthened undercover, but the majority of the rank-and-file and 
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opposition, the Christian Democrats, rather than 
expressing regret for their participation in the 
destruction of the political system, were committed to 
"learning the lesson of Unidad Popular", spreading 
criticism of the political system that made Allende's 
victory possible and repeated, (10 years later! ), the 
same criticisms the insurrectionists had raised against 
Allende's government. 31 This was the Christian Democrat's 
ideological victory in the midst of their political 
defeat. The consequences would only become clear in the 
period begun by the national day of protest on May 11, 
1983. 
5.5 1983-1986 the political crisis of the dictatorship 
and social mobilisation of the opposition. 
In the first protest of 1983, the fragmentation of 
the parties; the ideological struggles; the political 
the clientele were excluded from them and only maintained an 
ideological link through those intellectuals who could occupy the 
spaces permitted by the dictatorship in the cultural field in 
general and particularly in this case, political journalism. The 
intellectuals had assumed great independence from the parties 
because, among other things that had happened, they were not 
employed in state institutions in which even their personal 
situation might depend on the vagaries of politics and on their 
party affiliation. 
31 "Above all, we understand that Allende failed in his basic 
premise, " stated Tomäs Mulian, a political scientist of the Left. 
"He thought Chile could be taken to socialism with the support of 
only 30 percent of the population. Now we understand that no 
political programme can be successful unless a great majority of 
Chileans support it. " (Excelsior, Mexico, Sept. 25,1983, p. 31). 
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struggles and social processes; the overall retreat bý 
the political parties as a whole; and, in general the 
party's loss of historical currency as organic mode-' was 
clearly revealed. Nevertheless, beginning with those 
protests the process of political reactivation or 
repolitisation of Chilean society began, particularly 
characterised by the reactivation of what remained of the 
parties, their fractions and sectors, and the appearance 
of the new organisations aspiring to the same status. '` 
The old political elite and new elements that shared some 
of its characteristics participated in an intense 
political life which, objectively and subjectively 
displaced social protest and channelled itself along 
lines of creation, consolidation and development of party 
structures, and linkage in blocs both within the 
government and the opposition. 
What the offensive of 1983 showed was the 
organic incapacity of the political opposition to 
organise the protests of working class sectors, and the 
A year after the process of political reactivation began, El 
Mercurio listed the following actors as the most significant: 
ALIANZA DEMOCRATICA (composed of the Christian Democrats, Social 
Democrats, Radical Party, Republican Right, Socialist Party, MAPU, 
MAPU-OC, Group for Convergence, Movement of University Convergence); 
GROUP OF EIGHT(National Union, Independent Democratic Union, 
National Party, Social Christianity, Radical Democracy, Movement for 
National Action, Democratic Socialist Workshops, PCPU, AR 
DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT (Communist Party, Almeydista Socialist Party, 
MIR). (El Mercurio, Santiago, June 17,1984, p. D1). 
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crumbling of the dictatorsrlýp's social bloc of scr: 
which provided the opportunity for the protests to be 
expressed and extended in society toward The middle-class 
and even to sectors of the bourgeoisie. What stands out 
in this view of the process is the scope of the protest 
rather than its intensity. This is also confirmed by the 
organic weakness that led the copper workers to call for 
a more diffuse, but more extended expression of protest 
when they found themselves unable to carry out their 
planned national strike in the copper mines. 33 The overall 
characteristics of the protest movement constituted the 
subject matter for analysis in its initial phase. The 
general characteristics spontaneity and violence 
established some differences between its various 
expressions in different social sectors. 34 These 
ideological images of the protests, at the same time, are 
a good reference point by which to evaluate the meaning 
33 The Confederation of Copper Workers agreed on April 21 1983, a-- 
its Extraordinary Congress at Punta de Tralca, to call a "24-HOUR 
NATIONAL STRIKE to protest against current labor legislation and 
economic and social policy". The strike could not be agreed upon in 
Chuquicamata nor in the three unions at El Teniente controlled by 
officials nor in the professional union of the Andean zone, directed 
by a vice president of the Chilean Workers Confederation 
(CTC). ("Chile Itinerario de la Protesta nacional", Convergencia, No. 
9, Mexico, July 1983, pp. 37-38. ) 
34 A very detailed description of the first protests where a 
noteworthy attempt is made to evaluate the importance of these 
characteristics, can be found in the Informe Mensual de Coyunture 
Politica, number 35, Santiago, May 1983. 
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of three parallel processes that characterised Chilean 
politics beginning in May 1983: first, the politicisation 
of protests, and second, closely linked to i, the 
formation of political blocs in the opposition, composed 
by (or decomposed by) an accelerated reconstruction of 
the political parties. Finally, there were attempts to 
recompose the dictatorship's support bloc, a process 
expressed not only in the military government's policies 
but also in a politicisation of its party members that 
suggested the structuring of parties or at least began 
moving in that direction. 35 Examination of these processes 
can be an effective way of evaluating Christian Democrat 
strategies in the context prevailing at the beginning of 
1983. 
If the protests' scope and spontaneity are related in 
their origins, it is because of the social 
manifestations' low level of political articulation 
observed from 1977 to 1983. However, the change in the 
correlation of social forces that the 1983 protest 
signified had to look for means of expression that 
reflected this change. Vis-a-vis the dictatorship's de- 
politicisation project, the opposition's politicisa`ior. 
35 See previous chapter. 
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was a way of advancing toward the creation of 
alternatives. From this point of view, the protests' 
development, as it happened, could be considere 
"natural". If the protests scope "exploded" in May 1983, 
the characteristics of its development can be traced to 
before this date. On one hand, as has been said, the 
protests' sphere of influence found its base in the 
decomposition of the dictatorship's social support bloc, 
but on the other hand, the organic forms that channelled 
this decomposition would not allow a political process of 
the dimensions that the protest provoked. The 
dictatorship's social support decomposed naturally 
through the corporate channels that had concentrated the 
bourgeoisie's political representation since the crisis 
of their traditional political parties. The levels of 
radicalisation possible within this organic model were 
reaching their limits (among truckers, wheat producers, 
merchants, etc. ) while, synchronically with the economic 
crisis a reactivation of the political elite began to 
appear. 36 
36 This process is registered in the monthly reports of the Political 
Analysis Workshop, specifically the transition form the corporate 
model to the reactivation of the parties, detected through the first 
attempts to recast the National Party, can be seen in the Informe 
Mensual de Coyuntura Polltica, Numbers 30 and 31, December 1982 and 
January 1983. 
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The May 1983 protest broke this line of evelcpment, 
not to interrupt these processes but to put them on 
another level, in which they accelerated cons derab 
The call to a day of protest on the part of the 
Confederation of Copper Workers was complex. On one hand, 
on social grounds, the working class sectors became a 
vanguard in an expression of discontent that in the 
bourgeoisie and middle classes could not overcome their 
ideological and organic limitations. It was those sectors 
that were able to recruit others in the middle classes, 
and, even, the bourgeoisie, to their movement, but not 
the other way around. 
The generalised character of the protests, however, 
is defined by the presence of sectors that came from the 
dictatorship's social support bloc. On the other hand, 
the same call was of an undoubtedly political nature, 
however ambiguous. The labour union leaders, despite the 
parties' disarray, still had identifiable political 
affiliations and, in this sense, the copper workers' call 
implied a unitary participation even if it was in a 
corporate organisation of the Christian Democrats and the 
Left. Finally, despite the same political content, for 
the middle classes and the bourgeoisie the copper workers 
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still represented the working class sector that share. 
their opposition against the Unidad Popular. 37 
The protest's politicisa`ion aavancei from the 
reactivation of the party leadership to the reactivation, 
reconstruction or formation of political organisations. 
Because of their composition and the characteristics of 
their project, the Christian Democrats were able to take 
advantage of the situation, becoming the axis of two 
significant processes. The first was the reactivation of 
the old political elite and its grouping into what could 
become the embryo of a political party system 
reconstructed according to the guidelines of the 
Christian Democrat blueprint, ie. the Alianza 
Democratica. The second was the re-establishing of the 
social representativity of this reactivated elite, and 
specifically the PDC, via the politicisation of the 
protest. To achieve this it seemed to be enough that the 
Christian Democrats nominally assumed the responsibility 
to head a "spontaneous" movement. This is what they di: 
from July 1983. However, this type of politicisation of 
37 All the ambiguity of the significance of the copper workers is 
reflected in the internal problems that in the Confederaciön de 
Trabajadores del Cobre (CTC) preceded the rise of Seguuel to 
leadership and the call to the first day of pretest. 
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the protests revealed, in its limitations, the processes' 
complexity. 38 
If the protest's spontaneity and scope indicated the 
degree of disarticulation between politics and society 
attained as an effect of the application of the 
dictatorship's project, the variety of the protests' 
expressions, specifically its acts of violence and social 
distribution, as indicated by its spatial distribution, 
made it clear that it was not about an undifferentiated 
"social movement". The parties' disengagement from their 
social bases, specifically among the Left, was not so 
thoroughgoing so as to suppose that the Christian 
Democrats used the protest to fill an absolute political 
vacuum in the ideological and organic sense. 
39 For the 
PDC to match the image it wanted to project and the 
supposedly consequential action that it began in this 
process, it was necessary to make some cuts in the 
political contents as well as in the "spontaneous" 
38 On this protest see Jorge Lavandero, El precio de sostener un 
sueho, pp. 91-96. 
jq For example, the distribution of the events in Santiago and the 
degree of violence involved in them during the protest of 14 June 
1983 give the impression that despite the time that had passed and 
the indubitable changes in Chilean society, there were political 
elements that had a greater permanence than they are usually 
attributed. Not only nostalgia leads us to observe the importance 
of that day's events produced around the wPedagögico". (Macul 
sector, Greece Avenue-Dr. Johow). (Hechos Urbanos, Number 
22, 
Santiago, June 1983. ) 
h 
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expressions of social protest. However this posited some 
dilemmas for the Christian Democrats. 
To present themselves as a democratic alternative the 
Christian Democrats had to maintain the protest's size in 
the social sectors that had supported the dictatorship, 
but, at the same time, this meant controlling the most 
violent expressions of protest among the working class 
sectors and radicalised social groups (students). For the 
Christian Democrats this situation constituted one of the 
typical dilemmas of a politically central position; a 
dilemma that they have never been able to solve 
satisfactorily. Acting on all these components of social 
protest put them in a position of having to recognise 
that other elements of political juncture existed. 
In the bourgeoisie and the middle classes the 
Christian Democrats had to compete with the military 
government which represented the political engagement of 
those classes, and with the new political organisations 
that aspired to carry out that role. For this, the 
Christian Democrats counted on the cadres of the "old 
Right" and the organisations reconstructed by then. 
However, both the government and the new organisations 
that supported it looked to reconstruct the 
2 38 
dictatorship' s social support be Jinnin ; with con-e=-. i-: j 
the "violence" and "chaos" that were made `o be 
synonymous with the opposition. For the Christia-: 
Democrats, fighting this image implied winning the 
dictator's recognition of their being a" em. c; cratic" 
alternative. This was perhaps its greatest political 
achievement in 1983: to have its their democratic 
credentials confirmed by the dictatorship's agreement to 
a political dialogue. 90 
The cost of this achievement was paid on the ground 
of the working class sectors. Here the Christian 
Democrats had to limit the spectrum of possible 
alliances. It did this with some relief since it was not 
a tactical question; the exclusion of the Left was 
assumed in their strategic blueprint. Thus, among their 
tasks, it gave priority to stimulating the development of 
social democrat tendencies in the Left. At the same time, 
in terms of social protest, it had to condemn violent 
demonstrations and appear in line with the government in 
facing the left wing that identified with these 
ao The dialogue's merits only exist in the fact that it took place. 
Jarpa's meetings with the Democratic Alliance were on 25 August, 5 
September and 29 September. The Democratic Alliance cancelled the 
dialogue on 20 October 1983. In the first meeting Pinochet's 
resignation was requested which in turn Jarpa rejected. In the third 
meeting the opposition only asked for an agenda to be se--. 
239 
demonstrations. In this way it defined the environment 
and some of the traits of the Left's opposition bloc. The 
Christian Democrat decision was to construct an 
alternative to the dictatorship that would contest its 
social support on its own grounds, before a unified 
opposition could; an opposition that incorporated the 
popular sectors with its own political expressions. The 
cost of this strategic position was, according to some of 
the Christian Democrats and analysts close to them, a 
radical change in the way the party acted: the 
abandonment of their "own path". 41 
The process of politicising the protests was 
completed with the formation of a second opposition bloc, 
the Popular Democratic Movement (MDP), the axis of which 
was the Communist Party. As with the Christian Democrats 
and the Democratic Alliance, what allowed the Communists 
to play such an important role in this second opposition 
bloc was their ability to survive as a party during the 
dictatorship, both in the organic sense as in that of the 
preservation of their social representation. However, 
the delay in the formation of this bloc indicated that 
the Communist Party valued the possibility of forming a 
a' For Edgardo Boeninger, the decision to open himself to specific 
agreements with other forces dates from 1979. (op. cit., p. 299) 
p. 
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unified opposition over the constitu`ion of an 
exclusively leftist regroupment. It was the Christian 
Democrat rejection of any alliance with the Left, except 
with sectors aspiring to constitute some sort of social 
democracy, that finally pushed the Communists to join 
groups which, in general, were inclined to oppose the 
dictatorship by all possible means, including violence, 
but which did not have a serious political strategy. 
The politicisation of protest through both opposition 
blocs was due to several factors. As has been pointed 
out, some were the result of the nature of protest itself 
while others derived from the strategies the parties 
formulated to join the protest. In this sense the role 
the Christian Democratic's strategy played was 
fundamental. On the other hand, before the first 
protests, this strategy translated into attempts to 
reactivate the old political elite as a step towards a 
re-composition of the party system in which the central 
role of the Christian Democrats would be indisputable. In 
this way, the scope and complexity of the protests 
reinforced the formation of blocs as a way of re- 
0- 
politising society. However, the blocs, and mainly the 
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Democratic Alliance, were a means to regroup the 
political elite and facilitate the reconstruction of the 
parties. As the protest accelerated the re-politicisation 
process an inconsistency appeared: the blocs were a 
better expression of the protests in their si: e and 
heterogeneity but, within them, each party had to search 
for its own re-engagement with the social bases it sought 
to represent. Thus, the blocs created the environment 
that made party re-composition possible, but this 
environment required definitions far more precise than 
those allowed by the protests and blocs themselves. The 
result was an apparent decline and loss of strength by 
the protest, a paralysis of the blocs at the level of 
their original definitions and an intense political life 
of the leadership in which the militants searched for the 
ideological and organic formulae that would permit the 
reconstruction of their parties. 42 
42The problem for each sector of the reactivated political elite was, 
on the one hand, to articulate a mass movement that had no 
legitimate ways of expression, and on the other, to search for a way 
to improve the image of its own representation vis a vis their 
competitors within the political class. By not having contrasting 
methods of their assumed social representation, the participation by 
blocs implied an acknowledgement by peers in the political class. 
The identification of social support with the blocs could have 
helped the mobilisation as long as the support for each party could 
not be measured. Nevertheless, the stagnation of the blocs was ue 
to a large extent to the priority given by the leadership to the 
reconstruction of each political party on separate terms. 
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Within the Democratic Alliance, the ChrIs: iar, 
Democrats, in their role as axis, searched for the 
reconstruction of a "democratic Right", privilegi g `heir 
contacts with the old Right, and the constitution of a 
democratic Left, privileging the presence of their bloc 
of cadres coming from socialism. However, the relations 
of power did not develop symmetrical. On the Right, the 
Democratic Alliance had to face the dictatorship's 
attempts to re-define its support, while in the Left, the 
Communist Party was an axis around which other forces 
regrouped. 
The protests' main achievement was, without a doubt, 
to express the change of the correlation of social forces 
in an overall process of social re-politicisation. This 
is also reflected in a politicisation of the dictatorship 
and the forces that supported it. 43 
If the dictatorship's economic development blueprint 
and the fact that it was carried out successfully for a 
period deepened the overall de-politicisation, the 
economic crisis decomposed the dictatorship's s'-, sport 
43 The dictatorship's politicisation can be seen in the Cabinet. It 
started to include old politicians like Jarpa, Collados and Escobar 
in the key ministries. The politicisation of its support can be seen 
in the variety of organisations from the Right, the most important 
of which were mentioned in the Group of Eight. 
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bloc in certain sectors, the interests of nyý: r_ were 
differently affected and which expressed their protests 
in corporate ways. On the other hand, the imccrtar_ce of 
protests and their rapid politicisation forced the 
government to respond on the grounds chosen by the 
opposition: political grounds. The increasing 
politicisation of the administration reflected these 
determinations in the appointment of first Jarpa as 
Minister of the Interior and then the Collados and 
Escobar in key economic ministries. 
For the new Right it seemed the time had come to 
assume the political role that until then they had been 
denied by the dictatorship. At last, cadres could aspire 
to leadership positions and did not need to settle for 
being civilian advisors to a military government or for 
being isolated ideologues whose only means of 
communication with the masses was journalism. On the 
other hand, also within the pro-dictatorship sphere, 
cadres of the old political elite were reactivated, 
especially nationalists coming from the National Part},, 
but also conservatives. In this way, a border was formed 
around the old Right where the Democratic Alliance art 
the different sectors that supported the dictatorship 
competed but also, where they communicate--. 
R 
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The balance from this period shows that the pe iý? sr 
movement of the Christian Democrats was strategically 
fruitful for both main sectors into which the party 
leadership divided. They contributed to determining the 
party's lead role in the transition. By pushing the party 
towards the Left, Gabriel Valdes' leadership allowed him 
to link up with the social protest and to attract the 
Socialist Party (Briones-Nünez) to a party alliance that 
excluded the Communists. Thus the alliance that 
represented the unity of the working class was broken. 44 
The ideological cost was to take on the most radical 
opposing programme (repudiation of the Constitution, 
Pinochet's resignation, elections in a constituent 
assembly), but, in exchange, it allowed the party 
alliance to link up with social protest. This pushed the 
Left towards an even greater radicalisation, forming a 
party alliance that represented the tradition of the Left 
defeated in 1973 (the MDP) and, shortly after, the 
beginning of the activities of an armed organisation (the 
FPMR) . 
95 
44 See Chapters 1 and 2. 
45 The MDP was formed in October 1983 and the FPMR produced the first 
"blackout" in December of the same year. 
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Another sector of the Christian e ccra`s eb ý 
Aylwin, the party's vice-president at the time, looked 
for agreements with the traditional Rig_t. The rejection 
of the demands of the Democratic Alliance and 
cancellation of the dialogue with Jarpa left a vacuum of 
significant political activity among the elite, although 
the protests continued monthly. The collapse of this 
situation came in July 1984, in a seminar in which 
Francisco Bulnes, patriarch of the traditional Right 
presented his idea of the legitimacy of the 1980 
constitution. 46 The position stated by Patricio Aylwin at 
the close of that seminar represented the beginning of 
the subordination of the opposition to the transition's 
itinerary designed by Pinochet's advisers and, according 
to one commentator, marked the real beginning of the 
transition in Chile. 47 In his statement Aylwin said: 
"Not even I can hope that General Pinochet would 
recognise that his Constitution is illegitimate, not 
16 Bulnes' position was that the opposition programme should centre 
on the proposal to reform the Constitution and not on its total 
rejection and that Pinochet should accept that his Constitution was 
subject to reform. "The democratic opposition should stop attacking 
the President and recognise not the legitimacy of the Constitution 
of 1980, that would be asking too much, but the fact that it is 
current and that it is the only juridical framework we have for the 
transition. " (Underlined by R. Y. ) Comment by Francisco Bulnes in The 
seminar Una salida politico constitucional para Chile, p. 141. 
47 Rafel Otano, Crönica de la transiciön, p. 21. 
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even he can demand that I shoul, recognise it to be 
legitimate. 
The only advantage that he has over me, in this 
respect, is that that Constitution -whether I like it 
or not- is operative. This is a fact that I accept . i48 
The importance of this fact only appears in 
retrospect. At the moment it happened, the PDC, headed by 
Gabriel Valdes, was dominated by the faction closest to 
an alliance with the Left and mobilised itself to appear 
at protests, the opposition's most ample social 
expression. However, in the internal struggles within the 
DC and negotiations with the dictatorship, instead of 
resolving the explicit ideological and political 
conflicts, the framework that would lead to the 
transition was being formed. The most important point in 
this period is the separation between social and 
political opposition. The first aimed for the unity of 
opposing forces and its action pointed towards 
radicalisation. The second, centred on the DC in the 
party reconstruction process, impeded the union in 
limiting the size of the alliance by seeking to isolate 
the Communists. Explicitly, the rejection was of violence 
" Patricio Aylwin's participation in the aforementioned seminar. Pp. 
148-149. 
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"wherever it came from", as the chosen motto said. 
Nevertheless, the violence of organisations such as the 
FPMR was confused with the violence of street 
demonstrations that were part of the protest movement. 
Ultimately, this was a concession to the dictatorship 
that, since the negotiations with Jarpa, had demanded an 
end to the violence. 
The National Agreement, an initiative from the 
Catholic Church that established an ideological spectrum 
that excluded the Communists was the next step in the 
party reconstruction process. Formally, the agreement 
excluded the extreme right UDI that fought not only to 
keep the Constitution without any amendments, but also 
for the rigorous enforcement of its most questioned 
article, article number 8, by asking the constitutional 
tribunal to outlaw the MDP. The National Agreement gave 
in to the dictatorship in accepting the principle of 
exclusion of some political forces as a way of protecting 
democracy. However, it accepted this because of specific 
"acts" of anti-democratic organisations and not as an 
exclusion of doctrines or ideas. 49 The meaning of this 
49 The text of the "National Agreement for the Transition to Full 
Democracy" was published in the magazine CAUCE, year 3, No. 50, from 
26 November to 2 December 1985, pp. 23-25. 
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agreement was limited to the Neolog cal se `bac l_ o --h. e 
political opposition expressed in the elite, since 
Pinochet did not even agree to talk about the mat `er 
Cardinal Juan Francisco Fresno, then Archbishop of 
Santiago. 50 
5.6.1986-1990: The Subordination of the opposition 
hegemonised by the PDC to the Dictatorship's Blueprint 
for Transition. 
At first, this failure of the negotiating opposition 
seemed to strengthen social mobilisation as an 
alternative. The strategies were evaluated in terms of 
periods to end the dictatorship. Clearly, Pinochet was 
looking to arrive at the plebiscite planned for 1988 
supported by the transitory articles in the Constitution. 
The opposition was looking for ways to end the 
dictatorship sooner. The formation of the Assembly for 
Civility and its Demand for Chile published in April 
1986,51 looked to recover the initiative the mobilisations 
of 1983 had provoked. It was made up of the 18 most 
important social organisations in Chile but all their 
leaders also were familiar with party militancy, ever: 
though none of them were national party leaders. The 
50 See previous chapter. 
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demands were of a sock-economic yeo, _, - t-ney ^egan 
establishing the dictatorship's inability to meet s'-, ch 
them, and so called for democracy as a prior co-. it io-. . 
The opposition's possible strategies created problems 
for their components, especially the DC. The MIDP's 
proposal for unity caused discrepancies in the Democratic 
Alliance because it meant an alliance wiTh the 
Communists. In the end the year's events cleared the way: 
the national protest called for by the Assembly for 
Civility faced the most brutal repression ever seen until 
then by these mobilisations. 52 That same year arsenals 
attributed to the FPMR were discovered, and on 7 
September the failed attempt on Pinochet's life occurred. 
All this contributed to cancel the image of the viability 
of armed struggle and, according to some, strengthened 
the dictatorship vis-a-vis the opposition with which it 
looked to negotiate. 53 
Pinochet's tactical advances had repercussions on the 
opposition and particularly on the DC's , interior. At the 
51 In the magazine, "CAUCE". 
5' The strike of July 2 and 3 that led to the highest level of 
street protests was marked by a horrible incident in which a couple 
of young people were burned by a military patrol. One of a 
boy, died. Cavallo et al., op. cit., pp. 36-37. 
53 Rafael Otano, op. cit., pp. 36-37. 
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end of 1986, without any advances in the negc-ia-ing 
strategy, and with the advances of the MDP in social 
movements, particularly among students, the Socialist 
Party (Nunez), represented by Ricardo Lagos, announced 
its retirement from the Democratic Alliance. The 
presence of the PS-Nunez, separate from the PS-Almeyda 
and the PC, in an alliance that even included the Right 
as it sought to distance itself from Pinochet, and in 
which the PDC had hegemonic control was Gabriel 
Valdes"great achievement as party leader. It was the 
renovation of the PS and at the same time as its 
subordination to the Christian Democrat blueprint. 
However, upon the failure of a union of the Left, the 
subordination of the PS-Nunez to the DC was renewed in a 
new pact: the Committee for Free Elections (CEL) created 
on 13 March 1987, and co-ordinated by Sergio Molina. 54 
At the same time the opposition's subordination to 
the dictatorship's strategy was being imposed through the 
always conflictive and incomplete acceptance of politica! 
legislation. From February 1987 the new electoral 
registers were opened and in March the new law for 
political parties was issued. The PDC, not to mention the 
54 Edgardo Boeninger, op. cit., p. 331. 
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Socialists, debated calling tweir ý. ere---s an 
sympathisers to register as voters and, later, to begin 
the legal registration procedures of political 
organisations. It was clearly understood on the part of 
some of its leaders that these facts represented the 
acceptance of the Constitution, and of its strategy for 
transition, as legitimate. The electoralist party line 
supported by those who already "thought the plebiscite 
to be inevitable" 55 triumphed in the National Meeting of 
the DC, held 31 July and 2 August 1987. A new leadership 
headed by Patricia Aylwin as president and Andres 
Zaldivar, Narciso Irureta y Edgardo Boeninger as vice- 
presidents was elected. Gutenberg Martinez became the 
new Secretary General. The old DC was reconstructed to 
subordinate itself to the dictatorship's transition 
blueprint, thus subordinating the Left as well. The Left 
soon had to join the electoral campaign since in Aylwin's 
words the mobilisation was "a waste of gunpowder" 56 The 
character and limitations of these social mobilisations 
were clear to the DC strategists. In October 1986, in a 
letter to the Christian Democrat party, Edgardo Boeninger 
highlighted the "difference in motivation and behaviour 
55 Edgardo Boeninger, op. cit., p. 333. 
56 Rafael Otano, op. cit., p. 52. 
252 
of the key sectors of the middle class when ýý. r4 r: ý he 
present process to the events of October 1972 and May 
1973. At that time the aforementioned sectors moby-lised 
with the firm intention of ending the Unidad Popular 
government [... ], today it is essentially a party devoted 
to the recovery of lost ground vis-a-vis the government 
it contributed to establish. i57 
What should be added is that those mobilisations 
subordinated the DC in a bloc led by the strikers. 58 The 
danger was that the mobilisation could lead to the 
radicalisation of working class sectors and to the Left's 
avoidance of subordination to the DC, the other opposing 
force. The lesson was that the party system guaranteed 
the DC's central role even when this juncture had to 
subordinate itself to the dictatorship's blueprint since, 
in exchange, it had the opportunity to neutralise the 
Left. 
Discussion about inclusion in the electoral rolls 
separated the PS-Almeyda from its Communist allies. Ir. 
January 1988, the Christian Democrats and the PS-A worked 
together in an Agreement for the NO which improved on the 
57 Edgardo Boeninger quoting himself in op. cit., pp. 329-330. 
58 See Chapter 2. 
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Democratic Alliance and gave rise on February 2 `o The 
formation of the Accord of Parties for the NO. This 
agreement was subscribed to by a total of 17 par`ies and 
minor groups. It was the embryo for the reconstruction of 
a party system centred on the Christian Democrats' 
initiatives, whose president, Aylwin was designated 
"spokesman" for the Accord-59 which excluded only the PC, 
the MIR, and other minor Left socialist groups. 
The triumph of the NO in the plebiscite inspired the 
idea that Aylwin was the natural candidate for the 
presidency of the republic if the alliance of parties 
that had been formed for the plebiscite were preserved. 
Objections arose within his own party where Eduardo Frei 
Ruiz-Tagle also had both ambitions and support. 
Discussion around a necessary generational renewal 
obscured real observable changes and continuities. The 
Christian Democrats arose as the axis of the system and 
their actions were independent of the movement of 
society. Decisions were taken by a generation of 
"operators" who, though they came from before 1973, had 
never been so powerful. In fact, a new elite, with The 
same cast of characters but a new political culture 
59 Edgardo Boeninger, op. cit., p. 338. 
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assumed control of the system. ry win's candiäacy aas 
imposed as a consensus to cover up the shameful frauds 
carried out in the party's internal elections. t` 
This Right-wing Christian Democrat line was to make 
alliances with small groups within the greater Alliance 
for the NO, for the purpose of confronting a socialist 
contender for the candidacy. In particular, Ricardo 
Lagos accepted that socialist ambitions could be 
postponed for a second transition administration. 61 In the 
end, Aylwin's candidacy concentrated the support of the 
majority of the NO forces. 
If Aylwin's victory meant legitimisation of the 1980 
Constitution, with reforms that did not change its nature 
beyond eliminating of Article 8, regarding the exclusion 
for ideas, and the acceptance of the timetable for 
transition to full enforcement of that Constitution 
contained in the transitory articles, it is necessary to 
explain what was gained by the parties that assumed the 
administration and whose axis was the Christian Democrat- 
Socialist alliance. The victory of the Christian 
60 Rafael Otano, op. cit., pp. 78-79. 
61 "To me it seems very difficult that there not be a Socialise 
candidate in 1994. Because if that does not happen, it will mean 
that this transition was a failure. " Quoted by Otano, op. cit., p. 
79. 
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Democrat political blueprint was reflec-e, 
in 
the 
subordination of the Socialists and the practical 
expulsion from the party system of the Communists who n'-'\1.7 
belonged to the extra-parliamentary Left. The Christian 
Democrat role as axis of the entire party system was 
guaranteed by its ideological influence in the renewed 
Socialist Party62 and by the reinforcement of the 
political parties against the social demands contained in 
the Constitution. 
What signified a radical change in the form of 
Christian Democrat thinking was their acceptance of the 
economic development model imposed by the dictatorship. 
Christian Democrat ideas and programmes had given 
substance better than those of any other party to Latin- 
American development thinking and its structuralist roots 
in economics. This way of thinking inspired Christian 
Democrat's "technical" criticism of the management of the 
Chilean economy under the dictatorship well into the 
80, 's. 63 However, at the time of Aylwin' s presidential 
campaign, the thinking which, at its roots, had inspirei 
the dictatorship's economists had become dominant in the 
international academic field. It also dominate designs 
of plans for economic policy throughout Latin America 
after the 1982 debt crisis, and finally, the Chilear. 
6' See following chapter. 
63 Alejandro Foxley, Experimentos neoliberales en America 
Chapter III, El Experimento Neoliberal en Chile, pp. 44-92. 
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model was reputed as successful and had a TM. irers a, -. JA 
imitators in other countries. With all this, the problem 
was not the conversion of Christian Democrat economists 
(and their renewed socialist colleagues)64 but that the 
conversion be convincing to Chilean and foreign investors 
and entrepreneurs present in Chile. 65 
6a Edgardo Boeninger, op. cit., p. 356. 
b5 Rafael Otano, op. cit., pp. 134-135. 
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Chapter 6. The Transformations of the Left 
6.1. Introduction 
On becoming President of the Republic in 1990, 
Patricio Aylwin was backed by a coalition of 16 poif: icai 
parties of which the main partners were the Christian 
Democrats and the Chilean Socialist Party. This may have 
given the impression that the Chilean political process 
was returning to a point in its development similar to 
the one interrupted in 1973. An alliance between 
Christian Democrats and Socialists seemed the solution to 
the dilemma Allende could not solve in order to preserve 
the political system and continue with the transition to 
socialism. Aylwin himself, however, had been the 
Christian Democrat leader that prevented an agreement 
with Allende and opened the door to the coup d' etat. The 
alliance Aylwin led in 1990 represented somethiing quifie 
different from the alliance that might have been effected 
between the Christian Democrat Party and government of 
the Unidad Popular. There were differences in each aspect 
of the alliance, with the Socialists revealing the most 
noticeable ones. In fact, their presence in the alliance 
epitomised the changes suffered by the Ch la n Left 
during the military dictatorship: the break-up of the 
Communist-Socialist alliance as axis of the Left ar i =. : 
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transformation of the Chilean Socialist 7 ar7 nt 
something similar to a social democratic party. This was 
the result of a process that culminated in the 
subordination of the Left to the Christian Democrats as 
the axis of reconstruction of the political party sysrem 
and, at the same time, of the subordination of the 
parties to the national blueprint imposed by the 
dictatorship. 
Once the dictatorship dissolved parliament and 
suppressed formal party activity, the population was 
disengaged from political participation. The organic 
link between the parties and their clientele, structured 
through elections, was severed. This does not mean, 
however, that the parties' organised rank-and-file and, 
even less their leaderships, had been completely 
deactivated. For the entire period of the dictatorship, 
politics became mostly super-structural in the sense that 
the actors were mainly members and organisations of a 
prior political elite and also that those ideological 
matters came permanently to the fore whereby the 
intellectual side of politics became fundamentally 
important. These general characteristics of the political 
process would be reflected in the Left as well and 
particularly in the Socialist Party. 
6.2. The Left after 1973. 
The coup d'etat was immediately successf, _ in some 
bk. 
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of its objectives: the destruction of the goverrmeit of 
the UP and the dispersal of its members. However, at the 
level of political organisation an ideology, this were 
not so easy. The political organisations of the Left were 
defeated, militarily and politically with great spee , 
but this meant neither their complete destruction nor 
disappearance of their social influence, even though 
careful evaluation is necessary of the degrees and forms 
of survival of these elements under the conditions of the 
dictatorship. 
In the first period after the coup, the Left's 
complex of parties was shaken not only by repression, but 
also by arguments ver the causes of their defeat and 
their future perspectives. In general, the arguments and 
alignments corresponded to positions prior to 1973. On 
one hand were those who criticised the ultra-Left's 
actions, in and out of the UP. They considered the ultra- 
Left's lack of appreciation of the importance of 
maintaining institutionality as one of the causes of 
defeat. ' On the other hand were those who criticised the 
reformism they imputed to the entire UP strategy and the 
rituals with which institutional forms had been 
maintained, that may have impeded the development of 
elements that could have allowed them to successfully 
1 Chilean Communist Party, *El ultraizquierdismo, caballo de Troya 
del imperialismo", and Jaime Gazmuri, "Aprender las lecciones 
del 
pasado para constuir el futuro". 
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confront the coup. 2 
In the fundamentally important matter of 
organisation, no new significant organisati--ns appear 
other than the parties in the first period of regrouping 
after defeat. 3 In general, the parties remained intao- 
and within them their pre-coup tendencies remained 
dominant, with the exception of the PS, in which some 
changes were observed. But even the UP, as an alliance of 
parties, was reconstituted as such. 4 This organic 
situation reflects a first result of the ideological 
confrontation. In other words, the hegemonic sectors 
during the UP government maintained their positions with 
greater or lesser difficulty within each party. This 
meant that, as a whole, the Left assumed an "anti-fascist 
front" party line. This line was promoted by the PC and 
implied the search for an alliance with the DC in a 
blueprint to reconstruct the political system beginning 
with an evaluation of the already noticeable 
discrepancies between the dictatorship and the PDC. 5 
2 Chilean Socialist Party (Coordinadora National de Regionales, 
CNR), 'Posiciön politica". 
3 There is news of highly restricted spontaneous youth 
organisations, that were dismantled by repression in the first 
months after the coup. 
4 It may be said that the UP existed as an alliance of parties, at 
least in exile, until 1980. In 1981, in Mexico, there was a call for 
a 'Chilean Left" that includes the MIR, (18 September 1981). 
5 See, for example, the declaration of the External Political 
Committee of the UP, in London from October 14-16 1975, where the 
effect of the DC's rejection of the proposal 
for unity stands out. 
Chilean Communist Party, Boletin del Exterior, No. 14, October- 
November 1975. 
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Beginning in 1977, this general party line was 
reinforced when the dictatorship outlawed the PDC. 
However, it failed ignominiously on the PDC's refusal to 
enter into any agreement with the Left. Moreover, in this 
second period, when conditions seemed optimal for 
consolidation of strategy for the anti-fascist front, the 
ideological discussion changed within the Left and, 
again, the main symptoms were observable within the PS. 
In this period, the axis of the ideological confrontation 
within the Left became the question of democracy and 
social ism. 6 
At this point it is important to establish the 
connections between what happened in Chile and what 
happened abroad among Chilean exiles. At first glance, 
taking the explicit terms in which the ideological 
question was posited, the impression is of an echo of 
world-wide ideological confrontations reproduced among 
the exiles. This seemed to imply a shallow adoption of 
"vogues" such as quotes from Gramsci, historical 
compromise, Euro-communism, the critiques of real 
socialism etc., among Chilean intellectuals. Doubtless, 
there was some of this. In fact, not only the language 
was borrowed but money was as well. Chilean exiles became 
involved, through a sense of international solidarity, in 
6 The problem appeared openly in January 1977 with Julio Silva 
Solar's criticisms of Luis Corvalän's speech in Moscow, January 4 
that same year, in which Corvaldn reaffirmed the strategic validity 
of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Chile-America, No 28. 
hw.. 
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a network of contacts that favoured a democratic outcome 
for Chile through a modified reconstruction of the pre- 
1973 party system. Among the important elements of this 
process was the Socialist International's support of the 
contacts between Socialist and Christian Democrat 
sectors. ' However, this process should not and, 
ultimately, cannot be reduced to a dynamic of individual 
opportunism on the part of the exiles. 
The internal correlative of this confrontation in 
Chile was the PDC's ideological offensive against the 
Left. At the same time that it began distancing itself 
from the dictatorship, the PDC was compelled to justify 
its support of the coup d'etat (which it had never 
condemned) and it did this through an attack on the 
"Leninism" of the UP government. It explicitly proposed 
the formation of a Chilean "Euro-communist" Left with 
which it could negotiate. 8 Given the then-current 
conditions in Chile, the PDC's ideological offensive 
developed fundamentally among the intellectual sectors 
and within this context was quite successful. The reasons 
for its success had to do with the situation in which the 
Left reconstructed its organisations under the 
dictatorship. 
7 The first meeting of this type took place in Colonia Tovar, 
Venezuela from July 7-11 1975. Among those present were Bernardo 
Leighton and Renän Fuentealba, from the DC, and Aniceto Rodriguez 
and Clodomiro Almeyda, of the PS. 
8 Genaro Arriagada Herrera y Claudio Orrego Vicuna, Leninismo y 
democracia, Santiago, 1976. 
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Repression had forced the parties to reccns: ruct 
clandestinely, which gave them very different 
characteristics to the ones they had before 1973. On one 
hand, it established a limit to activity among the 
masses. The organisations could disseminate their 
propaganda clandestinely, but did not have the organic 
channels to measure its response, and even less to gather 
support. The organisations' internal characteristics 
established social and generational divisions that, under 
the dictatorship's conditions, made a large part of the 
party members unable to participate in its activities. 
All this resulted in that, in Chile, sectors that before 
1973 were organised and in many cases subordinate to the 
parties in their political activities, acquired 
ideological independence. Among them, the most important 
were the intellectuals and the labour union cadres. 
The expulsion of the Left's intellectuals from the 
universities placed them in a "market" situation. There 
arose a complex of research institutes and schools which, 
being independent of the state, were not susceptible to 
party intervention as had been the case before 1973. The 
financing on which these new academic institutions 
depended came from the same external sources that 
supported the exiles. When some of the Christian 
Democrats were excluded from the universities, they 
developed common corporate interests with previously 
excluded left wing intellectuals. This made their 
KIL 
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eventual ideological subordiation to the PDC easier. 9 
Also, in the labour sector, the PDC developed a 
relatively successful offensive. Beginning with the 
repression of the Left's labour union cadres and the 
PDC's distancing from the dictatorship, the labour 
movement appeared "available" to the Christian Democrat 
labour cadres. However, the weakness of labour 
organisations under the dictatorship, and the persistence 
of leftist political affiliations amongst the workers in 
general, did not allow them to consummate their purpose, 
despite some important achievements. '0 
In this situation, the socialist cadres that 
directed the clandestine party organisation showed 
shortcomings in facing their own intellectuals on 
ideological ground and their "military" or "apparatchik" 
type tendencies made neither dialogue nor the broadening 
of party influence any easier. " 
An obvious question that arises from the 
observation of this process, is why didn't the DC accept 
the anti-fascist alliance, thus reinforcing the sector's 
9 Harry Diaz, Peter Lanstreet y Maria Teresa Lladser, Centros 
privados de investigaciön en ciencias sociales en Chile, published 
in 1984, records information on 33 centres that appeared during the 
preceding 10 years. 
10 On the first part of the dictatorship, see, Guillermo Campero and 
Jose A. Valenzuela, El movimiento sindical en el regimen militar. 
11 The parties' adaptation to new conditions had a high cost. In 
1977, the list of the missing included eleven members of the PC's 
Central Comittee and some of the main Socialist leaders that had 
stayed in the country. Among them were Excequiel Ponce, Carlos 
Lorca, Ricardo Lagos and Ariel Mancilla. They were replaced by young 
cadres or those who learned a new form of politics. 
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support of the system's reconstruction from within the 
Left? Instead, they positioned themselves against the PC 
leading those sectors that would support the 
reconstruction of the system over an ideological point on 
which it could not give in: Leninism. The answer lies in 
the project the PDC supported: the replacement of social 
alliances by party alliances with one representative 
dominant party, obviously themselves. This meant 
eliminating the class orientation of political 
participation in Chile and the main obstacle this project 
met with was the political and ideological independence 
of the working class, expressed in their Marxist-Leninist 
groups, through the PS and the PC. 
The PDC's ideological proposal began to penetrate 
the Left's elite through its closest area of influence, 
the sectors that came from the DC, the MAPU and the 
Christian Left. 12 There began to be questions about the 
class character of the Socialist projects, Leninism and 
the leadership of the proletariat. Only later would the 
Socialist and even ultra-leftist sectors join this 
ideological proposal. 13 
12 See the essays presented by Julio Silva Solar, Jose Antonio Viera 
Gallo, Sergio Bitar, Claudio Huepe, Pedro Felipe Ramirez, Jose 
Miguel Inzulsa, Esteban Tomic and Herman Schwemberg in the New York 
meeting (1-6 September 1976) sponsored by the Nation Council of 
Churches of the United States. Chile America, No. 25,26,27 November, 
December 1976 and January 1977. 
13 First Christians from the left, MAPU and Christian Left coincided 
in criticising the parties and questioning their social 
representation (Acta de Ariccia, Rome, 13 January 1980). The true 
content of the terms 'renovation" and 'convergence" was revealed in 
the document 'Por la Convergencia Socialista", (Milan, July 1982), 
in which some of the signing members of Ariccia no longer appeared. 
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As for the PC, because of its interna`ior_al 
affiliations, it first had to withstand an ideological 
offensive, 14 and then, abandon, at least apparently, the 
"reconstructionist" blueprint through an alliance with 
the DC. is 
6.3. The Socialist Party in the period after 1973 
The evolution of the PS after the UP's defeat in 1973 
was characterised by a series of internal confrontations 
that ended in expulsions, marginalisations, excisions and 
separations. However, these phenomena, which together 
resembled a process of decomposition, 16 were always 
accompanied by movements that at least in their explicit 
intentions sought to revert the tendency by promotion of 
regrouping. 
A detailed description of these processes is 
impossible, and might not even be very useful. What is 
being attempted here is to propose a more general scheme 
of interpretation that will allow exploration of the 
14 "Despite all the specificities -and there obviously were- in the 
Chilean Revolution, as in all revolutions, no Marxist-Leninist 
thesis can be questioned in light of this experience. On the 
contrary, it confirms it. " Luis Corvaldn, "Como se dio en Chile la 
via no armada". Corvalän, Secretary General of the PC, could not 
accept the discussion of the Marxist-Leninist thesis, that was being 
questioned by left wing Christians and the Socialists linked with 
them. 
15 Luis Corvalän, "El derecho del pueblo a la rebeliön es 
indiscutible". Speech given 3 September 1980. 
16 "The outstanding feature of the PSCh under the military rule is 
the malignant spreading of breakaway factions to the extent that 
there are now [19851 over twenty groups which claim to be Socialist 
offspring. " Benny Pollack and Hernan Rosenkranz. Revolutionary 
Social democracy. The Chilean Socialist Party, p. 167. 
16, 
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meaning of these conflicts, either individual 1- or as a 
whole. To fail to do so would imply accepting the 
explicit terms by which the conflicts themselves appearei 
to be leading to a highly ideological discussion. The 
determination of positions taken therein appears 
obscured by imputations either favourable or pejorative 
made by the actors themselves. 
The main stage for these conflicts was the Chilean 
exile community spread throughout the world. '7 Since 
debates regarding "interior" and "exile" figures 
prominently in discussions between the actors, each 
situation under analysis must be evaluated separately. In 
general, the supposition here is that, regardless of the 
complexity of establishing relations, in the end the main 
internal political conflicts of the PS were determined by 
Chilean political processes and the political actors both 
within and outside the country, and perceptions of those 
processes whether accurate or not. 
The consequences of the 1973 coup d'etat for the PS 
were, to a great extent, foreseeable. Not only was it the 
Left's largest party, but due to its organisation and the 
positions it held it was the most affected by the 
17 One example: Clodomiro Almeyda's designation as Secretary 
General, in 1979 was accepted by organised Socialist groups in 
Austria, Switzerland, Finland, France, Bulgaria, Hungary, Cuba, 
U. S. A., Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, West Germany, Sweden, Belgium, the 
German Democratic Republic, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Venezuela, 
Costa Rica, England, Australia and Norway, in a declaration signed 
by the local heads of the Chilean Socialist Party in all these 
countries. 
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repression in the first period. Its Secre`ar-,, - General 
Carlos Altamirano managed to leave Chile clandestinely 
but a large part of the national leadership suffered one, 
or more, of the three worst forms of the repression: 
imprisonment, exile or death. 18 Despite all this, the 
reconstitution of the PS leadership within Chile was 
relatively quick. In fact, at the end of 1974, there had 
already been two national leaders who had aspired to take 
control of what was left of the organisation but, above 
all, sought recognition of their leadership by Chilean 
Socialists spread all over the world and by the other 
parties of the Left, both Chilean and international. 
The first relatively long official pronouncement of 
any instance of the leadership of the PS in Chile is 
dated March 19,1974 and was issued by the Central 
Committee reconstituted around Excequiel Ponce. This 
document would go down in party history as the "Documento 
de Marzo"19 and would become a necessary reference in all- 
following debates. The moment it was released, the 
Secretary General Carlos Altimirano and other leaders 
installed a headquarters of the party in exile in East 
Berlin. From there they tried to retake control of the 
18 At the beginning of 1974, the balance was: four members of the 
Central Committee and seven regional secretaries dead; twelve 
members of the Central Committee and twenty regional secretaries in 
prison. 
19 `In the heat of battle against fascism, to build the people's 
leading force to insure victory! ", Document of the Chilean Socialist 
Party Central Committee, March 1974 (reproduced in Berlin). 
269 
I 
various party organisations that arose in fferent 
countries as the militant exiles reorganised. Depending 
on where the exiles lived, the reorganisation process 
took on its own characteristics. Shortly thereafter, the 
socialist regrouping took place in the midst of multiple 
conflicts which were channelled into two competing 
factions which faced each other inside Chile. Since it 
is not possible to reconstruct the variety of situations 
that arose in exile, only the main conflicts will be 
mentioned. Also there is no direct way to evaluate the 
influence within the country that each Socialist group 
attributed to itself. However, an effort will be made to 
clarify the criteria being used in each case. 
Criticism of the "Documento de Marzo" by the 
reconstituted Central Committee came from an organisation 
that had not existed in the previous political 
structure . 
20 The Coordinadora Nacional de Regionales 
(National Co-ordinator of Regional Committees, CNR), 
self-proclaimed national leader of the PS, generated a 
document denouncing the desertion of the Central 
Committee and the irregularity of the procedures used for 
its reconstitution in Chile. 
Two fundamental questions formed the main points of 
conflict between the polarised sectors in exile. What 
were the causes of the UP's failure that led to the coup 
20 %Entrevista a un dirigente de la Coordinadora de Regionales del 
Partido Socialista de Chile", Documentos No. 1, Paris, March 1975, 
pp. 3-5. 
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d' etat? And what were the party's and the Chilean Lef `' s 
general prospects within the new situation? These two 
explicit issues, besides the relations, conflictive or 
not, of each group of exiles with the party leadership 
installed in Berlin, ranked in primary importance before 
all other local conflicts. 
On ideological grounds, both the "Document de marzo" 
and the "Entrevista a un dirigente de la coordinadora... " 
revealed a continuity of positions already expressed 
prior to the outcome of the political process in Chile. 
In other words, interpretations from both perspectives, 
with respect to the UP's strategy, reaffirmed arguments 
blaming the other for the final defeat. 21 From that 
evaluation on, propositions with respect to the second 
position were a proposal for the party's reorganisation 
under a leadership that followed the party line. 
However, the conflict also posited an urgent organic 
question: which constituted the leadership of the Chilean 
party? 
Given the party's heterogeneous characteristics the 
exiled leadership did not face the problem immediately. 
It maintained the ambiguity of the situation for almost 
three years. This period was marked by intense 22 
21 See chapter 2. 
22 Only in September 1976, the exile secretariat in Berlin exhorted 
the members of the party constituting the groups called MR-2, 
Coordinadora de Regionales and Direcciön de Consenso, to suspend 
their divisive activities for thirty days. Documento No. 8 del 
Departamento de Difusiön del PSCh en Mexico p. 14. 
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ideological activity in exile and by r'--e reccnstrt---ive 
processes of all the parties of the Left inside and o, -it 
of Chile. This, of course, produced 'n the a 
proliferation of groups, factions and tendencies that 
reproduced their previous composition. However, iT. 
Chile, there were only two groups with apparent 
organisational capabilities, thus they suborjinatei most 
of the more varied external factions. 
The central ideological points were evaluation of 
the defeat and the response from the party's leadership. 
The main organic question depended on acknowledgement (or 
not) of the Central Committee elected at the 1971 
congress of La Serena, of its capacity to reform itself 
during the emergency and even the organisation of a new 
general party congress. 23 
According to the "Documento de Marzo" the main cause 
of defeat in 1973 was the political isolation of the 
proletariat and this, in turn, was the result of an 
inability to impose the hegemony of the proletariat on 
the implementation of the process. It recognised the PS's 
responsibility for these deficiencies because of its 
petit bourgeois leadership and its being the souce of 
23 In the interview with the head of the Coordinadora mentioned in 
footnote 22, he says: "Of the forty five members elected in the last 
ordinary general congress of La Serena, at this time in Chile, there 
are no more than five members of the Central Committee (including 
the Secretary General of the Socialist Youth Federation). These 
members tried to reorganise themselves through the co-option of 
others to integrate them into the Central Committee. However, they 
failed in their attempt to relate to the part; rank-and-file and to 
speak for the rank-and-file which is where the Coordinadora came 
from. " 
272 
politically dissipating tendencies during UP 
government. Mastery of these defects would again be 
possible, according to the document, if the parry's 
reorganisation were based on its previous Marxist- 
Leninist definitions and if the hegemony of the 
proletariat were based on a solid PS-PC alliance that 
would propel an anti-fascist front with a popular, 
democratic and anti-imperialist programme. 24 
Criticism of these positions on the part of the CNR 
began with a different evaluation of the defeat. First 
of all, it considered the 1973 coup as the "defeat of 
reformism". Based on this definition, it proposed the 
creation of a new working class vanguard starting with a 
regrouping of the Socialist rank-and-file it represented, 
and ignoring the reconstituted Central Committee as well 
as the alliances previous to the coup in which the PS 
participated. The new class unity would have to be 
created at the base through the formation of "workers' 
committees", which implied ignoring the leaderships of 
other parties, especially those of the PC, and therefore 
assumed the end of the entire pre-1973 political system. 25 
The PS's overseas leadership accepted the ambiguity 
of the situation and tried to reconcile positions, 
seeking to maintain its leadership status by preserving 
24 "Documento de Marzo", especially pp. 19,39,46,54 and 6! =-63. 
25 "Interview with the top leader of the CNR of the PSCh. Chile, 7 
February 1976". (Mimeographed). 
273 
the unity and heterogeneity of the PS. Ir. the firs 
plenary meeting of the Central Committee (Havana, May 
1975) a representative of the CNR was accepted . 
26 
This first internal conflict, reiterates some of the 
characteristics that are the product of the period's 
general situation,. like, for example, the ideological 
subjects discussed and the organic consequences arising 
from them. Those characteristics also replicate the 
Left's general situation. Evaluation of the defeat only 
repeated anew the positions prior held to the coup; the 
questions regarding the survival of the party system and 
the PS's role in it appeared organically. 
What characterises the conflict is that it 
translated into the PS's own components. The over- 
emphasising of ideological activity of the exiles added 
to the conflicts springing from regrouping in a foreign 
environment contributed to magnifying their internal 
repercussions. This at the same time contributed to 
magnifying the importance of the CNR in its prospective 
of political success. When the conflict was resolved, in 
1977, the main questions were resolved in the general 
tendency of the reconstitution of the Left's 
organisations. 
26 Interview with a participant at the Havana plenum. 
' The episode of the expulsions was very murky. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that all things considered, the departure of the CNR cannot be 
called a split in the party as was the breakaway of 1979. 
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Despite the unquestionable influence of the CNR in 
some organisations of the Socialist Party in exile, when 
the party separated from it, only very minority sectors 
followed the CNR. The conflict was resolved by the 
expulsion of two notable figures of the Socialist Party 
in exile and the marginalisation of small groups. 27 
Taking the Socialist Party as the axis rather than 
the groups that left it, it is noteworthy that in 1977 it 
was only able to reaffirm its organic existence. It 
clearly continued to exist as a party and as part of the 
system of alliances constituted by the Left. Its social 
and ideological heterogeneity persisted. But the very 
departure of the CNR was proof that its function as the 
centre of centrifugal tendencies in the party system was 
weakening, which may be taken as a sign of the 
dictatorship's progress in destroying the political 
system in general. 28 
Once the CNR had split from the PS, it demonstrated 
that it was in no way different from the latter that 
might justify its existence as a party within the party 
system (to which, moreover, it had no desire to belong). 
It showed no considerable progress in generating a new 
8 With respect to CNR policy, particularly its line of unity at the 
base in "worker committees" these do not figure in any way in the 
development of the labour or political movement during all the years 
of the dictatorship. 
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vanguard of the Chilean proletariat. At the first meeting 
of adherents to the CNR in exile, it was shown to be as 
heterogeneous as the PS itself. 29 The result was a process 
of divisions and decompositions of the CNR that reduced 
it to a fraction that retained the characteristics of the 
extra-parliamentary Left that had arisen in Chile in the 
sixties30 and was partially absorbed by the PS during the 
UP experience. 
This first breakaway was not the only one to happen 
in the PS during this first period. At the same time that 
its re-composition required resolution of the situation 
created by the CNR, some influential members split from 
the party. They assumed personal leadership in exile 
assembling a small number of individuals around them but 
participating actively in the ideological struggle, 
expressing opinions about Chile, the party and the 
future. The most noteworthy was Aniceto Rodriguez, who 
"' 'The world meeting [of the CNR in exile] was held last May [1978] 
in Paris. All its agreements and proposals await the COPOL's 
ratification, due to the fact that divergences of form and content 
arose in their development. " Published by Revoluciön (official organ 
of the CNR abroad)N°7, May-July, 1978, p. l. 
30 One of these characteristics was the tendency to minute 
fragmentation. The internal leadership of the CNR denounced members 
who "motivated by political caudillismo and opportunism have 
repeatedly not hesitated to fraudulently and secretly assume the 
name and representation of our National Directorate and Political 
Committee. " Resistencia Socialista, N°10, January-February, 1978, 
p. 11. Furthermore, as a continuation of their "line of rupture" 
during the UP administration, the CNR made agreements with sectors 
that held a similar position in other parties, MAPU, MIR, IC. 
Revoluciön, N° 5, January-February 1978, p. 33. 
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had been secretary General of the PS unties 1971 and who 
established residence in Venezuela. The departure of 
regional and ideological caudillos, whom the PS used to 
absorb when the political system was operative in Chile, 
occurred slowly and without fanfare. 31 However, it is well 
known that none of these groups managed to create a party 
based on the expression of a "pure" form of any of the 
tendencies that coexisted within the PS. 
The greatest intensification of the dictatorship's 
strategy and the lowest point in political party activity 
was witnessed in 1977. The break-up of the political 
system reached its highest level in 1980 and the tendency 
would not be reversed until 1983. Even so, this period 
generated the greatest ideological activity to the extent 
that party activity became introverted and that, in 
Chile, intellectuals sought, found and conquered spaces 
independent of the parties in which to express their 
political proposals. 32 
It is in this period that the ideological offensive 
against "Leninism' and the dictatorship of the 
31 Adherence to CNR of Mario Palestro, caudillo of the San Miguel 
commune in Santiago still causes curiosity. His positions bore no 
resemblance whatsoever to the general postulates of the CNR. See 
Resistencia Socialista N°9, October-November 1977, pp 46-50. 
32 Press activity by intellectuals holding identifiable political 
posts came to substitute for the relationship between the political 
parties and their clienteles, both among supporters of the 
dictatorship and the opposition. The latter gradually found and 
received space in the mass media. 
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proletariat - disputes raised abroad and in Chile - was 
echoed within the PS. The fact that conflicts were 
resolved by the PS office in Berlin broached the matter 
of authoritarianism from outside leadership on one hand, 
and the loss of party independence on the international 
scene due to dependence on the GDR for its foreign office 
on the other. The same was true domestically because the 
Communist Party could use its contacts with the 
governments of Socialist countries to pressure the PS 
leadership to adopt positions more coincident with their 
own. 33 In response, its critics emphasised their financial 
dependence upon the Socialist parties of Western Europe 
and their inclination toward positions characteristic of 
those kinds of parties . 
34 
In Chile, the differences between the clandestine 
leadership and groups of intellectuals grew for different 
reasons. The ideological gap between the "apparatchiki" 
of the leadership and the "sociologists" who found 
possibilities of expression under the conditions of the 
dictatorship, was evident. It must be remembered that 
these were the years of the "consumerist" boom among the 
33 According to Carlos Altamirano, Chilean socialism ought to be 
"non-aligned" ab origine. It should not rely on any 'Marxist- 
Leninist dogma". Remarks by Carlos Altamirano to Marcel Niedergang, 
Le Monde, May 5,1979. 
34 Clodomiro Almeyda, 'All advances have their cost", interview in 
Sweden, May 1979 (mimeographed). 
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Chilean middle classes that contributed to a 
demobilisation and consequent disarticulation of the 
political parties in general. 
When the conflict exploded in April 1979, the PS 
suffered its most serious division. On the ideological 
side the positions outlined above were reaffirmed, but 
organically little was resolved. The leadership in Chile 
reaffirmed itself as a clandestine apparatus but under 
the conditions of general retreat by the parties. The PS 
lost standing amongst intellectual groups in Chile 
whereas in exile, organisations in general were weakened 
not only by the division, but because the wear and tear 
of the internal conflict contributed to a growing number 
of exiles leaving party activity altogether. 
If there is one characteristic shared by both 
sectors after 1979 it is heterogeneity. Even so, within 
this movement of general retreat, Almeyda's PS was still 
able to preserve the unity of its heterogeneous sectors 
until 1983 because of its role with respect to the rest 
of the Left. On the other hand, Altamirano's sector 
revealed a different composition between the e:.: iles and 
those supporting them in Chile. In fact, in Chile, they 
associated themselves with a small apparatus left over 
from the Castro-ism of the sixties which was absorbed 
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into the PS during the UP government and preserved its 
autonomous structure as a fraction of the PS throughout 
all those years. 35 With the intention of settling 
ideological and organic questions once and for all and 
producing a regular and legitimate Central Committee, the 
Altamirano sector called the 24th party congress (which 
assumed the name PS 24 Congress). Just as in the 
experience of the CNR, the Altamirano sector did not 
survive the confrontation and divided. This time the 
result was two PS 24 congresses: one basically 
constituted by the Castro-ist faction mentioned above 
(MR-2) and the other consisting principally of middle 
class intellectual sectors inclined toward social 
democracy. 
6.4 The re-composition of the Left in the '80s 
The period of retreat ended with the plebiscite of 
1980. In it, the dictatorship consolidated its strategy 
of a new political structure by causing the approval of 
its new Constitution in which the role of the political 
parties remained undefined but limited. 36 The campaign 
preceding the plebiscite provided the first occasion for 
a meeting of opposition masses organised under the 
35 The MR-2. 
36 Constitution of 1980, article 8, eliminated in 1989, and article 
19, No. 15. See chapter 3 above. 
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leadership of the Christian Democrats, but in which the 
Left reaffirmed its presence. The most unexpected event 
in the days prior to the plebiscite, however, was the 
speech by Luis Corvalän, General Secretary of the PC, in 
which he affirmed the peoples' right to rebellion and the 
use of violence 37. In the same speech he reaffirmed the 
alliance of the Left constituted by Unidad Popular. 
Setting aside the causes of an event such as this change 
of course by the Chilean PC after so many years of being 
the principal promoter of the peaceful way to socialism, 
it can only be interpreted as an indicator of the depth 
of disarticulation of the party system which led to 
abandoning attempts at an alliance with the Christian 
Democrats. From that moment on, the Left as a whole was 
divided in a new way. On one side, what remained of 
Unidad Popular, as well as the new Left, now grouped 
without differences that might exclude MIR and other 
movements or fractions previously discarded as ultra- 
left. On the other side was a group that in July 1982 
launched the manifesto "For a Socialist Convergence", 38 a 
call for "the ideological, political and organic renewal 
of Socialism". With the signatures supporting the 
document, this meant the rejection of the party structure 
37 Quoted in note 17. 
38 "Por la Convergencia Socialista", (mimeo), p. 4. 
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and the incorporation of individuals until then: foreign 
to the Socialist Party of Chile into the movement of 
exiles. It is on this basis that later, when the Nüne: 
faction of the PS reorganised, it was joined by members 
of MAPU, MAPU-OC and MIR. 
The process of re-composition of the Left did not 
arise solely out of its internal dynamics. The processes 
determining it were on two external and more general 
levels. They were constituted by the crisis of the 
dictatorship on the one hand, and on the other by the 
reconstruction of the political party system, the axis of 
which was formed by the Christian Democrats. Previous 
chapters have described how the economic crisis of the 
early '80s provoked opposition social mobilisation. This 
reactivated the professional political elite which set 
out to reconstruct their party organisations. This 
movement as a whole tipped the balance from the forces of 
the dictatorship toward the construction of political 
parties and ensured the projection of the regime in that 
direction rather than toward other alternatives. 
Under the conditions prevalent in 1983, the Left saw 
the chance to put an end to the dictatorship by means of 
social mobilisation and launched itself to promote that 
mobilisation by popular protests. However, as 
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demonstrated above, the political parties and 
particularly the Christian Democrats very quickly placed 
themselves at the head of those mobilisations, seeking 
control of the transition from the dictatorship via the 
reconstruction of the party system of which they were 
undoubtedly best situated to become the axis. 
The lines of action coexisting in the Left seem 
paradoxical at first glance. Social mobilisation 
reactivated old groups in Chile and abroad that had 
suffered a sharp fall in their levels of activity after 
the dictatorship was successful in its attempt to impose 
its new Constitution by means of the plebiscite. This 
raised doubts about the very possibility of instigating 
opposition action through a party apparatuses which 
existed under progressively more precarious conditions 
due to the repression. This predicament, in turn, 
strengthened two divergent tendencies. The first was the 
militarism or "apparatus-ism" of the youngest and most 
radicalised sectors under the conditions of the 
dictatorship. Among them those who achieved the most 
development were members of the Frente Patriötico Manuel 
Rodriguez (FPMR), linked to the Communist Party. -- h: e 
second tendency assembled intellectual sectors of the 
middle class reinforced within Chile by assistan: e from 
abroad and over-represented in the exile community. The 
hik. - 
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latter questioned the representativity of the parties as 
such, that is as models of organisation for the 
expression of social sectors. At first, the situation 
created by protests against the dictatorship and its 
social rather than its political base seemed to support 
both positions. Both sides faced the problem of how to 
bind themselves to the social protest movement. The 
militant sector, or "Rodriguist militias", tried to 
create an appropriate organisation for struggle in the 
streets to which the protests gave rise. Meanwhile, in 
the political elite sectors of the middle class there was 
a proliferation of "referents", groups of politicians and 
intellectuals wishing to participate in the discussions 
and search for alternatives to political solutions which, 
even supporters of the dictatorship, perceived as 
unsustainable. 
The reactivation of the old political elite and the 
situation created in the Socialist party by disputes and 
divisions from previous decades placed the Christian 
Democrats in a situation of axis and arbiter of the 
elements with which the political party system would be 
reconstructed. The nucleus about which the Socialist 
Party of Chile was finally reconstituted was composed of 
cadres grouped around Ricardo Nunez and Carlos Briones. 
They were joined by Jorge Arrate after his return ro 
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Chile from exile in Holland. For this reason, cIurinü ýý e 
1980s the organisation eventually became known as PS- 
Briones, PS-Nunez and PS-Arrate. The other important 
fraction that only joined the final reunification in 1989 
was led and directed at all times throughout the period 
under the name of Clodomiro Almeyda. These groups 
preserve roots traceable to the Salvador Allende's 
Socialist party. Around them fluctuated other minor 
Socialist groups of the same genesis. 39 To these diverse 
groups of cadres of the professional political elite 
finally gravitated whose origins were different but who, 
to a large extent, assumed ultimate control of the party 
in the system reconstructed after the 1988 plebiscite. 
Between the plebiscite and Aylwin's election as 
president, the conditions under which the political 
process of reconstruction developed determined the final 
form of the organisations of the Left in a recomposed and 
redesigned party system. 
The preceding chapter described how possible lines 
of action defined alliances within the ideological 
restrictions that each party determined. The line that 
finally dominated the process was the one defined by the 
Christian Democrats as the axis of reconstruction of the 
39 Among the 16 parties constituting the Accord for the NO, on 
February 2,1988, there are five of more or giess remote origin in ~he 
former PS. 
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party system. However it wavered with respect `o social 
mobilisation, a weakness which reflected its internal 
conflicts and the struggles for leadership. The 
insurmountable limitations of the Christian Democrat 
strategy stemmed from its specific aim to isolate the 
Communists and its more general aim of attracting and 
subordinating all Socialists to their strategy. 
The goals and transformations of the various 
Socialist factions were framed by the same limits, with 
the additional drawback of being the permanent target of 
a repressive action or the threat of repressive action by 
the dictatorship. In August 1983, the first significant 
alliance of a faction of the PS with the Christian 
Democrats and without the Communists was the Alianza 
Democrätica with the participation of the PS Briones- 
Nunez. In September of the same year, the other important 
faction, the PS-Almeyda formed the Movimiento Popular 
Democrätico (MDP), with the Communists, the MIR and 
Izquierda Cristiana. The obvious difference being that 
the AD came to Jarpa for a dialogue, excluding the 
Communists from that alliance in spite of their attempts 
to be included. 40 Only at the close of that year, with the 
40 Cavallo et al. op. cit. 413 
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failure of the attempt to negotiate with the AD, did the 
Frente Patriotico Manuel Rodriguez (FPMR) go into action. 
In 1984, there was great ideological activity 
amongst the leadership of the political parties that 
would have significant consequences. At the same time 
that social mobilisation and the dictatorship's response 
of repression continued, Aylwin, as the vice president of 
the Christian Democrats, proposed his thesis of a search 
for a "negotiated end" to the dictatorship. He did this 
in a seminar attended not only by intellectuals and 
Socialist leaders but also by "organic" intellectuals of 
the dictatorship. 41 
The leadership of the party was reinforced by the 
return of exiled leaders and the next attempt at 
negotiation, promoted by the Archbishop of the Catholic 
Church in 1985, was attended by leaders of Izquierda 
Cristiana. Several important features of the political 
process emerged during the dictatorship's decline: 
first, the process of self-selection amongst the 
political elite, that is, the weight that recognition 
amongst peers carried in the absence of criteria of 
representativity to allow individuals to qualify for 
participation. Second, the ideological-practical 
41 See previous chapter. 
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character of the matters at hand, that is, the 
significance of proposals for institutional arrangements 
in terms of the correlation of forces in favour or 
against the blueprint for national development presented 
by the dictatorship. 
The principal Socialist component in all these 
dealings was the faction led by Nünez and Ricardo Lagos 
or other lesser representatives. This is the group that 
best undertook the ideological and membership overhaul 
begun by the manifesto for Socialist Convergence of 1982. 
The firmness with which Pinochet pursued his objectives 
caused those who tended to negotiate to hesitate, so the 
maintenance of Socialist unity became key. This, however, 
remained an abstract aspiration as long as the Socialist 
fraction, Almeyda's, remained united to the Communists 
and, in the conditions of the 1980s, to the 
insurrectionist Left. 
In the light of seemingly interminable difficulties 
regarding alliances and ideological limitations, more 
practical participants sought new ways to unify 
opposition to the dictatorship. Some "realistic" 
politicians also perceived the possibility of reordering 
priorities. Thus, at the beginning of 1987 the idea arose 
of an organisation that would unify the opposition behind 
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one single objective, democracy42. This is the earliest 
instance of the idea that would subsequently permit 
reorganisation of part of the Socialists into `: he 
"instrumental" party, the Partido por la Democracia 
(PPD) . The idea, whose strongest advocate was Ricardo 
Lagos, to some extent voiced the opinion of a sector of 
generally Socialist intellectuals like himself, who 
considered the debate justifying the multiplication of 
Socialist fractions and groups to be overly ideological. 
This group was known as "the Swiss". 
With respect to their original priorities, the 
political laws handed down in early 1987 put all the 
politicians and all organisations into another dimension. 
The opening of the election rolls to citizens and the law 
of political parties made their decisions more urgent. 
Nevertheless, it was the practical criteria that hid the 
ideological conditions under which the "normalisation" of 
political life was being carried out. The Constitution 
and the law of political parties established ideological 
and organisational exclusions and limitations that meant 
many radical changes in the party system in comparison to 
how it had existed before 1973. The acceptance of These 
rules and the correlation of forces that Christian 
Democrat hegemony imposed on the reconstruction of the 
° Rafael Otano, op. cit. p. 46. 
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party system was the price paid by the parties entering 
the system and by the professional politicians to 
continuing to exercise their profession. 
The PS-Nunez constituted the organised nucleus 
within the PPD, which nevertheless attracted a large 
number of political cadres from the broad spectrum of the 
ideological tendencies known as Socialist "renovaciön" or 
renewal, and of which Socialist "convergence" had been 
the most organic. This included members of the various a 
breakaway groups from the Christian Democrats during the 
'60s and '70s (MAPU and IC). There were also independents 
on the Left and Communists who had been disoriented by 
the militarising of their party's politics at the same 
time that in the Soviet Union reforms, that had been 
unforeseeable, were being undertaken. 
There were still sectors that resisted some aspects 
of the new imposed conditions, especially the isolation 
of the Communists, and who generated another 
"instrumental" party, the Partido Amplio de la Izquierda 
Socialista, or PAIS. 
The framework of restrictions within which the re- 
composition and reconstruction of the parties was carried 
out was defined by the situation of the ideological 
forces in the elite; the legal framework imposed by the 
kkil, 
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dictatorship; and, finally, the electoral result of the 
whole historical process reflected in the general 
elections of December 1989. 
The ideological defeat of traditional Chilean Left 
thinking was expressed in the subordination of the 
Socialists to the Christian Democrats, their separation 
from the Communists and new definitions of the problems 
they considered important43. The document of unity between 
the Arrate and Almeyda sectors brought about on December 
29,1989, the Bases doctrinarias y politicas del Partido 
Socialista de Chile, defined the ideological foundation 
of the party with a scope that would have perplexed pre- 
1973 Social ists94. This union included besides PS-Arrate 
and PS-Almeyda, MAPU and MAPU-0C45. 
The electorate had already expressed its opinion in 
mid-December in electing Aylwin as president, as well as 
43 Describing the discussion of the possible entry of the PS-Nunez 
into Izquierda Unida en 1988, Rafael Otano notes that the debate 
showed 'the paralysis implied in joining a conglomerate that would 
again float boring and sterile discussions of armed struggle, 
alliances, the impossibility of negotiating with the military 
regime... " op. cit. p. 47. 
44 "Today there is in Chilean Socialism a re-encounter of the diverse 
emancipating and revolutionary directions of the contemporary world, 
that restate their diverse origins and experiences, inserted into 
the critical matrix of capitalist society, from Marxist thought 
enriched and rectified by all the contributions of scientific and 
social progress, from the development of the best humanistic 
traditions and the creative contribution of values of solidarity and 
liberation in the Christian tradition. " Bases doctrinarias y 
politicas del Partido Socialist de Chile, December 1989, (mimeo), 
p. 3. 
45 Rafael Otano, op. cit. p. 92. 
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the corresponding part of the Senate an the e-.: ire 
Chamber of Deputies. Legal restrictions caused the 
Socialists to appear in this election as members of 
diverse organisations (PPD) or as independents. The 
problem lay with the electoral rolls that included only 
the "instrumental" parties, the PPD and the PAIS. These 
elections determined the exclusion of the Communists from 
parliament and the failure of the PAIS infused realism 
into those who still thought the Left, with the 
Communists included, could be incorporated into the 
system. 46 
Some reforms of the Constitution were negotiated 
between the 1988 plebiscite and the elections of 1989. 
Principal among these was the elimination of Article 8 
containing proscription for ideological reasons. The 
distinctions that separated the political parties from 
social movements remained in the Constitution and in the 
organic constitutional law of political parties47. 
Furthermore, an addition was made in May 1989 to the 
Organic Constitutional Law on Popular Voting and 
Scrutiny, article 109bis, which established the 
"binomial" system for assigning parliamentary seats. This 
40 In this sense, the most noteworthy failure was the canüica`y of 
Luis Maira, leader of Izquierda Cristiana. 
. 37 See chapter 3 above. 
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had a double stabilising affect on the sys err. by 
favouring the first minority (the Right has been the 
great beneficiary of this feature) and pushing the 
parties toward the formation of large blocs and 
alliances. 8 (The 9 most widely commented effect of this 
system in 1989 was the defeat of Ricardo Lagos as 
candidate for senator from Santiago, where Jaime Guzman 
was elected with fewer votes than Lagos). Finally, in 
1990 the Socialists accepted all of the new order and 
registered their party, fulfilling all the requirements 
stipulated by the law (which contains regulations 
referring to the organisation and internal life of the 
parties), 49 recording to this end a declaration of 
principles similar in its terms to the Bases 
doctrinarias... cited earlier. 50 Toward the end of 1990 the 
Communist Party also fulfilled the requirements for legal 
"° Article 109 bis: "In the case of parliamentary elections, the 
tribunal shall proclaim elected senators or deputies the two 
candidates on the same list when that list reaches the majority 
number of votes and has a total number of votes that exceeds double 
those received by the next largest list or register that follows it 
in number of votes. " 
"If no list obtain the two seats, each of the lists or registers 
obtaining the two highest majorities of total votes by list or 
register shall elect to one seat, the Tribunal proclaiming elected 
Senators or Deputies those candidates or deputies who, within each 
list or register, shall obtain the highest majorities. " 
a° Title IV, On the internal organisation of parties prohibits the 
participation of leaders of social organisations (associations and 
labour unions) and guarantees a role in the party to parliamentary 
representatives. 
50 Declaration of principles in the legal registration of the 
Socialist party (1990) Cuadernos del Aviön Rojo, year I, N°1, pp. 73- 
75). 
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registration, collecting more than 60,000 signatures. 5' 
However, its political isolation, its abandonment by its 
Socialist allies, its ideological decadence caused by the 
slowness of its changes52 which caused politicians and 
intellectuals to depart from the organisation, all 
translated into electoral failures, condemning it to an 
extra-parliamentary life yet with a degree of 
unquestionable value in the ideological struggle to 
rewrite recent history53 and electoral capital that may 
become decisive in a draw between the large blocs. 56 
sl Rafael Otano, op. cit. p. 130. 
,5 See Proyecto de nuevo programa del partido Comunista de Chile, 
document for discussion by the Party and the people, prepared by the 
Central Committee, November 1991; and Estatutos del partido 
Comunista de Chile, Approved in the 20th National Congress of the 
Party, 1994, and Reformed in the 2nd National Conference, 1997.. 
53 The PC never failed to support the relatives of the victims of the 
dictatorship. 
56 The contribution of the Communist vote to Lagos' victory over 
Lavin in the second round of the 1999 presidencial election is still 
a matter of discussion. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusions. 
The characteristics that the parties assume individually 
as a result of their participation in a party system do 
not seem to merit the same attention as the 
characteristics that individual party ideologies produce 
in the system of which they are a part. The existence of 
an overall ideological level, characteristic of the 
system, appears as a concern in another kind of 
theorising which seeks to establish the foundation of the 
political order at a more abstract level. The 
consequences of the establishment of an ideology of the 
system as a whole, point toward relations of 
subordination between political actors, justified on 
ideological and political grounds, but that are presented 
normally as individual characteristics of leaders and 
organisations ("realism", "pragmatism" etc. ). The system 
sets the limits not only of what is possible in action 
but also the limits of programmatic discourses and, as 
has been demonstrated here, may indeed reach the limits 
of the thinkable or conceivable on intellectual grounds 
as a condition of becoming or remaining a professional 
politician. 
What has been made evident in the case studied here 
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is the genesis of a system, out of a brutal, physica 
confrontation, which resulted in the political and 
ideological subordination of a cohort of professional 
politicians who, having participated in another earlier 
system founded on a different ideology on the whole, and 
individually assumed positions differing from those that 
they maintain today. The system's dynamic establishes 
ideological limits that determine the acceptance and 
recognition of participants by their "peers", i. e. the 
other politicians already established in negotiations 
whereby the system is structured. There may be 
politicians who continue to operate on the same terms 
that they developed from the positions maintained before 
1973, but, undoubtedly, they are not part of the system 
or, at the very most, they subsist on its periphery. The 
party system, like any other social system, prolongs 
itself by producing the elements, parties and individuals 
that have the characteristics that permit its functioning 
and its reproduction, by means of the practice of 
relations that constitute it as such. 
The most widely disseminated images of the process 
that led Chile from democracy to dictatorship and back to 
democracy again contain explicit interpretations of the 
causal mechanisms in action. Normally, these appear as 
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judgements about the individual or collective actors, for 
example, the "mistakes" made by Allende and his 
administration as the cause of the coup d'etat of 1973, 
or the democratic spirit of the Chilean people in the 
plebiscite of 1988 that put an end to the dictatorship. 
There is a level at which these judgements are 
undeniable, and which justifies their place in common 
sense. However, they are also part of the justifications 
formulated by the actors for their own role in the story, 
which makes them highly suspect when used in the field of 
political science. This dissertation seeks to move beyond 
these types of explanations as they too easily allow the 
actors to repeat once again the same justifications they 
offered at the time. The danger of these types of 
overly-simplistic explanations taking on the legitimacy 
of "analysis" is all too present. In other words, it has 
been attempted to locate a mechanism of the production of 
events on a different level, that constitutes an 
explanation of the events and not a mere reiteration of 
descriptions based on value judgements about the actors. 
This does not mean that this analysis takes no position 
with respect to the process, its actors and its results. 
What is important, however, is that the foundation of 
this analysis does not satisfy itself with that reductive 
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position. 
The party system has been presented here as the 
mechanism determining the positions and the actions of 
all the parties participating in any way and in any form 
in it. Two features of the party system have been 
emphasised: first, its having an ideology that sets 
limits which, in practice, modulate, correct and may even 
contradict the ideological expressions of parties that 
constitute it; and, second its determination by means of 
ideological limits the probabile entry and continuance of 
individuals in the professional association of politics, 
which they enter either as individuals or preferably 
through the parties. This is what associates the 
ideological schema with a corporative interest among 
politicians as a professional body. 
The explanation offered in this dissertation for the 
breakdown of the democratic system is centred on the 
crisis over an ideology of the party system that reached 
limits in its strategy for a peaceful transition to 
socialism. This, in turn, expressed the demands of all 
the social sectors mobilised as electoral clienteles and 
as the militant rank-and-file of parties whose leading 
cadres saw their representativity threatened by the 
appearance of alternatives of political action that fell 
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outside the party system. This radicalisation of the 
overall party system had its counterpart in the growth of 
alternatives outside the system at the other end of the 
ideological spectrum. Some of these were pre-existing 
and others appeared for the occasion provoked by the 
crisis represented by the victory of Allende and Unidad 
Popular in the 1970 elections. The development of this 
crisis led to the sharpening of the conflict, to the 
point that the very existence of the party system was 
placed in question. On the Left, the government was able 
to subordinate rupture-inclined sectors to its strategy 
of defence and maintenance of the political system as 
instrument and framework for social and economic change. 
On the right, the pro-rupture position was imposed by a 
process of decay which progressively subordinated the 
actors participating in the party system to a strategy 
formulated outside the system and that would have had no 
chance of foreseeable success if the system had not been 
destroyed. 
Once the coup d'etat had taken place, the right wing 
bloc that had supported it as opposition to the 
government had to replace its negative consensus by a 
proposal to reconfigure the system. It is at this point 
that the armed forces assumed a critical role as the 
. 
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apparatus of repression that fixed the terms off a 
political recess and thereafter the suppression of the 
political parties. This imposed a radical reform of 
Chile's model for economic development and the remaking 
of the political system by means of a new constitution. 
In this process, the situation described above for the 
government of Unidad Popular appeared inverted. This 
time it was the opposition that saw to the reconstruction 
of the party system while the dictatorship and its 
supporters at their most extreme opposed the very 
existence of political parties or at least postponed 
their reappearance to an unspecified future. 
The opposition to the dictatorship fundamentally 
agreed to the necessity of reconstructing the party 
system. However, each faction had its own version of the 
changes that the reconstruction should include. For the 
Communist Party, the reconstruction should have been 
undertaken on the basis of an antifascist alliance that 
would include the parties all of Unidad Popular and 
Democracia Cristiana. The latter, having succeeded in its 
purpose of overthrowing Allende, promptly shifted to the 
side of the vanquished upon being excluded as an 
organisation and as a strategy for the future by those 
sectors that took over power in the shadow of the armed 
la. 
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forces. 
Only the actions of the dictatorship pushed the 
Christian Democrats onto the side of the opposi`ion, 
while the Left suffered a process of decomposition 
particularly visible in the Socialist Party and in the 
frustrations of the Communists who saw their strategy 
becoming more sterile day by day. The retreat of the 
parties reached its extreme in 1980, at the same time as 
the culmination of the dictatorship's projects. By then 
all the parties seemed to be irreconcilable, with the 
exception of the Christian Democrats which, more than any 
other party, maintained its identity but was incapable of 
producing political events on its own initiative. The 
isolation of the parties from their electoral clienteles, 
the disarticulation of rank-and-file organisations by the 
repression, the exposure of the elites to international 
ideological debates through the exile community and their 
growing dependency on the solidarity of like-minded 
political organisations brought about an ideological 
evolution that caused them to doubt the very idea of the 
social representativity of political parties in a 
democratic regime. This was the beginning of the 
dictatorship's ideological victory. 
The imposition of a national blueprint is a process 
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by means of which those who are to be in the subordinate 
position accept the limits of the blueprint as the limits 
of what is possible. This is a highly complex process 
that involves all the sectors producing ideology and, in 
a technocratic age such as our own, most particularly the 
social sciences. The ideological revolution carried out 
on the right had as its cutting-edge a group of 
neoclassical economists who, allied with thoroughly 
reactionary sectors restructured the Chilean economy 
while their associates wrote a new constitution. The 
most traditional Chilean right never completely accepted 
this blueprint but remained subordinated in a bloc that 
was urgently required to defend the dictatorship and its 
works from the first symptoms of the decomposition of its 
social support in 1983. 
The opposition took the initiative in 1983 without a 
model of organisation or any clearer ideology. The very 
situation of decomposition in which it found itself and 
its doubts about the model of party organisation 
facilitated its parallel coexistence with the developing 
movement that sought an end to the dictatorship. This 
movement functioned in three ways: mass rebellion based 
on social protest, always suspicious of attempts by the 
parties to channel their movement; guerrilla military 
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strategy supported by armed action within the social 
protest, and efforts by the parties to reconstruct or 
renew a professional political elite that would be 
capable of negotiating the terms of an opening for 
political and social participation within the framework 
of the dictatorship's national blueprint. 
Recognition of this last as a reality of the Chilean 
transition is not very popular among those who were its 
political actors. But this has been established even in 
versions have no connection to Left-wing criticism, such 
as the work by historian Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt, first as 
an article of opinion in the daily El Mercurio and later 
expressed in detail in a book. ' The problem posited by 
this situation is that its critique is sterilised in the 
denunciation of the political operators who carried out 
the pacts. 
Referring to the above, Rafael Otano, chronicler of 
this transition and much quoted in previous chapters, 
establishes that "majority opinion accepts that the 
collective actors who have gained the most in this 
political business of the transition have been the Armed 
Forces, the Catholic Church, the entrepreneurs, El 
1 El Mercurio, January 22,1998 and El Chile perplejo. Del avanzar 
sin transar al transar sin parar. 
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Mercurio, the malls, and also Concertaciön de Partios 
para la Democracia. The losers have been the trade 
unions, the world of classic laicism, the traditional 
Left, progressive Christian's and community 
organisations 2 
The view presented in the preceding chapter's 
reveals the chain of ideological subordination 
progressively established for membership in the political 
elite, which reconstructed itself as the basis of 
recognition among "peers". This race was unleashed by the 
social protest, in the first place, and later by the 
eagerness to assume the supposed representativity 
conferred to the party with which one could legitimately 
undertake negotiations. Negotiation among the parties of 
the dictatorship and the tendency among the Christian 
Democrats led Patricio Aylwin to struggle first for 
leadership within his party and then for leadership of an 
alliance of parties that would accept the itinerary 
contained in Pinochet's constitution for the 
normalisation of Chile's political life. This process 
implied subordinating social protests to the dictated 
line and eliminating the vestiges of failed militant 
structures created by some sectors of the Left, 
` Op. cit., p. 11. 
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principally the Communist Party. At the other er of -he 
spectrum, the right needed to organise itself as a party. 
In fact it appeared as two new parties in spite of the 
ideological repugnance felt in some sectors for this 
model of organisation since at least the 1960s. 
The political modernisation introduced by this 
reconstructed party system is centred on the separation 
of social movements from parties. Social atomisation and 
barriers to the intervention of social organisations in 
political parties and vice versa, was established in the 
Constitution, and reinforced by an electoral system 
designed in the light of the results of the 1988 
plebiscite. The intent was to stabilise the system, 
guaranteeing a representativity to the right that would 
impede fundamental changes to the Constitution. The 
Constitution itself contains features that guarantee its 
immutability. 
Exclusion of the Left, and in particular the 
Communists which continues to think of its existence as a 
political act representing a social class, was completed 
after Aylwin's election, mainly by the subordination o 
the Almeyda wing of the Socialist Party to leadership 
controlled by the "renewed" sectors. Ideological 
adaptations have been made obligatory by the laws 
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regulating the existence of political parries and Their 
participation in elections. 
The stability of pre-1973 democracy ha been 
guaranteed by denying campesinos the right to independent 
organisation and by control of their votes by landowners. 
This resulted in the overrepresentation of the rural 
sector once deputies were assigned by districts. In the 
new democracy stability has been achieved by a 
combination of the independence of the political elite 
with respect to social organisations and movements, plus 
an electoral system that favours the formation of 
coalitions in which ideological control is easier. The 
result of this is that the ideology of the political 
parties loses importance in the face of the pragmatism of 
electoral strategies. These are progressively more like 
marketing strategies for any other product directed at 
individual consumers grouped by practical criteria of 
classification of demands and not by an analysis of the 
structure of society that assigns them some collective 
characteristic that might transform them into historical 
actors. 
Criticism of this state of affairs has concentrated 
on the ideological content of the imposed national 
blueprint and the consequences of the subordination of 
306 
the political elite. Omitting part of the Left, the 
Communists, from representation causes the ideological 
spectrum represented in parliament to appear displaced 
towards the right. This is particularly evident when 
comparing today's spectrum to those of parliaments 
previous to 1973: the UDI, included in today's parliament 
as representing the right, was then considered an extra- 
parliamentary group because of its right wing leanings. 
Debate inspired by the problem of the social 
representativity of the alliance in the government 
generated by levels of observable abstention in the 
parliamentary elections of December 1997, disappeared as 
a matter of electoral strategy in the presidential 
elections of 1999 in which positions, rather than 
ideological problems, were treated as attitudes and 
states of mind. What began as a debate over the the 
perception held by some sectors within the coalition of 
government parties regarding the transition from 
dictatorship, eventually ended in the mocking of such 
concerns as "self-indulgent" and "self-flagellating". 3 
Beyond these questions, which occupy an important 
place in the debates in Chilean social sciences on the 
See my article "Democratizacion y Transiciön en Chile" in Perfiles 
lationamericanos, Number 14, June 1999. 
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significance of the dictatorship in the modernisation of 
the country and the recovery of democracy, the case 
presented in this dissertation may hold some significance 
for theoretical discussions about parties and party 
systems. In large measure, the characteristics assumed 
by the Chilean experience are not particularly original. 
In fact, they are justified as an expression of the 
general process of change. 
161k, 
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METHODOLOGICAL NOTES 
Every methodological decision taken was subordinated to 
the interpretative hypothesis. This is natural in a 
historical research project. The main task to be carried 
out in this regard was the search for correlational 
elements that were visible as definable units of 
analysis. That is to say, the political parties viewed as 
part of a system, and therefore defined by the relations 
they establish and the role they play in it. 
The existence of such a system, or at least a 
nucleus of one formed by the main parties, is shown by 
their pre-eminence in Congress [Parliament] during the 
1932 - 1970 period. They successfully prevented the 
consolidation of an alternative political model, so 
common throughout the rest of Latin America. The 
composition of the lower chamber is clear evidence of 
this dynamic. Concomitantly, the attraction of the 
professional politicians to the main parties is 
established through statistical (correlation) analysis 
that indicates that individual parliamentary careers were 
dependent upon their joining one of the main parties, 
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even though they may have been elected to the chamber for 
the first time by a centrifugal political force. 
The cohesion of the members of the political 
profession, organised in these main parties, and their 
joint administration of the country, through she 
interplay of alliances in government and in parliament, 
was made possible by the existence of a national 
development project shared by all of them. This 
constituted a common ideology, relegating to a second 
plane other statements of individual party programmes. In 
this way, these programmes became alternative strategies 
for the attainment of a common goal. Analysis of the 1970 
presidential campaign documents shows this clearly. 
The Salvador Allende government saw the erosion of 
the relationships that made up the party system, to the 
point where the mere existence of the system was at 
issue. Both sides within the system had to compete 
against proposals and alternative elites emerging from 
the fringes or even from outside the system. The 
evolution of the balance of forces within: each side, any 
between the two of them, produced the final breakdown of 
the system in 1973. 
To make this process visible, a rereading, and 
indeed, an essential revision of ic. `uments and 
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contemporary accounts was required. These revealed a very 
variable degree of consciousness among the main actors 
about the meaning of their actions. This required viewing 
social and political history as a struggle, a process of 
conflict, in which the final result is anything but 
planned or wished by any of the forces taking part in it. 
The difficulties faced in the third chapter are 
those involved in any attempt to bring to light the 
necessary connections of three processes that have been 
separated by the present dominant ideology. Established 
thinking about the period under study would like to 
suggest that the economic development model was 
beneficial and necessary, and connected only incidentally 
with the reconstruction of the political system and only 
chronologically (and regretfully) to a bloody 
dictatorship. This necessarily renders a very repetitive 
account of the events that marked the years of military 
rule. 
The last process, the reconstruction of the 
political system started as a renewing of the relations 
that brought together the elite of professional 
politicians. First, the reconstruction of the party 
system appeared as an alternative to the dictatorship, 
but the process of redefinition of the external 1 r. i-_s of 
kfkl 
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the party system and the alliances taking place within 't 
were directed to make impossible a repetition of the 1970 
events. In this way, the new democratic party syst-err. 
shared the goals of the dictatorship. 
Although interviews were conducted with political 
leaders of the right, left and centre at various times in 
the last years, their content was not used in the thesis 
as evidence due to the self-justificatory tone of most of 
the answers to the questions about the main events of the 
period. On the other hand, they did not reveal any facts 
relevant to the thesis that were not known previously. 
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APPENDICES 
1) The report of the third session of the Committee to 
Study the New Constitution (September 26,1973), 
The report includes the first memorandum in which it is 
stated that the new Constitution: 
b) Must take into account a precept declaring that 
political parties which according to their stated 
objectives or the conduct of their followers run 
counter to the democratic system of government are 
contrary to the Constitution. Analogous 
dispositions are considered in the most modern 
constitutions of countries that have experienced 
this kind of emergency. Suffice it to quote as an 
example the German Constitution. Furthermore, 
individuals who promote the alteration of the 
democratic regime may not occupy public office, 
whether they enjoy popular representation or not. 
c) With respect to the other political parties, 
the Constitution should include general rules 
aimed at ensuring that their labours further 
subjects that are in pursuit of and inspired in 
the common good. In this sense, it should consider 
an express prohibition against e:.: tending their 
activities to public administration and elections 
taking place in labour unions, universities ar., i 
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educational institutions and in general to other 
analogous activities, establishing the appropriate 
sanctions. "' In the 6th session (October 9,1973) 
"... Mr. Ortüzar pointed out that according to the 
postulates and purposes manifested by the Junta, 
the Marxist parties should remain outside the law 
since they constitute illicit associations. With 
respect to the rest, it would be necessary to 
consider regulations that would force them to 
comply with their mission of protecting the public 
good by separating party influence from other 
activities of the Nation foreign to their field of 
endeavour. On October 23, in the ninth session, 
"Mr. Evans (... ) remarked that he considered it 
useful so as not to fall into negative statements 
to dispose that political parties should commit 
themselves ideologically to the rule of law and to 
the democratic and republican regime. " He 
proposed the following wording for that part of 
the memorandum. "Political parties should be 
organised and act according to principles of 
internal democracy established by law. They should 
maintain in their ideological description and in 
1 Up to this point, the Committee had been presided over by 
Enrique Ortüzar and included Sergio Diez, Jaime Guzman and Jorge 
Ovalle. The 6th session (October 9,1973) saw the inclusion of 
Enrique Evans, Gustavo Lorca and Alejandro Silva Bascunan. 
I&. 
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the conduct of their supporters, unrestricted ar. i 
permanent adherence to the democratic and 
republican system of government and to the 
principles and values that sustain the state 
dedicated to the rule of law. " 
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2) From an order from Pinochet to the cr: airma of the 
"Committee to Study the New Constitution, " Enrique 
Ortüzar, on November 10,1977: 
Paragraph h 
(for) the establishment of electoral systems that 
prevent political parties from becoming 
monopolistic conduits for citizen participation and 
gigantic power apparatuses that subordinate 
legislators to `party orders' imposed by small 
oligarchies that lead the parties without real 
title or responsibility at all, and dispose of 
large sums of money of unknown origin. 
The new constitutional and electoral regime 
should favour the existence of new forms of 
political groups understood as currents of opinion 
that prevail by virtue of the quality of their 
members and the seriousness of their doctrinal and 
practical proposals. Furthermore, it is imperative 
that basic requirements of suitability Ice 
established for those who aspire to public office. 
Paragraph n 
Preservation of intermediate bodies between the 
individual and the state, accor. g to the 
principle of subsidiarity is an irreplaceable 
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vehicle for social ýarticipatior: jr. a free 
community. This autonomy should extend only to + -he 
field appropriate and specific to The 
circumscription of reference, outside of which it 
would have no legitimacy. The above mentioned 
intermediary bodies must have institutionally 
legitimated means of communication with the source 
of political power. However, it is inadmissible in 
all cases that this be generated on the basis of 
the organs in question as mistakenly favoured by 
so-called corporativism. Since the state's specific 
mission is to protect the common good, that 
objective becomes impossible if a system is 
structured in which more powerful interest groups 
can impose themselves without control upon the 
weaker, or in which laws may be the fruit of simple 
arrangements between private interests. 
It is my opinion that it is necessary to prevent 
the intervention of future parliamentary 
representatives or political groups in the 
generation and functioning of gremialista, labcir, 
student, professional and neighbourhood 
associations, particularly including lacour or 
student conflicts. sanctions against those who 
transgress this prohibition should he precise 
drastic. 
N&I 
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In the same way, I consider i: basic to stsdy, 
rules of incompatibility that would make it 
impossible for gremial activities be confused with 
the political variety, or serve as a springboard 
for them. The use of gremial posts as a means to 
begin future political careers seriously prejudices 
the country and should be rejected out of hand by 
the new institutional system. 
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3a) Constitution of 1980, Article 8 
Any act of an individual or group aimed at 
propagating doctrines that attack the famil; -, 
propound violence or a concept of society, the state 
or the legal order, of a totalitarian nature or 
founded on the class struggle, is illegal and 
contrary to the institutional order of the Republic. 
Organizations, movements and political parties 
that by virtue of their aims or the activities of 
their adherents tend toward to those objectives are 
unconstitutional. 
It will be the duty of the Constitutional Tribunal 
to 1 udge infringements of the foregoing 
dispositions. 
Without prejudice to other sanctions established 
in the Constitution or by law, individuals who incur 
or who may have incurred in the violations indicated 
above, may not undertake public posts or functions 
whether of popular election or not for a period of 
ten years from the date of the Tribunal's decision. 
Nor can they be Rectors or Directors of educational 
institutions, nor can they exercise t eaching 
functions in them, nor exploit a medium of social 
communication or be Directors or admiristrtors o= 
the same, nor exercise functions related to the 
Ok., 
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broadcast or dissemination of opinions Cr 
information; nor can they be leaders of political 
organizations or organizations related to education 
or of a neighbourhood, 
entrepreneurial, labour union, 
professional, 
student or 
gremialista nature in general during that period. 
If persons such as those referred to above were at 
the time of the Tribunal's decision in possession of 
public employment or posts, whether or not of 
popular election, they shall lose them by law. 
Individuals sanctioned by virtue of this provision 
may not be rehabilitated during the period 
stipulated in paragraph four. 
The duration of the prohibitions contained in this 
article shall be doubled in case of recidivism. 
3b) Constitution of 1980, Article 19 
The Constitution assures all persons: (... ) The 
right of association without prior permission. To 
enjoy legal status, associations shall constitute 
themselves according to law. 
No one may be obliged to belong to an association. 
Associations contrary to morals, public order and 
the security of the state are prohibited. 
Political parties may not participate ir_ 
activities foreign to those for which they were 
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established, nor may they have an, privilege or 
monopoly on citizen participation. Their records and 
accounts shall be public; their sources of financing 
may not consist of funds, goods, donations, 
contributions or credits of foreign provenance. 
Their statutes shall obey the regulations assuring 
effective internal democracy. A constitutional law 
shall regulate all other matters concerning them and 
include the sanctions that shall be applied in the 
event of non-fulfilment of these precepts, among 
which their dissolution may be considered. 
Associations, movements, organizations and groups of 
individuals that pursue or carry out activities 
appropriate to political parties, without following 
the above regulations, are illegal and shall be 
sanctioned according to the above mentioned 
Constitutional law. 
bb-. 
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